International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS)

Vol. 11, No. 2, 2009

“Turks Abroad: Settlers, Citizens, Transnationals”
“Turks Abroad: Settlers, Citizens, Transnationals”

DIRECTOR OF PUBLICATION: PAUL DE GUCHTENIERE
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: MATTHIAS KOENIG
GUEST EDITORS: CHRISTINE INGLIS, SAMIM AKGÖNÜL, STÉPHANE DE TAPIA

CHRISTINE INGLIS, SAMIM AKGÖNÜL, AND STÉPHANE DE TAPIA,
TURKS ABROAD: SETTLERS, CITIZENS, TRANSMATIONALS — INTRODUCTION

KEMAL KIRİŞCI, A “THREE-WAY APPROACH” TO INCORPORATING
MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS IN THE EU: A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE

MICHAEL HUMPHREY, SECURITISATION AND DOMESTICATION OF
DIASPORA MUSLIMS AND ISLAM: TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN GERMANY AND
AUSTRALIA

SERGEI V. RYAZANTSEV, TURKISH COMMUNITIES IN THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION

JOEL WINDLE, “SOFT” AND “HARD” LANDINGS: THE EXPERIENCE OF
SCHOOL UNDER CONTRASTING INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN
AUSTRALIA AND FRANCE

MAURICE CRUL, EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS OF CHILDREN OF TURKISH
DESCENT IN THE NETHERLANDS

JENS SCHNEIDER, FROM “KANAK ATTACK” TO THE “GERKISH
GENERATION”: SECOND-GENERATION TURKISH NARRATIVES IN GERMAN
CULTURE AND POLITICS

LIZA HOPKINS, TURKISH TRANSMATIONAL MEDIA IN MELBOURNE: A
MIGRANT MEDIASCAPE

BANU ŞENAY, A “CONDITION OF HOMELESSNESS” OR A “STATE OF
DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS”? TURKISH MIGRANTS AND HOME-MAKING IN
AUSTRALIA
Celebrations and conferences to mark an anniversary of international migration are a rare occurrence. Noteworthy then are the series of recent events marking the 40th anniversaries of bilateral agreements enabling Turkish emigration to European countries and Australia. In the 1960s and 1970s emigrants from Turkey to Europe and Australia were widely seen as experiencing severe disadvantage which is often suggested as continuing down the generations and affecting current migrants and their children born and brought up outside Turkey. Paradoxically, the events celebrating the 40th anniversary of the bilateral migration agreements are largely the initiative of the immigrants and reflect their concerns to showcase their individual and community settlement experiences in a positive light. The celebrations therefore provide a symbolic timeline against which to revisit and re-evaluate the experiences of individual migrants, their incorporation into new societies and their ongoing relations with Turkey. More specifically, the similar timing and mechanisms involved in the mass emigrations from Turkey four decades ago to different destinations create a rare opportunity to examine the factors related to the similarities and differences observed in the way the Turkish population has been incorporated in various countries. In this way the Turkish case provides an opportunity to reflect on broader policy and theoretical issues associated with international migration and relations between societies in a globalising and transnational world where the movement of peoples is part of a wider flow of goods, services, resources and cultures that have affected both the source and receiving countries. Turkish academics and social researchers have produced a substantial body of knowledge, data and analysis on Turkish migration patterns. Now it is time to propose an assessment of five decades of research on migration and its consequences. The contributions to this issue will contribute to the work already done by Abadan-Unat (2006), İşduygulu and Şahin (2007) İşduygulu and Kirişiçi (2009) for Turkey and the world and by Kaya and Kentel (2005; 2008) for Germany, France and Belgium in Europe.

The challenge in comparative studies is that it is difficult to use the same terms for two different contexts such as Australia and Western Europe. While in English-speaking countries such as Australia and the United States, the term “Turks” is still used, in European studies of migration it is increasingly common to replace this term by periphrasis to designate the groups originating from Turkey. This is
because the word “Turk” has three different meanings depending on the circumstances. Legally, a Turk is a citizen of Turkey (Article 66 of the Turkish Constitution). In Europe there are more and more citizens of the country of residence so this signification is no longer appropriate. “Turk” also has a religious connotation: belonging to Sunni Islam or Alevism. The definition of identity in post-industrial countries such as France can no longer fit with this religious connotation. Finally, the ethnic signification is the strongest. In particular, Kurds, from Turkey and often with Turkish nationality, claim their “Kurdicity” and refuse to be identified as Turks. Therefore, in the European context, to use the term “people originating from Turkey” seems more appropriate. Many of the contributions to this issue, however, have adopted the English-speaking practice of using the term “Turkish”, but when it is used here it should be understood as including both those of diverse ethnicities from Turkey as well as those from other countries who identify themselves as “Turkish”.

This issue is largely based on papers presented at an international conference at the University of Sydney in October 2007 to mark the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Bilateral Migration Agreement between Australia and Turkey on the 5 October 1967. This was the last in a series of similar agreements which were signed between Turkey and Germany (1961, revised 1964), Austria (1964), Belgium (1964), the Netherlands (1964), France (1965) and Sweden (1967). In addition, social security agreements were also signed with the United Kingdom (1959), Switzerland (1969) and Denmark (1970) (Akgündüz 2008).

The timing of these agreements highlights the demand for labour which the Western European countries and Australia were experiencing as they reconstructed and developed their economies in the aftermath of the Second World War. This period also coincided with changes in Turkey where emigration became seen as contributing in diverse ways to national development, including the transfer of knowledge and skills necessary in a modernising economy, the obtaining of remittances benefiting families, regions and the nation and addressing concerns relating to un(der)employment (Akgündüz 2008).

Before considering the more detailed contributions to this issue it is important to understand something about the different destination countries which attracted immigrants from Turkey. Section 1 therefore briefly outlines some of the similarities and differences in the way these destination countries have viewed migration and its role in nation-building. How these approaches relate to the patterns of migration from Turkey and the contemporary issues affecting the

1 Funding for the conference Immigrants as Citizens: Transnationalism and Incorporation as Future Directions in Turkish Relations with Australia, Europe and North America was provided by the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship, the Foundation for Population, Migration and the Environment (Switzerland), the University of Sydney, the Community Relations Commission for a Multicultural New South Wales, the Innovative Universities EU Research Centre, the Turkfest Committee and Affinity Intercultural Foundation.
incorporation of Turks abroad will be discussed as a prelude to locating the contributors in relation to a number of themes taken up in more detail in Section 5.

1. The varied contexts for immigration from Turkey

Australia, together with other countries such as Canada and the United States, is often referred to as an immigrant nation where the state emphasises the importance of immigrants and immigration to its project of nation-building. This approach is then contrasted with nineteenth-century European nationalism where modern states were carved and constructed out of the ashes of older, ethnically diverse empires. Following from this distinction, immigrants in European countries are cast as marginal to nation-building, whereas in Australia the rhetoric puts them at the centre of the nation-building project.2

This is to oversimplify the European situation. In Western Europe, the discourse on the nation-building process depends on the time and country. In most Germanic countries where membership is based on blood, the contribution of immigration to nation-building has been denied for a long time. Since German reunification, and various migrations of Germanic people from Kazakhstan and elsewhere abroad, historians have begun to change this discourse of unity (on this evolution see Berger 1995). In France, on the contrary, immigration was viewed positively for decades until after 1970, when the discourse began on French pure identity with the motto “Being French is inherited or deserved” (être français, cela s’hérite ou cela se mérite) transformed the meaning of identity as being based on jus soli or birth in France. In response, many scholars starting in the 1990s tried to produce a discourse on a kind of “melting pot à la française” which underlined the importance of the migrants (see for example Tribalat 1995 or Noiriel 1992).

Despite the oversimplification in Australian rhetoric concerning the place of migrants in European nationalist discourse, it does provide a basis for understanding Australia’s long-established search for permanent immigrants. It also helps to account for the adoption of measures such as relatively easy access to Australian citizenship, to retain the immigrants and ensure their unproblematic incorporation into the fabric of Australian society. By the 1960s Australia had experienced two decades of a mass immigration programme initially intended to increase the population by 1 per cent a year. In order to achieve this target the government’s immigrant recruitment programmes, often involving assistance with fares, housing and finding work, had been extended beyond the United Kingdom to Western Europe, then Mediterranean countries including Greece, Italy and Spain and, by the mid-1960s, to Lebanon in the Middle East. For all these programmes, including that with Turkey, the Australian expectation was that the migrants would remain permanently in Australia. To encourage this, if they left within two years of their arrival, they were required to repay their subsidised fares. An indication of the

2 In doing so, the indigenous population was marginalised and there was a definite preference for immigrants of Anglo-Celtic backgrounds.
success of the immigration policy was that between 1947 and 1971 the Australian population increased 40 per cent, from 7.6 million to 12.7 million.

Initially all migrants were expected to become assimilated into Australia’s Anglo-Celtic society. After 1967, when the first assisted migrants and their families began to arrive from Turkey, the limitations of the assimilation policy for an increasingly diverse population were being recognised amidst calls to provide material support to new arrivals and recognise the importance of their non Anglo-Celtic heritage in settlement policies. By the 1970s this resulted in the adoption of the policy of multiculturalism with its recognition of the need to address both material and cultural disadvantage through reforming Australian institutions. As a group who, along with the recently arrived Lebanese and Vietnamese migrants, were viewed as particularly experiencing material disadvantage, the migrants from Turkey were early beneficiaries of these policy changes. They also benefited from the greater openness to cultural diversity resulting from the presence of earlier groups of non Anglo-Celtic migrants which encouraged the development of multicultural policies. This was especially important as the migrants from Turkey were the first major immigrant group from a Muslim background since the nineteenth century. A unique achievement is that the Turks have established their close connection to the 1915 military campaign on Turkey’s Gallipoli peninsula which is now one of the most potent symbols of Australian national identity. Australia and Turkey were enemies in the Gallipoli campaign in the First World War and for this reason early arrivals in Australia often experienced hostility. Despite this, and with the passage of time as Australians’ involvement in the Gallipoli campaign has become increasingly revered through the national ANZAC Day celebrations and its place in the school curriculum, the Turks have established their claim to be acknowledged as contributors to this process. This has been achieved through arguing that for both Australians and Turks Gallipoli is a key stage in the construction of their modern identities. For Australians this involves their distancing themselves from the former British colonial power, whereas for Turks it is because Atatürk’s successful military campaign was an important step on the way to the construction of the Turkish Republic.

As indicated above, in European countries where migrants from Turkey have settled, their place in debates about nation-building and national identity have been somewhat different. Similarly there have been differences in the policies affecting their settlement and incorporation, including in some cases those relating to gaining citizenship. The contribution of Turkish immigrants in the nation-building process of European countries is unique for several reasons related both to the context of the host country and the country of origin.

The Turkish emigration to Western Europe in the 1960s was viewed as provisional by three sides: by the host country (Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, etc.), by Turkey, and by the migrants themselves until the 1970s and even beyond. Therefore not only was the concept of assimilation considered irrelevant, but even the concept of integration has been considered useless, if not sometimes dangerous.
The fact that Turkey was never a colony of the host country; that Turkish society sees itself as the descendent of an empire; furthermore that the first Turkish migrants were drawn from the lower social classes; and, finally, the fact that the first migrants were foreigners to the culture (and language) of the host country, ensured that neither the host society nor the group from Turkey has felt the need for the emigrants from Turkey to participate in mainstream society. Also relevant is the solidarity linked to micro-geographical allegiances (those from the same village), familial solidarity (individuals of the same extended family who locate themselves and reproduce in the host city), ideological proximity (belonging to the same political group, same religious group and/or the same brotherhood) and of course ethnic belongings (especially among Kurds).

Note also that the Turkish authorities have always discouraged extensive interactions with the host society, fearing that the Turks in Europe would assimilate and lose their allegiance to Turkey, including obtaining the citizenship of the country of residence. However, over the past ten years there has been a change in tone in Turkey. Obtaining German (or French, Dutch, Belgian, etc.) nationality is no longer considered as a step in the loss of Turkish identity. That said, the identity framing of Turkey continues through the work of imams and teachers as well as through the export of cultural and material products. Under these conditions, although in practice multi-belonging has become an undeniable reality, in the discourse the view has persisted of exclusive belonging to Turkishness. This sustains alarmist discourses in the host society on “communitarianism”.

2. Migration from Turkey

Between 1967 and 1977, 22,165 men, women and children born in Turkey migrated to Australia, two-thirds of them as assisted migrants whose fares and initial settlement costs were paid by the Australian Government. When they arrived they found a small population of those with Turkish ancestry from Cyprus who had arrived soon after the end of the Second World War. There were also others from the Western Thrace area of northern Greece and Bulgaria, as well as some who had migrated via Germany and other Western European countries. Since the ending of assisted migration in the mid-1970s, annual migration from Turkey has continued at lower levels. Most have entered Australia on the basis of family reunion with a smaller number entering as skilled migrants or refugees. More recently there have been growing numbers of students from Turkey coming on a temporary basis to study in Australian universities and colleges. By 2006, when nearly one-quarter of Australia’s population were born overseas, the 30,489 who were born in Turkey were 0.2 per cent of the total population. Their ancestries reflect Turkey’s diverse population: 79 per cent stated they were Turkish, with Kurds (4 per cent), Armenians (3 per cent) and Greeks (2 per cent) also prominent among those born in Turkey. After four decades of settlement nearly half (47 per cent) of the 57,559 Australian residents who claim Turkish ancestry are second-, if not third-generation Australians.
Compared with Australia, immigrants from Turkey and those of Turkish ancestry are more numerous in many European countries most notably Germany, France or the Netherlands. Germany has the largest population with 1,738,831 Turkish migrants and more than 732,000 citizens of Turkish ancestry in 2006. Nevertheless, the country where Turks have been more accepted as new citizens is not France, but Belgium, with only 39,664 registered migrants and more than 87,000 citizens of Turkish ancestry. Belgium is more open to granting citizenship in relative terms, while Germany is ahead in absolute numbers. Nowadays, *jus sanguinis* (as in the German or Austrian cases) and *jus soli* (as in the French or Belgium cases) are not so different in application. However, after a period of greater civic and political openness towards granting immigrants rights in all European countries, it must be emphasised that we are now in an increasingly restrictive period common to all European countries, even in the most democratic regimes.

It is not so easy to find accurate statistics. European countries have common approaches, but lack the same data-collection systems. It is obvious that the Western European region has the most active and viable data-collection system in EuroStat. While sometimes shared with other parts of the world, as in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s annual *International Migration Outlook* SOPEMI, it does not cover all countries with the same reliability and validity. The United States and Canada data-collection systems are quite different and those of Eastern Europe, including the Russian Federation, are not at all precise.³ Turkey publishes a very interesting report, based on the data of each immigration country (for example, DIYI 2007), which is supported by the data from the Turkish Labour Office (Türkiye İş Kurumu) showing annual legal departure towards foreign countries.⁴

The total number of Turkish migrants and their children, most of them now citizens of European countries, is about 4 million living in Norway, Sweden and Finland in Northern Europe, Romania and Greece in South-Western Europe, with a majority residing in the Germany-France-Netherlands-Belgium-Switzerland area. The volume of Turkish migration towards Europe is higher if returnees and returning foreign-born generations are taken into account. In the German case, for example, more than 5 million Turkish migrants moved between 1961 and 1999 (3,528,850 registered arrivals and 2,334,261 departures). At the same time, 2,053,564 Turkish citizens and some 400,000–500,000 Turkish-born German citizens were living in Germany (ISOPLAN 2000). This shows the importance of studying the demographic stocks and flows with great care.

---

³ Stéphane de Tapia was in Baku (Azerbaijan) in April 2010. The Turkish data show that some 15,000 Turkish citizens are living in that country, where their presence is notably dense in Baku city as sellers or restaurant owners, But Azerbaijani statistics enumerate less than 100 entries a year.

⁴ See http://www.diyih.gov.tr and http://www.iskur.gov.tr. These websites are generally bilingual Turkish and English.
3. **Settling outside Turkey**

When Australia signed the bilateral migration agreement with Turkey it was assumed that the migrants from Turkey, like other post-war arrivals, would settle permanently. However, the Turkish Government and many of the immigrants initially viewed their stay in Australia as a temporary sojourn after which they would return to Turkey. This did not change until the 1980s as their children grew up in Australia and families accepted that the reality was that they would settle permanently in Australia. Once they perceived themselves not as sojourners but as settlers they began to more actively put down roots by buying houses and encouraging their children to concentrate on gaining educational qualifications rather than entering the workforce as early as possible (Elley 1985; İçduyuğ 1991). Once Turkey accepted dual citizenship they also rapidly adopted Australian citizenship. Now the rate of Australian citizenship among eligible migrants from Turkey (92.2 per cent) is far higher than for the total eligible foreign-born population (75.6 per cent) (Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2008).

Initially, Australia had hoped to recruit at least 30 per cent of skilled migrants from Turkey but, instead, found that those sent for interviews by the Turkish authorities were mainly unskilled workers, few of whom had any knowledge of English. In the early years of settlement they and their children were widely seen, alongside migrants who arrived in the same period from Lebanon and Viet Nam, as experiencing high levels of social and economic disadvantage. Low levels of educational qualifications and English together with high rates of unskilled factory employment, if not unemployment, were seen as typical of the Turkish experience of settlement. Since the 1980s the increasing migration of well-educated, English-speaking professionals and the coming of age of the Australian-born second generation have resulted in a major improvement in the socio-economic status of the Turkish population, although it is still slightly below the levels in the general population.

Accompanying the shift from being sojourners to settlers there was a growing sense among the Turks that they were becoming accepted within the wider Australian community, but this was disrupted by the first Gulf War which generated security concerns about Islam and Muslims in Australia. Following attacks in 2001 by terrorists in the United States, Europe and Asia, fears of Muslims have gained strength in Australia where they have also been associated with assertions that Islam is incompatible with Australian values. Hostility has not been directed primarily at those of Turkish background but, rather, towards Lebanese and other Arabic-speaking Muslims. However, many Turks have begun to question their identity and their acceptance as Australians. This questioning of identity in relation to being “Australian” coexists with a questioning of their identity as a “Turk”, especially among some Alevi and Kurds.

The Turkish population is itself heterogeneous and divided along often cross-cutting lines associated with political, ethnic, religious and geographical differences, which can make it difficult to achieve the united action often
associated with being a community. Thus, while the large Turkish population living in Melbourne was able to organise forty events over a two-year period to mark the 40th anniversary of migration from Turkey, the slightly smaller population who lived in Sydney were unable to match this level of organisation and cooperation although their financial and social resources differ little to those living in Melbourne.

Many of the divisions among the Australian Turks reflect divisions existing in society in Turkey. In many instances, developments in recent years facilitating travel and contacts between Australia and Turkey have provided opportunities for maintaining close and regular contacts that were unavailable to the early immigrants. Although these have done much to overcome the effects of the geographical distance separating Turkey and Australia, it is still more difficult for those living in Australia to maintain the same level of direct personal visits and meetings with relatives and friends in Turkey which are possible for those living in Europe.

Over four decades there has been a growth in the type of transnational linkages between Australia and Turkey, as well as other parts of the world where migrants from Turkey have settled. Initially these links were based on family and social ties. While business people with commercial links to Turkey are still relatively few, technological developments have certainly assisted in providing virtual, if not actual, links to Turkish society, thereby broadening the scope of transnational linkages beyond the individual’s immediate social or locality network. In more recent times, other important linkages involving educational and religious networks and institutions have become increasingly important. These are associated with both the government’s Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (DİTİB) inaugurated in 1983 within the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, and other organisations including Millî Görüş and groups associated with Fethullah Gülen. These provide for many in Australia a further, tangible, way through which they can be connected to particular sections of Turkish society and culture, whether in Turkey or internationally.

This collection of papers aims to highlight the similarities and differences between people of Turkish origin living in Europe and Australia. The common feature of these populations is of course their geographical origin and their sense of identity. Can we therefore speak of a “Turkish Diaspora”? It depends on the definition of the concept of “diaspora”. Most of these definitions remain related to the Jewish Diaspora. According to William Safran (1991) a diasporic group has to have a traumatic history of dispersal, common myths and collective memory, an idea of alienation, a collective strong desire to “return”, an unshakeable support of the homeland, and a collective identity. According to this definition, it is difficult to characterise Turks abroad as a diaspora in so far as there is not a commonly remembered traumatic history of dispersal. According to Robin Cohen (1997) a group can qualify as a diaspora where there is:
− dispersal from an original homeland;
− the possibility of expansion;
− a collective memory;
− a collective commitment to the homeland’s prosperity;
− the development of a return movement;
− a strong ethnic group consciousness;
− a troubled relationship with host societies;
− a sense of empathy and solidarity;
− a distinctive life in host countries.

Here the definition still remains too restrictive to define the Turks as belonging to a diaspora. Kim Butler’s looser definition of a “diaspora” based on four explanatory factors is broad enough to include Turks (Butler 2001: 189). This minimalist definition of diaspora requires at least two destinations, a kind of relationship to homeland (whether involving support or conflict), self-awareness and a time factor of at least two generations.

Elements of this minimalist definition do however apply to the Turkish case. In particular, their commercial networks constitute diasporic forms of self-organisation. The Turkish Studies Centre in Germany is one of the rare research centres studying social and economical inputs of the Turkish migrants’ business in global terms. It demonstrates for example that in 2002, some 82,300 Turkish enterprises (61,300 in Germany) were working all around Europe. Employment data were 411,000 in the whole of Europe, including 350,000 in Germany. The majority of these enterprises and companies are small or even micro-scale including taxi-drivers, doner kebab take-away shops, fruit and vegetable markets. But some are now middle or large-scale industries or services in the textile and garment industry, the food sectors of milk and meat products, or tourism agencies with air companies, such as Marmara in France or Onur Air in Germany. Some businessmen like Kemal Şahin (textile and garment manufacturing) and Vural Öger (tourism) have gained important positions in Germany. The first created more than 11,000 jobs; the second was counsellor in the German Government of Bundeskanzler Schroeder as “Mr Integration”. In comparison to the American definition of ethnic business, the Turkish origin enterprises are often said to be helâl business. This is because of their Islamic orientation as they produce halal meat products, women’s religiously approved garments and conform to prohibitions relating to alcoholic beverages and the consumption of pork. In practice the situation is not so clear. The Turkish business world is very rich and varied. The self-organisation trends, ties and networks connecting Turkish markets and producers mean that some businessmen are both producers in Turkey and sellers in Western Europe. The integration of international logistic and transport systems between the United Kingdom and China, with their hub centralised on Turkey, is another example that fits the Turks within the model of a diaspora. It is very exciting to observe similar forms of Turkish enterprises in such different cities as Paris, Berlin, Sydney, Almaty or Baku, and to eat doner kebab in all these parts.
of the world! It shows how the Turks can be agents of globalisation, to use the perspective of the French sociologist Alain Tarrius (2002).

4. Perspectives from the contributions to this issue

The contemporary importance of governments in the migration and settlement of peoples is well illustrated in the case of migration from Turkey, where bilateral agreements between states provided the institutional arrangements for the initial migration in the 1960s. More recently, the growing influence of European Union policy-making on Member States and Turkey’s application for membership add an additional layer of government which has the ability to significantly affect those living in Europe. Three contributors to this issue provide more detailed commentary highlighting how the role of states contributes to the processes of migration and settlement. In the first paper, Kemal Kirişci discusses the role of governments in the process of incorporation and integration. As he shows, the European Union has now formally moved beyond a focus on one-way integration where the responsibility for change lies with the immigrants, to a two-way process in which the receiving government also has an active and supportive role to play. In practice, however, there is often considerable variation about the extent to which the state plays this positive role. He then argues for extending responsibilities and contributions towards the settlement of immigrants to a third party – the government and society from which the immigrant has come. To support the value of this approach he provides specific examples from Turkey. These illustrate the benefits that can be derived from using the knowledge and expertise of the country of origin to work with the destination country to facilitate the incorporation of the immigrant population.

Over the last decade, growing governmental concerns about the ways in which migration may be linked to terrorism and a danger to domestic security have had a particular impact on countries with Muslim populations. Germany and Australia are no exception, as Michael Humphrey highlights in his paper. He compares the policies developed by the German and Australian governments to address potential threats posed by their Muslim immigrant communities and, in particular, by those who have migrated from Turkey. As he shows, despite the Turkish Government having the same institutional structures involving the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) formally overseeing the religious aspects of Turkish emigrants, the outcomes in the two countries have been somewhat different. This is because, unlike in Germany, the Turks in Australia are not the major immigrant background population. Nor are they even the largest group of Muslims as those born in Turkey (7 per cent) are outnumbered by those born in Lebanon (10 per cent) although many of their children are among the 41 per cent of Muslims born in Australia. At issue of course is how these government policies impact on individuals from Turkish migrant backgrounds. Humphrey argues that differences between Germany and Australia relate primarily to the specific role of the state in the recruitment of Turkish immigrants as workers and the relative
dominance and public perception of Turks as constituting the face of Islam in both countries.

The paper by Sergei Ryazantsev provides information about the hitherto little-studied Russian Turkish community. As he shows, it is important to distinguish two separate and disconnected Turkish communities in Russia; that involving recent Turkish labour migrants and the much longer-established community of Meskhetian Turks whose origins are in the Meskhetian region of Georgia. In 1944 the latter were resettled in the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union but have now become internal refugees following its breakup. The Russian case brings into sharp relief the importance and complexities surrounding the definition of who is a “Turk” through illustrating its effect on Russian census data and, more broadly, on state policy-making. The Russian example is also a reminder of the way in which the breakup of empires (in this case the Ottoman Empire and the Soviet Union) and the processes of globalisation have ongoing effects on the growth and circumstances of minority communities.

Education has long been seen as one of the crucial areas affecting minority incorporation, not least because of its importance for participation in the labour market. With the second generation now becoming an increasingly important segment of Turkish migrant communities, their participation in education is widely seen as a litmus test for the effectiveness of policies of integration and incorporation (Crul and Vermeulen 2003). Joel Windle’s comparative analysis of the educational outcomes and attitudes of students of Turkish background in France and Australia provides insights into the compounding effect of government policies towards settlement and citizenship on student outcomes when they are combined with specific educational policies, structures and practices. More specifically, whereas in France Turkish-background youth acquire a sense of failure and marginalisation in Australia, Windle argues, there is a maintenance of “dreams” associated with higher levels of tertiary participation.

The importance of education for other areas of social life and incorporation underlies Maurice Crul’s examination of the extent of intergenerational educational mobility evident among young people of Turkish background. Although they are not yet on a par with the Dutch background population, he shows that there have been major improvements in educational outcomes. Instead of the usual focus on governmental policies, Crul argues that one key factor in these changes involves a changed attitude in the Turkish community towards the importance of education for girls as well as for boys. Not only is this linked to the experiences of the earlier settlers but the growing realisation that the Netherlands rather than Turkey will be their permanent “home”. This parallels similar patterns noted above in Australia after the 1980s.

The necessity of appreciating the evolutionary and generational changes occurring within Turkish communities is illustrated by Jens Schneider. His analysis shows how the cultural and artistic expression from succeeding “generations” of young
people of Turkish background in Germany reflect their changing circumstances as well as their relationship to Germany and Turkey. Through the use of the artistic and cultural productions of Turkish-background youth in Germany he provides a fascinating window into the changing nature and content of “Turkish” identity among young people growing up and living in Germany. He also highlights the complex and dynamic processes involved in the process of ethnic identity production.

The recent technological advances associated with the internet and World Wide Web have enhanced the long-standing role of the media as a force in the construction of identity and links across national borders. Liza Hopkins’ contribution examines the part played by the Turkish-language media in the lives of communities in Europe and, particularly, in Australia. She describes how in Australia the local as well as Turkish-produced media have developed in a way that has created opportunities for more diverse information to be transmitted. This can allow a more contemporary and nuanced appreciation of developments in Turkey. She also argues that it can contribute to a more diverse representation and construction of individuals’ personal identity.

Constructions of identity are not only complex and change over time but they also vary depending on which dimension of experience are being examined. One key experience for those from recent immigrant backgrounds is related to the affective links they maintain with “home”. Banu Şenay shows in her contribution the complex manner in which this is envisaged and experienced by settlers in Sydney. These settlers’ view of “home” contains a multilocal focus which also involves an important situational dimension depending on the physical location of the individual and their recent experiences. What is evident from Şenay’s analysis is that over time, and also as a result of particular events such as a mother’s visit to Australia, the sense of “home” changes. What was initially a rather distant and “uncomfortable” sense of Australia constituting a “home” appreciated for its physical and material attributes, can be replaced by a more positive sense of attachment and belonging.

5. Going forward

In Europe, unlike in Australia, Turkish emigration has been widely studied, sometimes from a comparative perspective. Yet as the contributions to this issue show, many factors which are now current call for a more detailed examination taking into account the international and local changes that have occurred over four decades.

When considered in their totality, the present collection of papers examining how Turks have been incorporated in countries abroad highlights the considerable diversity which exists both within countries over time and, also, between countries. To speak of a homogeneous “Turkish” community in any of the countries examined is to seriously misrepresent the situation and to risk the creation of
stereotypes in a manner which is particularly unhelpful in the current climate where fears surrounding migrants, and those of Muslim backgrounds, are contributing to marginalisation. While there is evidence suggesting that those living in Australia have been incorporated as settlers and citizens in a more positive manner than in many parts of Europe, to explain this by referring to the state policies of multiculturalism and its historical heritage as a nation of “immigrants” is overly simple. Geographical distance, the scale of immigration from Turkey and the institutional structures associated with social mobility all need to be considered in seeking an explanation.

Another factor which has received little attention in this issue concerns the transnational linkages and networks involving those in Australia and Europe. Nevertheless, the transnational paradigm with its recognition that national boundaries are porous and that international mobility, even for those who are settlers and citizens of a particular country, can be frequent and complex, is an important dimension which also needs to be addressed in seeking an understanding of the contemporary situation among Turks living abroad. One of the major debates surrounding the transnational paradigm concerns its impact on the loyalty and incorporation of migrant minorities, particularly from the perspective of their new countries of residence. Evidence suggests that populations of Turkish background living outside Turkey maintain a high level of transnational contacts. Thus as well as settlers and citizens they also are transnationals. In some cases it has even been suggested that these transnational ties are of such density and strength that the groups have simply “recreated” their own locality-based communities abroad. Perhaps more common are cases where the transnational ties are with the modern sectors of the Turkish nation or society.

The significance of the contemporary Turkish case is that it addresses the important question of how these ties are integrated into individuals’ daily lives. Do they undermine, as some would argue, individuals’ loyalty to their country of residence? Or, rather than seeing loyalty and cultural knowledge and skills as a zero sum, does the Turkish experience highlight the ability of individuals to move beyond a narrow, particularistic view of their social attachments and identity? If so, what are the preconditions for achieving such outcomes? How are they affected by experiences of social and economic marginalisation and disadvantage?

References


Turks Abroad: Settlers, Citizens, Transnationals – Introduction


About the authors

Christine Inglis, a sociologist, is director of the Multicultural and Migration Research Centre at the University of Sydney (Australia). She has written about Turkish migration to Australia since the early 1980s and is currently writing the history of Turkish migration and incorporation in Victoria. E-mail: christine.inglis@sydney.edu.au

Samim Akgönül is a historian and political scientist, associate professor at Strasbourg University and a researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS). He is working mainly on minorities, more precisely on non-Muslim minorities in Turkey, Muslim minorities in the Balkans and new Turkish minorities in Western Europe. E-mail: akgonul@unistra.fr
Stéphane de Tapia is a geographer working with the CNRS “Cultures and Societies in Europe” programme linked to Strasbourg University. As a lecturer, he covers the human and social geography of Turkey and the Central Asia Turkic Republics. He has written books and articles about Turkish migration towards European countries, emphasising the circulation patterns in the migration. He is currently working on the Turkish migrations towards Azerbaijan and Central Asia. E-mail: stephane.detapia@misha.fr
A “Three-Way Approach” to Incorporating Muslim Immigrants in the EU: A Turkish Perspective

KEMAL KIRSCI

Transatlantic Academy and Boğaziçi University

The European Commission has made a tremendous effort to get Member States to accept the notion of a “two-way approach” to the integration of immigrants. However, this paper shows how this “two-way” approach needs to be supplemented by a “three-way” approach to meet the challenges associated with the incorporation of Muslim immigrants in particular. This would, where possible, engage and make use of the experiences of the sending country to assist receiving countries in achieving a better incorporation of immigrants. Traditionally, sending countries have been seen as part of the integration problem associated with immigrants, and partnerships with third countries have been largely framed to prevent or control unwanted migration. The three-way approach would simply mean that the EU would create possibilities for European governmental and non-governmental agencies to exchange views on how some of the “integration” problems might best be addressed. Subsequently, it would be up to Member States and EU institutions to put these ideas into practice. What form might a three-way approach to integration take and in what specific ways might a sending country be able to play a constructive role? The answer to these two questions is explored by looking at the case of Turkey.

In recent years the issue of the incorporation of immigrants, especially from Muslim countries, has come to dominate the agendas of a number of European Union (EU) Member States as well as the institutions of the EU. It has also been receiving growing attention in academia as well as policy-oriented research centres.
(Cesari 2004; Kastoryano 2004; Kaya 2009; Laurance and Strum 2008; Laurance and Vaisse 2006; Masci 2005; Maussen 2007). An estimated 15 million Muslims lived in various countries of the EU before the 2004 enlargement (Cesari 2004: App. I). While some have become citizens of the respective countries in which they are resident, many continue to hold the status of third-country nationals. Although there are large numbers of Muslims, current or former immigrants, who have integrated and in some cases even assimilated into their host societies, there are also those who remain outside mainstream life. Poor labour market integration accompanied with low levels of education is often associated with these migrants as well as their descendants. Certain practices ranging from domestic violence against women, forced marriages, religious radicalism to the denial of schooling to young girls are seen by host societies as cultural characteristics contributing to the failure of these immigrants to integrate. The emergence and concentration of Muslim immigrant communities in major European cities have also rendered the integration “problem” more conspicuous.

The “problem” is increasingly linked to “security” in the narrowest sense of the word too. The 9/11 attacks on the United States have been linked to the radical nature of the “Muslimness” of the perpetrators and their failure to integrate (Guild 2003; Brouwer 2003; Monar 2002), as have subsequent major terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, as well as crimes such as the dramatic assassination of the Dutch film-maker Van Gogh. The fact that most of the perpetrators were residents of EU countries and some were actually EU citizens led many to see the presence of Muslim immigrants through the prism of security (Sendagorta 2005). Yet, at the same time there is also a recognition that the rise of anti-immigration or anti-immigrant feelings accompanied by Islamophobia in many host societies risks threatening the very liberal values that constitute the basis of the European Union. A European Parliament Resolution in 2006 addressing the issue of immigrant integration in the EU openly raises the danger of “fear among citizens subverting respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” (European Parliament 2006: para. G).

These developments have coincided with the efforts of the EU to develop common migration policies (Geddes 2007). 2009 is the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Tampere Programme in October 1999, which aspired to put into place a first generation of EU common asylum and visa policies by 2004, and also to start addressing broader migration issues such as illegal migration (European Council 1999). Subsequently, the EU Council in November 2004 endorsed the Hague Programme. This programme identified a set of policy priorities in respect of the

---

1 Immigration issues until the Maastricht Treaty (1993) remained strictly in the realm of national sovereignty. However, in the course of the last decade many immigration-related issues such as asylum, combating illegal migration, and management of visa policies have been moved to community level. Since 2004, the European Commission has acquired the right to prepare legislation and take legislative initiative in these areas. The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) has also provided for the possibility of co-decision and qualified majority procedures to be adopted.
creation of an area of “justice, freedom and security” in the EU. These priorities among others envisaged the need to better integrate third-country nationals in Member States as well as introduce an “external dimension of asylum and migration”. The latter also called for partnerships with third countries to enhance the effectiveness of the EU emerging common migration policy.

The issue of immigration into EU Member States and their incorporation remains in the purview of national sovereignty with only a limited role envisaged for the institutions of the EU. Nevertheless, at the EU level a set of modest principles and programmes has been developed to guide the integration policies of Member States. Central to these principles is the notion that integration has to be a “two-way process”. It is based on the idea that a successful policy inevitably has to view the integration exercise as a process that engages both the immigrant and the host society. In this regard a critical development occurred when the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council adopted, in November 2004, a set of Common Basic Principles (CBPs) to guide the integration policies of Member States (European Commission 2005a). This was followed by the adoption of A Common Agenda for Integration, which listed integration as being a two-way process at the top of eleven CBPs (European Commission 2005b). In turn this culminated in a major surge of activities in addressing the issue of integration of third-country nationals in the EU. The Commission prepares annual reports on migration and integration and has also prepared two editions of a Handbook on Integration to offer guidance for Member States in formulating and implementing their respective integration policies (Niessen and Schibel 2004). More importantly in April 2007 the EU established a modest fund to support projects for the integration of third-country nationals (European Commission 2007b). This was followed by the establishment of the European Web Site on Integration and the European Integration Forum as well as the holding of a conference on intercultural dialogue. These two programmes and the conference aimed to increase dialogue among EU Member State policy-makers and experts as well as engage EU civil society.

This paper shows how this “two-way” approach needs to be supplemented by a “three-way” approach to assist Member States to meet the challenges associated with the incorporation of especially Muslim immigrants. This would be an approach that would, where possible, engage and make use of the experiences of the sending country to assist receiving countries in achieving a better incorporation of immigrants. Traditionally, sending countries have often been seen as part of the integration problem associated with immigrants (Ostergaard-Nielson 2003: 3). Hence not surprisingly little allowance is made for the idea that sending countries could have a role to play. Instead, the current EU policy of partnerships with third countries limits their role to preventing and controlling unwanted migration into the EU geography. Three types of partnerships are envisaged.

---

The first type of partnership concerns the “management of migration” into third countries. These are countries from where migration to the EU occurs in the form of direct, legal or illegal migration of nationals or in the form of transit migration of asylum seekers or illegal migrants. The European Commission Communication on The Global Approach to Migration One Year On, for example, identifies “Romania, Morocco, Bulgaria, Turkey, Ukraine and Russia” as countries from where “most important flows” originated in 2004 (European Commission 2006: 2). The list of course is not limited to these countries, and other EU documents make reference to Asian countries such as China, as well as African countries. The partnership is envisaged in the form of agreements involving return procedures, conclusion of readmission agreements, combating human smuggling and enhancing border control of these countries. The fourth priority of the Hague Programme lays out the contours of such partnerships (European Commission 2005a: 8–9).

The second area of partnership envisaged by the EU is in the context of linking migration and development. There has long been a recognition that development does lead to rural to urban migration and then also to emigration (Massey et al. 1998). However, more recently, considerable effort has been mobilised, notably in policy circles, so as to develop ideas and policy instruments that may achieve the reverse effect. Development has come to be seen as a means to partly transform emigration countries, reducing, and preferably preventing unwanted migration into affluent countries (Duffield 2001; GCIM 2005; Widgren and Martin 2002). The European Commission in its Migration and Development Communication develops a series of policy-oriented ideas to assist development in countries of origin and especially the contribution of members from migrant communities (European Commission 2005c). It offers the possibility of “helping developing countries map their diasporas and build links with them”, facilitating “return migration” and mitigating “the adverse effect of brain drain” as well as foster “institutional partnerships” (European Commission 2005c: 5, 7–8). The Communication elaborates on these measures in an Annex.

The third area of partnership, which is least developed but increasingly highlighted, is legal economic migration. This is a particularly sensitive area as admission of economic migrants remains under the competence of Member States. However, the Hague Programme does call for the need to address the issue at EU level and encourages the European Commission to initiate a debate on economic migration into the EU. In this regard the Commission adopted a Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration so as to lead this debate and develop policy recommendations (European Commission 2005d). This has subsequently led to the adoption of the Communication on Policy Plan on Legal Migration that constituted the first step to prepare proposals for directives to govern legal migration (European Commission 2005e). The EU hopes in this area to address two objectives: on the one hand the consequences of a declining population in most EU Member States and hence the need for labour, and on the other the “fight against illegal immigration and employment, including trafficking” (European
A “Three-Way Approach” to Muslim Immigrants in the EU

Commission 2005e: 4). The Communication on circular migration tries to meet both objectives by introducing the notion of “mobility partnerships” (European Commission 2007a). However, a close reading of the Communication reveals that once more “control and security” concerns shape the motivation behind EU efforts. The Communication notes that circular migration will be made available in accordance with “the level of commitments which the third country is ready to take on in terms of action against illegal migration and facilitating reintegration of returnees, including efforts to provide returnees with employment opportunities” (European Commission 2007a: 3).

Beyond the concern and emphasis put on “control”, what is also very striking and quite conspicuous is how in the conceptualisation of these partnerships the role of third countries remains framed as a passive one. Hence for this reason the EU policies may carry little credibility with third countries and prospects for “genuine partnerships” may remain as just rhetoric (Collett 2007: 4). The attitude of treating countries of origin as passive becomes even more conspicuous in the case of the “integration and incorporation” of third-country nationals and migrants from outside Europe. In stark contrast to the above three partnerships in respect to “integration” no form of “partnership” is actually envisaged, and the notion is completely missing in related EU documents. Similarly, none of the rich set of events and activities associated with the European Web Site on Integration and the European Integration Forum as well as the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008 appears to engage sending countries. Similarly, the long-awaited recommendations of the High Level Group on the Social Integration of Ethnic Minorities and their Full Access to the Labour Market did not envisage any engagement of sending countries or the notion of a “three-way approach” (ENAR 2007). This situation repeated itself during two ministerial conferences on integration in June 2007 and November 2008 held respectively in Potsdam and Vichy. This is not surprising considering that the Commission in its Report to the 2008 Ministerial Conference on Integration did not include a role for sending countries among the ideas and recommendations it formulated (European Commission 2008).

The idea that academics, non-governmental organisations, let alone governmental institutions and officials from third countries, may actually have something to contribute to the efforts in EU Member States so as to better integrate their nationals or former nationals into mainstream life is completely absent in EU thinking on this issue. In the following section I propose that the European Commission ought to promote the idea that the “two-way approach” be expanded to a “three-way approach”. This would simply mean that the EU would create possibilities for European actors, governmental and non-governmental, to interact and exchange views on how some of the “integration” problems might best be addressed and may be solved. Subsequently, it would be up to Member States and EU institutions to decide whether these ideas are actually put into practice. In the meantime the three-way approach would open the way to a much more balanced and fulfilling dialogue between the host country, the immigrants, and the country
of origin that could indeed foster circumstances for a “win-win” outcome. The benefits would not be only restricted to the “integration” aspect of the migration agenda, but would spill over into the issues of the “management of migration flows”, “migration and development” as well as “legal migration”. This would also be closer to the spirit and letter of the notion of a “global and comprehensive approach”. Lastly, it would also contribute to confidence-building between sending and host countries as well as between host countries and their immigrant communities.

What form might a three-way approach to integration take and in what specific ways might a sending country be able to play a constructive role? The answer to these two questions is explored by looking at the case of Turkey, which is pertinent to explaining the importance of the idea of a three-way approach to integration for a number of reasons. First, the immigrant community in Europe that has its origins in Turkey is one of the largest. Second, among the Muslim sending countries, Turkey is the one that has the closest and longest-standing relations with some of the leading immigrant receiving countries of Europe. Furthermore, Turkey is engaged with the European Union in an accession process that is supposed to lead to membership, and hence one should expect a “deeper and more balanced” dialogue between Turkey and the EU on migration. Third, “integration” problems – or at least some of them – that Turkish immigrant communities in Europe face are symptomatic of problems across other immigrant communities from Muslim countries. Finally, the engagement of Turkey by the EU as a candidate country since December 1999 precipitated important reforms and changes in the country. There is now a lively civil society that partly deals or tries to address social problems somewhat similar to the ones found among Turkish immigrant communities in Europe. These problems range from the issue of domestic violence against women, honour killings, forced marriages and the need to improve the schooling of girls, especially in eastern parts of the country, to education in general. The Turkish state has also been transformed to an important extent. There is much more cooperation between civil society, domestic as well as international, and government agencies in addressing social and political problems. More importantly, the current government is much more open to the idea of addressing the “integration” problems of Turkish immigrant communities in Europe. Both Premier Tayip Erdoğan as well as the current President Abdullah Gül, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, have on numerous occasions called upon Turkish immigrants to make a greater effort to “integrate” during their visits to EU Member States and especially to Germany by, for example, learning the local language and becoming socially and politically active in the host societies (“Başbakan’dan AB’ye önemli çağrı” 2005). Less than a decade ago this would have not been usual, and the fact that this is advocated by a government that has an Islamist background lends it additional significance.
1. The Turkish case

The presence of almost 3.5 million Turks, including naturalised ones, in Europe has deeply marked European politics and social life (İçduyuğ and Kirişci 2009). Many in Europe have highlighted the failure of Turkish immigrants to integrate into their host societies and have also used this to resist Turkey’s EU membership prospects. It is true that Turkish immigrants experience high levels of unemployment and many Turkish immigrant youth perform poorly at school. Arranged marriages and the serious problem of honour killings adversely affect public perceptions of Turkish immigrants. In parallel to the developments in Turkey, religion has also come to play an increasingly prominent role in the associational lives of many Turkish migrants. The Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs), the Turkish national bureaucracy of religious affairs, which had previously dominated the religious lives of immigrant communities, was increasingly challenged by Milli Görüş (National Vision), an immigrant organisation with very close ties to political Islam in Turkey (Avcı 2005; Yurdakul and Yukleyen 2009). For a long time Turkish immigrant civil society was organised very much around events and politics in Turkey rather than those of host communities. This situation is changing as Turkish immigrants are becoming increasingly involved in local and national politics in the countries where they live (Yurdakul 2006; Michin and Vermeulen 2009). This of course has very important implications in terms of the integration process as well as the immigrant communities’ relations with the host state as well as Turkey.

The problems of integration that Turkish immigrants face are complicated and diverse (Erzan and Kirişci 2008). First, just as there are many unemployed and poorly integrated Turkish immigrants in Europe, there are also Turkish immigrants who have fared well in their host countries, including Turkish businessmen who actually employ locals and other immigrants in their businesses (Abadan-Unat 2002; Kaya and Kentel 2005). Some of these immigrants have actually become major public figures and politicians at the local, national as well as at the European Parliament level. On the other hand, the absence of an environment that can be of assistance to addressing the challenges that immigrants face has long been a reason that has aggravated the problem of integration. Many European governments until recently failed to acknowledge that they had become immigration countries. Many also shied away from adopting active policies to support the integration of immigrants. Anti-immigrant politics and racism remain major challenges. Against this background this section explores activities in three different but related areas in Turkey that could benefit “integration” efforts in the EU.

The first area relates to ensuring and promoting women’s rights in Turkey. Turkey was one of the first countries in Europe, well before France for example, to grant women the right to vote. Women have also enjoyed rights since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 that women in many other, especially Muslim, countries lack to this day. However, there are still problems, especially in respect of the actual practice and implementation of these rights (Arat 2008). Domestic violence against women and especially honour killings is a particularly serious
problem in Turkey. However, numerous Turkish non-governmental organisations together with international agencies such as the United Nations Population Fund and government agencies, especially the General Directorate on the status of women, have been engaged in numerous programmes and campaigns (Altunay and Arat 2007). Each and every one of these campaigns and programmes is a reflection of the tremendous experience that is being accumulated in this area in Turkey. Still, the most striking one is the campaign launched to educate young Turkish conscripts about women’s rights. The campaign involves cooperation between the government, the military and various national and international civil society agencies (Tamer 2006). This campaign gains particular significance when one bears in mind how relations between the government and the military have traditionally not always been positive. Ironically, a government that is suspected by the military to have a hidden Islamist agenda and to be dominated by men has been able to develop such a campaign with the military, a male organisation par excellence.

The case of KAMER is also particularly interesting. KAMER is a non-governmental organisation based in Diyarbakır and active on the subject since the mid-1990s in a particularly difficult region of Turkey where violence against women and especially honour killings are endemic (Gambetti 2005). KAMER representatives have had to struggle with deep-seated prejudice and customs against women in Kurdish society, as well as face the resistance of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), the Kurdish nationalist separatist group, whose members frequently argue that the time was not ripe for women’s rights and that priority should be given for the right to self-determination. Surely the members of KAMER, who operate under such difficult circumstances, would have an important experience to share in respect to “integration” problems in Europe. However, a member of KAMER told how she had been invited to Europe to address the problems of immigrants only twice.³ On the occasion of her visit to Sweden, she had the distinct impression that her Swedish counterparts seemed very open and willing to benefit from her experience. Yet her experience in Holland was very different, and her hosts seemed much more interested on that occasion to hear from her how Kurdish immigrants could be encouraged to return to Turkey rather than learn from her knowledge about how to promote women’s rights among immigrants.

Relating to the prevention of domestic violence, it was actually a Turkish daily Hürriyet, widely read by the Turkish immigrant community in Europe too, that came closest to putting the idea of a three-way approach into practice. Hürriyet ran a series of conferences and meetings in Germany as part of a campaign it launched under the heading of Aile İçi Şiddete Son! (End to Domestic Violence Within the Family!) directed at the Turkish immigrant community. One of the meetings was attended by Maria Bühmer, the German minister of state responsible for migration and integration. It is interesting that at this meeting the minister chose to note that

³ Interview held in Diyarbakar on 2 November 2006.
“out of every four German women one is subject to domestic violence” and welcomed the campaign. Her Turkish counterpart, Nimet Çubukçu, minister of state responsible for women and family affairs, in her speech stressed that she was ready to support efforts to learn from each other (Hürriyet 2006: 6). A prominent Turkish female journalist reported the remarks of Walter Momper, Speaker of the Berlin State Parliament, who maintained that he was impressed to see Turkish public opinion take an interest in the problems of the West. The journalist clearly sensed the potential for a three-way approach as she herself observed that Turkey had owned up to a problem existing in Europe with this campaign (Benmayor 2006).

A second area in which Turkey has developed considerable governmental and civil society experience lies in increasing the rate of schooling among girls. In 2003, the newly elected government launched a campaign called Haydi Kızlar Okula! (Off to School, Girls!) led by the Ministry of Education in cooperation with UNICEF. The campaign focused particularly on the eastern provinces of Turkey and aimed at persuading parents to send their girls to school. Of the more than 270,000 unregistered girls, the campaign succeeded in getting more than 80 per cent of them to register and regularly attend school. The campaign also attracted the support of civil society. A number of non-governmental organisations with long-standing experience in education became involved, such as the Foundation for Contemporary Education (Çağdaş Eğitim Vakfı), a staunch supporter of women’s rights as well as a secular way of life. Furthermore, the prominent Turkish daily Milliyet started its own campaign called Baba Beni Okula Gönder (Daddy Do Send Me to School) in 2005 to mobilise both public as well as financial support for government efforts. At first sight, this experience may not be directly relevant to the problems of Turkish immigrants. However, if one considers that through family reunification a considerable number of poorly educated brides join the Turkish immigrant community in Europe, the case may be different. Educational projects directed towards new brides, and especially their children, could surely make a contribution to the broader effort to ensure better incorporation of Turkish immigrants into mainstream life. In this context, the experience of the Turkish Ministry of Education as well as civil society could be put to good use. One example is the experience of the Mother Child Education Foundation (AÇEV) from Istanbul which is a large, long-standing non-governmental organisation founded in the early 1990s. It advocates the idea that it is crucial to the development of children to start education as early as possible. AÇEV currently works very closely with the Ministry of Education and has a well-deserved reputation in Turkey as well as outside, especially in the United States. This experience, for example, could assist the German authorities to design policies to help Turkish immigrant children to achieve better educationally. This would at least increase the chances of these children becoming employable and integrating better as adults into day-to-day German life. However, Ciğdem Kağıtçıbaşı, a

---

4 Details about the campaign can be reached at www.haydikizlarokula.org.
5 Details about the campaign can be reached at www.bababeniokulagonder.org.
A third area has to do with the fact that Turkey faces its own “integration” problems resulting from the massive internal migration that has taken place over the last decade from rural areas into urban centres. This has led to a growth in the population of major urban centres such as Antalya, Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, where migrants have had difficulty in adjusting to often very Western ways of life. Honour killings and domestic violence against women are partly the expression of a failure to adjust or “integrate”. There are numerous projects that try to address the integration problems of recent migrants from rural parts of Turkey. Some of the “integration” problems do not seem very different to the ones that some Turkish immigrants encounter in Europe. Taha Akyol, a prominent senior columnist, for example, offers a fascinating analysis of the efforts and projects of local government and civil society in the Istanbul township of Bağcılar to assist the integration of rural migrants into urban life (Akyol 2007). There is also the case of Zeytinburnu Municipality in Istanbul, which ran a project called “inter-municipality dialogue between municipalities to assist the integration of migrant families to urban life”. Zeytinburnu has always had a large number of migrants including, more recently, immigrants from Turkey’s neighbours. This project involved the training of specialised municipal personnel to assist the integration of migrants. The project, fascinatingly, included the participation of officials from the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (German) and Beringen (Belgian) municipalities at a ceremony in Istanbul where certificates were awarded to those who had undertaken the training.7 There are also at least two academic programmes, the Migration Research Program at Koç University and the Center for Migration Research at Biliği University, which actively support research projects that look at “integration”-related issues both in Turkey as well as in Europe. Also numerous seminars and conferences addressing these issues are held. In other words, there is a growing academic and intellectual capital on “integration” that could easily be engaged should a three-way approach to integration be adopted or advocated in the EU.

Lastly, it is important to note that the attitude of the government in general has considerably evolved over the last couple of years on the issue of cooperation with host countries with respect to integration. The position of the Prime Minister and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs has already been mentioned. However, it should be noted that they are not the only ones who want to see Turkey play a more positive role in this regard. Mehmet Aydın, a professor of theology and former minister of state also responsible for religious affairs, has on numerous occasions

---

6 Her remarks were made during the panel on “Advocating Research Co-operation and Developing Research Infrastructure” at the MiReKoc Conference on “Critical Reflections in Migration Research: Views from the South and the East”. Koç University, Istanbul, 7–9 October 2009.
highlighted the importance of Turkish immigrants integrating with their host countries (Aydın 2006). It is not surprising that it should be during his term of office that the Diyanet started a number of projects with the support of universities to train the imams to serve Turkish immigrant communities abroad in the local languages and culture of the host country. This would have been unusual a few years ago. The Turkish Grand National Assembly has become interested in the problems of Turkish nationals living abroad too. The election in November 2002 of members of Parliament with immigrant background or experience has played an important role in this. The Parliament set up a commission in April 2003 to visit immigrant communities in Europe and investigate their problems. The Commission adopted an extensive report analysing a wide range of problems experienced by Turkish immigrants and submitted their recommendation in December 2004 (TBMM 2004).

What form could the three-way approach take? One obvious way would be to encourage contact between European and Turkish non-governmental organisations. This should not be too difficult given the existence of numerous facilitating financial instruments. However, what is critical here is the Commission adopting the idea of a three-way approach and actually encouraging non-governmental organisations to develop projects reflecting the spirit of the approach. The Commission in its Migration and Development Communication had offered the possibility of “helping developing countries map their Diasporas and build links with them” (European Commission 2005). It could also help by identifying non-governmental organisations in sending countries that may have something to offer. However, the more difficult task would actually require changing “hearts and minds” especially among the officials of Member States. The image that sending countries are part of the problem of integration will not be easy to change.

Additionally, the notion of a three-way approach to integration may appear to be too intrusive to some EU policy-makers and analysts. Such an approach might provoke apprehension over the fact that actors from sending countries might want to impact the decision-making processes of the EU and Member States by the back door. The Commission persevered for almost a decade to get EU members to accept the two-way approach to integration. It ought to be able to do the same with the three-way approach. The Commission already has some of the tools to introduce the three-way approach into the debate on integration in the EU without suggesting in any way that sending countries should become part of EU decision-making processes. In its Communication on The Global Approach to Migration One Year On, the Commission suggests the need “to establish Migration Support Teams (MISTs) composed of experts from EU Member States which could provide the necessary assistance to requesting African states” so as to help them deal with migratory flows (European Commission 2006: 6). Why not consider similar MISTs on integration, composed of EU as well as third-country experts, to assist EU Member States that choose to seek help? The Commission goes on in the Communication, very rightly, to emphasise the importance of links between policy and research. It notes how, “Inspired by the academic network linking migration
research institutes in Mediterranean countries (CARIM), the Commission will support initiatives stimulating the establishment of a ‘pan-African network of migration “observatories” and/or migration research institutes’” (European Commission 2006: 6). In this context, the Commission could perhaps encourage CARIM (Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration) to set up a network of “integration observatories” composed of experts from the EU and some of the sending countries. This would allow both sides, the receiving and sending countries, to explore ways in which sending countries might be able to assist receiving countries to better integrate immigrants into mainstream life. The Commission could also encourage EU stakeholders to organise events that would explore the idea of a three-way approach to integration.

Agencies of Member States could also try to engage and benefit from the experiences of sending countries. Most EU Member States have tremendous experience in assisting candidate countries through twinning projects in their efforts to harmonise their policies and practices with that of the EU on a wide range of issues. Non-governmental organisations have also taken part in these projects. The present author has participated in numerous training seminars for the Turkish police, gendarmerie and judiciary concerning a wide range of issues from combating human smuggling and trafficking to the implementation of asylum law. Often the implementing partners of these training seminars were non-governmental organisations including the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC). Numerous middle- and high-rank officials have received certificates from ICMC with the name “Catholic” engraved on them. Would it not be possible to envisage training programmes in the other direction? Can one not envisage that Turkish non-governmental organisations active in, for example, combating domestic violence against women, such as KAMER, run training seminars for the police or judges of EU Member States? A case in point is the observation of an Austrian journalist of what happened to a number of Turkish immigrant women who were victims of domestic violence and had approached the police in Vienna for help. The police had sent back these women to experience more violence and even death on the grounds that “in Turkish and Muslim culture domestic violence against women was normal and that they should submit themselves to their husbands” (Salzburg Seminar 2007). Just as the Turkish police learn how to treat asylum seekers properly through the intermediary of EU and UNHCR officials in training seminars organised by ICMC, could it not be possible that English- or German-speaking Turkish female officials, affiliated for example to the General Directorate on the Status of Women in Turkey and representatives of KAMER, run similar training programmes for the Austrian police.

A list of possible ways of cooperation in support of a three-way approach to integration could be expanded ad infinitum. However, the critical point here is to recognise that in a globalising world characterised by transnationalism it would be difficult to address the integration problems of immigrant communities, especially the Muslim ones, without adopting a three-way approach wherever possible. Turkey has been used here as an example, however, the same observations could
be made for Morocco too. Even if not all sending countries might be in a position, or for that matter willing, to engage themselves as players in a three-way approach to integration, the European Commission, as well as other stakeholders with an interest in a better incorporation of immigrants into the mainstream life of host countries, ought to consider exploring the idea. It would fit well with the aspiration of developing a “global and comprehensive approach to migration” of the EU.

2. Conclusion

Integration of Muslim migrants is likely to remain a major challenge for a while to come. Adopting the idea of a three-way approach to their integration can benefit the EU in a number of ways. First, if the right frame of mind is adopted and the three-way approach is well managed, it could enrich the EU toolbox developed to address the challenges of integration. Second, it could help to meet the European Parliament’s concern that if integration-related challenges are not addressed the very values on which the EU is built might be undermined. Third, engaging sending countries and developing genuine partnerships and dialogue would help to improve the credibility of the EU and achieve a better implementation of the external dimension of the EU’s common migration policy.

Adopting and implementing the idea of a three-way approach to integration need not be understood to mean any sort of interference on the part of the sending countries in EU decision-making on integration policies. It would mean no more than acknowledging that sending countries may have the social capital, the experience and the interest to contribute to EU efforts to develop better integration policies. Members of academia and civil society as well as government experts from sending countries, where appropriate, could be engaged by the European Commission and willing Member State governments and/or their civil society to share their experiences and ideas. This would also lead to the recognition that both sides may have something to contribute and actually help each other in concrete and meaningful ways. This would be a much more promising relationship and involve a more genuine “partnership” than so far exists. In other words, actors from sending countries ought to be seen as legitimate stakeholders.

Clearly not all sending countries may be in a position to participate in a three-way approach to integration. Turkey could be construed as one country that would have a positive contribution to make. The case of Turkey is also particular, not only because it is an accession country but also because it is a Muslim country that has been significantly transformed partly as a function of EU engagement. Part of the buoyant Turkish civil society today addresses social problems that very much resemble the ones faced by Turkish immigrants who fail to integrate in Europe. In addition, the government’s attitude towards Turkish immigrant communities has been transformed, and governmental institutions have become much more accustomed to cooperating with the international community. This ought to make Turkey a useful partner for the EU in formulating successful integration policies.
In any event, a lot will depend on the European Commission. The Commission has more than two decades of experience in trying to raise the issue of the integration of third-country nationals. As Geddes points out, the Commission has an important agenda-setting role to play in the area of migration issues (2007: 140). The idea of a two-way approach to integration took almost a whole decade to percolate through the corridors of the EU and Member States’ thinking and policy-making before it became part of the Common Basic Principles. The documents and instruments concerning integration that the Commission has developed have more than enough room to incorporate this approach. The added advantage is that the adoption of the three-way approach may not necessitate an additional budget but only a major change in mentality. It is the latter that may well continue to constitute a major challenge, especially given that the EU Immigration Pact developed and adopted during the French Presidency of the EU failed to mention CBPs, let alone acknowledge integration being just a “two-way process” (Collett 2008).

References


A “Three-Way Approach” to Muslim Immigrants in the EU

the Next Five Years: A Partnership for European Renewal. COM(2005) 184 final, 10 May, Brussels.


—. 2005c. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Migration and Development: Some Concrete Orientation. COM(2005) 390 final, 1 September, Brussels.


—. 2005f. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Migration and Development: Some Concrete Orientations. COM(2005) 390 final, 1 September, Brussels.


TBMM. 2004. Yurtdışında Yaşayan vatandaşlarımızın sorunlarını araştırarak alınması gereken önlemlerin belirlenmesi Anayasa Kaftanlı Medid Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu, Session 22, Number 335, Legislative Year 2, 17 December. İstanbul: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi [Turkish Grand National Assembly].


About the author

Kemal Kirişçi, a professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Boğaziçi University, Istanbul (Turkey), is currently a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Academy in Washington DC. He holds a Jean Monnet Chair in European Integration and was also the director of the Center for European Studies in Boğaziçi University between 2002 and June 2008. He has worked extensively on asylum, border management and immigration issues in Turkey as well as in EU-Turkish relations. Publications include Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey, 2009 (with A. İçduygü), Turkish Immigrants in the European Union: Determinants of Immigration and Integration,
A “Three-Way Approach” to Muslim Immigrants in the EU

2007 (with R. Erzan) and Turkey in the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 2004 (with J. Apap and S. Carrera). E-mail: kirisci@boun.edu.tr
Securitisation and Domestication of Diaspora Muslims and Islam: 
Turkish immigrants in Germany and Australia

MICHAEL HUMPHREY 
Department of Sociology & Social Policy, University of Sydney

This paper explores the securitisation and domestication of Muslims and Islam in Germany and Australia by looking at the case of Turkish Muslim immigrants. Securitisation and domestication of Muslims and Islam are an expression of transnational governmentality, the disciplining and management of a social category beyond state borders. They have been increasingly constituted as a homogenised transnational object through the harmonising of public policy and law and through the creation of a Western public sphere produced by spectator-citizens witnessing mediated risk events. The Turkish Muslim immigrant case reveals that while securitisation and domestication positions them as “threats” the Turkish state’s role in managing diaspora Islam has positioned them as “moderate” Muslims. In both Germany and Australia, the Turkish state, through the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) remains directly involved in providing clerics, supporting mosque building and religious education. In the politics of the domestication of Islam, the Muslim immigrants from Turkey and Turkish Islam have been put forward as a model of secularised “moderate” Islam and antidote to “extremists”.

The emergence of the threat of international jihadist terrorism with the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States and the subsequent terrorist events in Europe – the Madrid (Atocha) commuter train bombings (11 March 2004), the London transport suicide bombings (7 July 2005) and the recent Muslim doctors’ plot in the United Kingdom (2 July 2007) among other incidents – has transformed the position of Muslims and Islam in the West. They have become a shared “security” concern for Western governments and been made the object of suspicion and the focus of state intervention and political management. Their citizenship has become increasingly conditional on their “performance” as citizens measured by active efforts to integrate on the one hand and their rejection of radical Islam on the other.
Muslim immigrants in the West have come to occupy the space of the abject, the racialised slot of the “suspect other” (Silverstein 2005; Humphrey 2007). No longer judged to be merely “culturally incompatible” the Muslim immigrant now is suspected of “political disloyalty”, and even to be dangerous. The “clash of civilisations” paradigm is being enacted through the “war on terror” and the latest icon of such fears of permanent immigrant mobility, of preternatural Islamic transnationalism, has become the young European Muslim man, recruited to travel abroad in the duties of global *jihad*, the ‘foreign fighter’ in Iraq” (Silverstein 2005: 1). The consequence for Muslims in the West is their positioning at the social margins, at the limits of citizenship, where they are constantly challenged to prove their trustworthiness and justify their claims to citizenship.

Diaspora Muslim communities and Islam have been made objects of “securitisation” and “domestication” through policies directed at their policing and urgent social and cultural integration. Securitisation and domestication are governance strategies based on the logic of spatial exclusion and inclusion focused on disciplining bodies. Whereas national sovereignty and territoriality has long been spatially rooted, what is new in the current securitisation is the national/transnational dimension of governmentality and the impact of transnational securitisation on citizenship as conditional and degradable. Thus while securitisation and domestication are state-managed strategies, they are at the same time an expression of transnational governmentality, the scaling of sovereignty up and down as one outcome of globalisation (Gupta and Ferguson 2002). Securitisation and domestication have become integral to the state project in “states of emergency” which has as a central concern the re/linking of people to the state and the production of the state “as a social subject in everyday life” (Aretxaga 2003: 395). And behind the intensification of policing and linking bodies is the anxiety of sovereignty in the era of globalisation. The potentiality of exclusion becomes the embodiment of the law and the state, and the means of legibility of power (Aretxaga 2003).

Securitisation is “a political technique of framing policy questions in logics of survival with a capacity to mobilize politics of fear in which social relations are structured on the basis of distrust” (Huysmans 2006: xi). The effect of securitising Muslim immigrants is to displace them as a social category within a particular ethnic/racial hierarchy and national space to a transnational “Western” space. Securitisation constitutes “Muslim immigrants” as a transnational social category for policing increasingly detached from specific national social and political contexts and at the same time provides a common language to connect diverse Muslim communities as threats (Risley 2006). As with the earlier use of the term “immigrant” as a category for transnational policing and surveillance in the European Union (EU), so the term “Muslim” has become a transnational category referring to the suspect and potentially threatening other (Bigo 2002). Securitisation as a transnational process has become articulated within a “transnational security field” in which Muslims have emerged as an integrating focus (Risley 2006). Securitisation is a policy of social defence defining political
community at the national level and a project of transnational governmentality constituted by inter-state cooperation, the harmonising of policies and laws and the forging of a transnational Western public sphere focused by threats.

Domestication refers to state intervention in cultural and social difference with the purpose of defining limits with respect to national values and culture (Bowen 2004). The project of the domestication of Islam and Muslims in Western societies seeks to promote a moderate Islam (with the purpose of undermining the appeal of radical Islam) by creating national Islams – in President Sarkozy’s phrase “to be Muslims of France practicing an Islam of France” (Bowen 2004: 43) – and to address the social causes of Islamic radicalisation understood as social exclusion. The policy of promoting a “moderate Islam” addresses a particular organisational characteristic of Muslim immigrant communities; the fragmented character of representative organisations and structures of diaspora Islam as an historical expression of the absence of a church-like structure in Islam as well as the product of ethnic differentiation of religious organisation among Muslim immigrant communities. The response of Western states has been to try to shape the Muslim leadership and governance of Islamic institutions in Muslim immigrant communities. Islam has become a target of governmental techniques, the state reaching into civil society in order to discipline Muslims by reconfiguring and legitimating domesticated religious institutions and leaders as well as producing a public discourse on moderate Islam (Bowen 2003, 2004).

Securitisation and domestication of Muslims and Islam describe forms of political management and disciplining directed at them as threats understood to be globalised through international migration and the formation of a Muslim diaspora, the emergence of a politicised global Islam, the circulation of itinerant radical clerics in the diaspora, and internet witnessing of Muslim suffering by the globalised *Umma*. Securitisation and domestication represent the dual strategies of exclusion or inclusion. Muslims are constituted by their host national states as a transnational category, and no longer just an immigrant ethnic community or minority through first, the cultural essentialisation of Islam; second, the political construction of radical Islam as a non-state threat – in Appadurai’s (2006) terms a clash between “vertebrate” and “cellular” global systems – and third, the mediatisation of risk and formation of transnational public opinion about the Muslim threat. Securitisation and domestication of Muslims and Islam are an expression of transnational governmentality, the disciplining and management of a social category beyond state borders. They have been increasingly constituted as a homogenised transnational object through the harmonising of public policy and law and through the creation of a Western public sphere produced by spectator-citizens witnessing mediated risk events (Feldman 2004). Bigo (2002) describes the securitising of the “suspect other” as the “government of unease” managed through the interventionist state and no longer the protective state.

---

1 While the nation-state is vertebrate in organisation, part of a system of global regulatory norms and laws, Islamic radicalism is “cellular”, decentred, networked, transnational and self-sustaining.
All Muslim immigrants and minorities are now being reshaped under the discourse of “social inclusion” determined on the basis of politico-cultural categorisation of “our” Muslims and Islam as either moderate or extremist. The term social inclusion emerges from the 1980s EU focus on social exclusion understood as the product of social dislocation, the decline in social solidarity and a lack of integrative institutions (Daly 2006). Social inclusion then refers to policy directed at social and cultural reincorporation. Social inclusion in relation to Muslims addresses social marginality on the one hand and cultural conflict on the other. It promotes cultural change through the domestication and nationalisation of Islam (e.g. creating an Australian Islam) by seeking to bring Islamic values closer to Western ones. The approaches to domestication vary. Two contrasting European approaches are “British ‘multiculturalism’ (where Muslims are defined by a distinct ethno-cultural identity) and the French assimilationnisme (where Muslims may become full citizens only by shedding their pristine identity)” (Allen et al. 2007: 57). The choice of “domestication” offered to French Muslims by the French state is, according to either pluralist, “[Muslims should] … seek to (re)interpret scripture so as to bring about a de facto convergence of Islamic norms with European ones”, or monist “[Muslims should] … explicitly discard the baggage of Islamic law and politics entirely, and live an Islam of the spirit (and a Frenchness in everyday public life)” (Bowen (2003: 49). Nevertheless both approaches are premised on the idea that “religion is embedded in a culture, so if one is a Muslim one belongs to a different culture” (Allen et al. 2007: 57).

This paper explores the securitisation and domestication of Muslims and Islam in Germany and Australia by looking at the case of Turkish Muslim immigrants. I argue that the Turkish Muslim immigrant case reveals that whereas securitisation and domestication positions them as “threats”, the Turkish state’s role in managing diaspora Islam has positioned them as “moderate” Muslims. In both Germany and Australia the Turkish state, through the Presidency of Religious Affairs, remains directly involved in providing clerics, supporting mosque building and supporting religious education. While other homeland states (e.g. Morocco, Algeria) have supervised diaspora mosques in European host/receiving societies (e.g. Spain, Belgium, France) these have been on a much more restricted scale. In the politics of the domestication of Islam in the diaspora Turkish Muslim immigrants and Turkish Islam have been put forward as a model of secularised “moderate” Islam and antidote to “extremists” (Allen et al. 2007).

1. Turkish Muslim immigrants and Islam in Germany

Today there between 3.2 million and 3.4 million Muslims in Germany of whom 75 per cent (2.6 million) are of Turkish origin or from Turkey, representing 3 per cent of the total population of Germany. The modern German state’s relationship to its Turkish Muslim migrants has been shaped by three main themes: the Turkish guest-worker scheme and Germany’s citizenship laws; Germany’s attitude towards Turkey’s ambition for EU membership; and the impact of international jihadist terrorism in Europe after September 11. The German Government’s policy towards
Muslims and Islam has moved from social exclusion on the grounds of their foreignness to social inclusion conditional on their integration.

The position of Turkish Muslims as foreign and socially separate was forged in the 1960s through the then West German state’s sponsored guest-worker (temporary labour migration) scheme. Turkish guest workers were brought to Germany as contract unskilled labour on a temporary basis. Although they were expected to return home at the completion of their work contracts, many stayed on to become long-term residents and second-generation communities, but without the possibility of becoming citizens (Castles and Kosak 1973; Castles 1984). Even when foreigners reached 9 per cent of the population in the 1990s, Germany still maintained it was not an “immigration country” (ICG 2007: 21). Genealogy and not birthplace or residence determined citizenship, leaving most second- and third-generation migrants with the status of foreigner.

Because the guest-worker scheme marked Turkish migrants as “temporary foreigners” and not for social and cultural integration, Islam was also viewed as a temporary presence. The German state’s relationship to Islam was kept at arms length by outsourcing the management of Islam to a branch of the Turkish state, the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Türk-Islam Birliği, DİTİB). While legally a German association, in practice the DİTİB was Turkish state-controlled and a branch of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), the highest religious authority in Turkey. The role of the DİTİB in Germany was to run mosques, support religious education, and provide Turkish state salaried clerics whose role it was to manage “Islam for émigrés”. From the perspective of the Turkish state, the DİTİB’s management of Islamic orthodoxy in the Turkish diaspora was a logical extension of the “secular” Turkish state’s supervision of Islam at home. The continued role of the Turkish state’s administration of Islam in the Turkish diaspora is the exception among Muslim immigrant communities in the West, whose Islamic organisations and mosques have generally been the organic expression of local community religious needs.

The German state’s acceptance of the DİTİB’s role in the Turkish Muslim diaspora inhibited the development of a German Islam by reinforcing immigrants’ alien status as well as their social separateness. First, it obviated the need for Islam to gain official recognition as a minority religion. Under the German Constitution religions not granted official recognition as public corporations, a status granted by the German state (Länder) governments, are denied the right to give religious instruction in public schools (Jasch 2007). Second, the DİTİB’s role divided Muslims on religious and ethnic grounds and hindered the development of more representative German Islamic organisations. The “non-transparent organisational

---

2 The aims and objectives of the Diyanet are set out in Article 136 of the Turkish Constitution: “The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which takes place in the general administration, is responsible for the execution of the duties specified in the special law in order to provide national unity and solidarity, and remain separate from all political views and thoughts in accordance with the principle of secularism” (http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/tanitim.asp?id=13).
Securitization and Domestication of Diaspora Muslims and Islam

141

structures and the lack of clear membership rules” also stopped them gaining corporation status at the Länder level (ICG 2007: 27). Muslim immigrant religious fragmentation in fact only reinforced German state patronage of the dominant Sunni orthodoxy administered by the DITIB as the representative voice of Islam in Germany which in turn allowed the state to ignore oppositional and minority Muslims such as the Alevi (non-Sunni) and the second-largest Turkish religious organisation, the Islamic Community of the National Vision (Müll Göö ûş, IGMG).3

The 2000 citizenship law saw German policy towards Turkish residents shift from their social exclusion as foreigners to their social inclusion as citizens. These changes permitted naturalisation of first- and second-generation Turkish residents conditional on their successful integration. The link between citizenship and integration was further emphasised by the Immigration Act of 2005 which made immigration conditional on integration, such as by taking language tests. However whereas these citizenship laws opened up the chance for full membership through citizenship, local barriers remained. Applicants found that, depending on which state Länder they applied to for naturalisation, the assessment of an applicant’s “integration” (Germanness) varied. For example, Baden-Württemberg introduced a questionnaire for naturalisation in 2006 entitled Gesinnungsfragebögen (questionnaire about one’s convictions) with questions targeting Muslim immigrants to assess their internalisation of German national values.4 One commentator described these citizenship questionnaires as tests to see whether applicants held views in line with current public opinion rather than upheld the constitution.5 To date an estimated 1.9 million out of the 2.6 million Turkish resident population still hold only Turkish citizenship. Moreover, a number of those who took German nationality found themselves denaturalised for reacquiring Turkish citizenship.

Turkey’s application for membership of the European Union has also shaped the domestication of Muslims and Islam in Germany. In parallel with the requirement that individual Turkish immigrants prove their “Germanness” to be accepted as citizens, a whole state, Turkey, has been set the task of proving its “Europeanness” to become a member of the EU. The general question of accession to the EU has provided a political focus for the formation of “European” public opinion around the EU as a political entity informed by debates about social and cultural integration. Although the criteria for EU membership focus on measures of national economic, social and political development and targets to be met, it is the Islamic culture of Turkey (even the secularised Turkish version) and the European

3 The IGMG has developed as an alternative religious institution to the DITIB with a significant network of Koranic schools, mosques and prayer spaces as well as addressing the welfare needs of migrants and organising hajj tours to Mecca.
4 Examples of questions are: “What do you think about the fact that homosexual people hold official offices in Germany?” “What do you think about the statement that the wife has to obey her husband and that he may beat her if she does not obey him?” and “Your adult daughter/wife wants to dress just like other girls and women as well. Would you try to prevent it? If yes, with what means?”
5 Country Profile – Germany, Euro-Islam.Info (www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/germany/).
6 ibid. p. i.
experience of Turkish immigrants which remain the touchstone of acceptance or rejection of Turkey as a member. While human rights have also provided a measure for acceptance – minority rights, gender equality, health care, penal reform and right to free expression – culturally based issues gain greatest public attention, especially gender issues. For example, criticism of forced marriages targets Islam as in need of reform before EU membership is possible.

The German public, and in turn German politicians, have increasingly viewed the question of accession through the lens of the Turkish immigration experience in Germany. The German Government had supported the commencement of EU accessions talks in 2005 but the arrival of Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2006 saw a shift to the French Government’s position: to grant Turkey “privileged partnership status” rather than full EU membership. German public opinion now strongly opposes Turkey’s membership. As one report put it, public opinion about Turkish immigrants’ ability to integrate “… is not judged by the many immigrants who succeed, but by those who fail. It is they who become the triggers for discomfort and anxiety, with complaints ranging from poor educational performance, high unemployment and alienation from the broader society to the isolation of woman, wearing of the veil, forced marriages and ‘honour killings’. Much of this behaviour is attributed to Islam and religious tradition.”

Paradoxically, despite these concerns about the cultural compatibility of Turkey as a Muslim country in Europe, it is only since the AKP (Justice and Development Party), a moderate Islamist party (their position is that they seek greater religious freedoms), came to power in a landslide victory in 2002, and re-elected in the 2007 general election, that real progress has been made towards EU membership. For the AKP, EU membership has served as an anchor to promote political reform at home and has not just been an external goal (Emerson and Tocci 2004). Ironically it is the Turkish ultra-nationalists, still fiercely prosecuting offences against “Turkishness” in Turkey, who are the Euro-sceptics rather than the AKP (Finkel 2007). If, as Finkel suggests, it is the Turkish ultra-nationalist (who may at the same time be secularists) who want Europe to reject them to benefit from the popular nationalist backlash it would provoke in Turkey, then European anti-enlargement and anti-immigration politicians may well deliver that result. The contradiction is that, just as the religious AKP has delivered the most far-reaching reforms at home to meet EU targets for membership, they may be rebuffed in Germany as a consequence of the securitisation and domestication of Islam and Muslim immigrants. Recent developments in Turkey, especially the attempt to

---

8 Prosecutions have been pursued on the basis of Article 5816, designed to protect Ataturk’s reputation, and Article 30, which forbids insults to Turkishness.
have the AKP banned, have slowed the impetus towards meeting the accession targets.

The securitisation and domestication of Islam and Muslims accelerated after September 11 and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe. Securitisation extended the framework established at the Tampere Summit (1999) on EU immigration and asylum policies focused on border security and integration. September 11 turned “social relations into security relations” (Huysmans 1998: 232). Social problems such as immigration have increasingly been framed so as to “dramatize the threat they pose to Europe’s citizens” (Loader 2002: 134–5). However despite efforts to harmonise securitisation through a common EU counter-terrorism policy continuing disagreement over the role of Islam and Muslims as the source of terrorism has so far prevented it (Burke 2008). Instead each EU state has legislated their own national counter-terrorism measures which have consistently eroded citizenship and residence rights – e.g. detention without charge, invasion of privacy on the basis of perceived threat, banned organisations, criminalising intentions over acts, and expulsion. Germany passed a series of anti-terrorism laws: the 2001 First Anti-Terrorism Package, 2002 Second Anti-Terrorism Package, 2007 Act Supplementing the Anti-Terrorism Act. These laws were designed to make detention easier, ban extremist religious organisations, withdraw asylum status, allow the profiling of dangerous social categories, deportation and exclusion. Many of these laws police Muslims and Islam through administrative exclusion directed at individuals and organisations identified as suspicious – such as rejection of naturalisation applications, refusing visas to visiting imams, expelling activists.

At the same time that securitisation policies have sought to exclude radical Muslims and Islam, domestication policies have promoted the social and cultural inclusion of moderate Muslims and Islam. In Germany domestication of Islam and Muslims has focused on the formation of a German Islam. The key element in this strategy was to promote the DITIB as the representative of moderate Islam in Germany, while Turkish governments have even supported the DITIB as an important interlocutor with the EU. At the Ankara conference in 2004 Prime Minister Erdogan declared that the DITIB should be accepted as the EU’s partner in recognition of Turkey’s “leading role” in the Islamic world (ICG 2007: 7). The official appointment of the DITIB as the sole representative of Muslims in Germany at the Integration Summit in 2006 at the same time excludes opposition Turkish groups and Muslims from non-Turkish national origins who rejected the role of the DITIB as the primary, if not sole, representative of German Muslims. Again in 2007 major Turkish community organisations boycotted the Integration Summit because they regarded the 2005 Immigration Law, which made immigration conditional on capacity to integrate, to be discriminatory against Turkish immigrants, particularly in relation to language and marriage (Landler
The stated aim of the Summit was to promote the integration of foreigners in order to counter radicalisation and home-grown terrorism.9

Despite the official view that Turkish Muslims are “moderate” communities and considered to have a “low risk” of radicalisation, public opinion polls reveal an increasing concern with the threat of Islamic radicalism at home. Recent Pew Polls have found that 82 per cent of Germans polled were worried (very concerned/somewhat concerned) about Islamic radicalism in Germany (ICG 2007: 22). New anti-terror laws, which include the deportation of “radical clerics” if they incite violence, also reflect a growing concern with religiously inspired violence (Rice-Oxley 2005). The foiled bomb plot in September 2007 involving two German converts and a Turkish immigrant who had trained in Pakistan10 only served to challenge the official view of Turkish immigrants as “moderate” and resistant to radicalisation (Landler 2007). Instead the state adopted a homeland security discourse focusing on the dangers of home-grown terrorism, calling for more effective counter-terrorism legislation and policies promoting greater use of internet surveillance and a closer surveillance of converts.11

In September 2006 the German Islam Conference (DIK) moved away from its dependence on the DITIB as the main representative of German Islam by creating a new more broadly based national forum representative of Muslims in Germany. The aim was to promote a German Islam through religious recognition and religious reform. In this context the DITIB was seen as both too conservative and too tied to the Turkish state’s project of promoting Turkish-language learning and providing Turkish imams for religious instruction. The aim of the DIK has been to facilitate negotiation and communication on Muslims and Islam through the appointment of thirty representatives of the German state at federal, regional and local levels and Muslim communities. Its central agenda is the national domestication of German Islam as moderate to contain Islamic extremism. To this end the DIK was drawn from the five main Muslim organisations: DITIB, Islam Council, Central Council of Muslims (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, ZMD), Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren, VIKZ), as well as ten ministerial appointees who included, in Interior Minister Schäuble’s words, “representatives of a modern secular Islam from business, society, science and culture” (ICG 2007: 27). The DIK’s agenda in establishing a national Muslim representative body combined religious and political purposes: to “create a new sense of community” to support the “principles of harmonious existence”. The DIK motto is Muslims in Germany – German Muslims.

9 “Germany’s integration summit clouded by Turkish boycott”, 11 July 2007 Deutsche Welle (http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2678315,00.html).
11 “How to fight homegrown terror?” Der Spiegel 7 September 2007 (http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,504470,00.html).
The German state’s management of Muslims and Islam through its primary reliance on the DITIB is shifting under EU harmonisation of policy around social exclusion/inclusion and in response to growing public anxieties about Muslim immigrants in general. The DIK initiative to domesticate Islam through state-sponsored institutionalisation relies upon Muslim partners accepted as legitimate representatives of Muslim communities and therefore authorised to enter into a dialogue “to create a common understanding on how Islam can be reconciled with the national legal framework and with ‘Western values’” (Jasch 2007: 379). Despite the aims of the DIK to establish a national forum on Islam, public attitudes towards Muslims are evident in the variation of laws regulating Islam at the regional (Länder) level and justified on the grounds of neutrality towards religion and ideology. Half of the German states currently ban schoolteachers from wearing headscarves in schools: Bavaria, Bremen, Baden-Wurttemburg, Hessen, Lower-Saxony, Berlin and North Rhine-Westphalia. These laws were passed in the last five years and force women to choose between religion and their jobs (HRW 2009).

2. Turkish immigrants and Australian Islam

As in Germany, the Muslim presence in Australia is the product of immigration. But, unlike in Germany, Muslims immigrated as permanent migrants who were eligible to apply for citizenship after three years. Immigration to Australia was an inclusive planned project shaped historically by policies of assimilation, integration and multiculturalism which determined selection and the social terms of settlement in Australia.

Whereas the Muslim presence dates back to the 1860s, it was only after 1970 that significant growth occurred. Since then the number of Muslims in Australia, according to census figures, grew from 0.2 per cent to 1.7 per cent of the Australian population (Table 1).

Table 1: Number of Muslims in Australia according to census figures (1971–2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Share of Australian population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>22,311</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>200,253</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>280,871</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>340,392</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The distinctive characteristics of the Australian Muslim population are that they are culturally diverse, from over sixty-five countries, and their social life and religious organisation is strongly ethnically focused. Muslim immigrant communities have been formed by settlement immigration often recruited through chain migration.
This characteristically Mediterranean pattern of family and community immigration to Australia was reinforced by the strong preference for family migrants.

Although diverse, the two largest overseas-born Muslim communities in Australia are from Lebanon and Turkey. Based on the 2006 Australian population census figures, the Lebanese-born Muslims are the largest group with 30,287 and the Turkish born Muslims the second largest with 23,126 representing 9 per cent and 7 per cent respectively of the Australian Muslim population. In the Australian-born Muslim population, now at 128,904 or 38 per cent of the Muslim population, 30 per cent have Lebanese origin and 18 per cent Turkish origin. The significance of ethnic origin in the social and religious organisation of Australian Muslim communities is revealed in their concentrations at the state, city and suburban levels. Australian Muslims are concentrated in New South Wales (50 per cent) and Victoria (33 per cent) and overwhelmingly in Sydney (47 per cent) and Melbourne (31 per cent). The Lebanese and Turkish migrants have tended to concentrate in New South Wales (75 per cent) and Victoria (50 per cent) respectively. In Sydney Turkish immigrants are associated with the suburb of Auburn and Lebanese Muslim immigrants cluster in the south-western suburbs of Bankstown, Canterbury and Rockdale. In Melbourne there are concentrations in Preston (Lebanese), Broadmeadows (Turkish) and Fawkner (Iranian) (Dunn 2004; Wise and Ali 2008).

Turkish immigration to Australia was initiated by a state-to-state agreement in 1967 bringing 10,000 migrants in four years (BIMPR 1995). It was organised as family migration, which was subsequently reinforced by continuing recruitment under the family reunion category. Studies into the experience of Turkish immigrants during the 1970s and 1980s focus on the process of integration and settlement, especially employment, welfare and education (Manderson and Inglis 1984; Mackie 1987; Windle 2004). This period was the high tide of multiculturalism where cultural difference was examined as a factor of disadvantage. In other words, Turkish immigration and settlement experience were examined as issues of social equity and cultural disadvantage. They were found to suffer from high levels of unemployment and their children educational disadvantage because of their non-English-speaking backgrounds. As Muslims, however, Turkish immigrants did not have a conspicuous public profile.

Whereas in Germany it was the Turkish immigrant experience that provided the lens through which public attitudes towards immigrant Muslims and Islam were shaped, in Australia it was the Lebanese immigrant experience. The major expansion of Lebanese Muslim immigration was the product of a special humanitarian programme introduced in 1976 in response to the Lebanese civil war. Around 20,000 Lebanese arrived in Australia between 1976 and 1978. The sudden infusion of Lebanese Muslims in the context of the Lebanese civil war divisions was expressed in ethnic politics, rivalry between the older Lebanese Christian and recent Lebanese Muslim communities and a proliferation of community organisations lobbying for political attention and grants. The public perception of
Lebanese Muslims as a social and cultural problem was present from the 1980s (Humphrey 1984). The public notoriety of Lebanese Muslims based on media coverage of such issues as high levels of unemployment, welfare dependence, gang activity, violence against women, and conflicts over religious leadership profoundly shaped the public image of Islam and all Muslims in Australia (Humphrey 2007; Zwartz 2006). The negative profile of the Lebanese Muslims in Australia is captured by the “Urban Dictionary” entry for the pejorative term “Lebs”:

Broadly, they are people of Middle-Eastern appearance who usually have an Islamic upbringing, have a chip on their shoulder and who feel bigotry is their prerogative. Lebs usually conduct themselves in groups and work to intimidate others. In Australia, the term “Leb” connotes criminal, thief, geek, coward, racist, thug, one with a lack of culture, one with a lack of education, one who practices intimidation when in a group with other Lebs or with a weapon or when concealed, and someone who discriminates against Australians (non-Lebanese).12

The perception that Muslims were culturally incompatible in Australian multicultural society was present well before the international jihadist terrorist attacks of 2001. In other words, Muslims and Islam were framed as a social problem before their post-2001 securitisation. The securitisation initiatives included the use of administrative and legal measures to change radical Islamic leadership, promote community responsibility and protect Muslim women from harmful cultural practices. Key examples include attempts to deport Imam Taj ad-din al Hilali of the Lebanese Sunni Lakemba mosque in Sydney, the formation of an Arab Community Council to address the gang behaviour of Lebanese youth, and the introduction of legislation criminalising the alleged Muslim practice of female circumcision. The backdrop of the international politicisation of Islam in events such as the Iranian Revolution, the Salman Rushdie affair, and the emergence of radical Islam in civil-war Lebanon added to the fear of a radicalising Islam. Another important factor in the shift to the securitisation of Muslim immigrants was the arrival of refugees and asylum seekers largely from Muslim countries, especially Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In order to deter these “illegal” arrivals, to exclude them from Australia, the Australian Government used administrative detention and temporary protection visas, borrowing from developments in EU refugee and asylum policy in which it was directly involved (Humphrey 2002).

The securitisation of Muslims and Islam in Australia after September 11 saw the introduction of extensive anti-terrorism legislation. Some forty-four anti-terrorism laws were passed covering sedition, control orders without trial, secret surveillance, profiling, non-suspects detained for intelligence gathering, and restrictions on media reporting (Lynch and Williams 2006). The impact of these laws was felt in Muslim communities where religious signifiers became markers of suspicion. The other dimension of securitisation was the project to create an Australian Islam which was more representative of Muslims. The key state strategy

was to promote moderate Muslim leaders to oppose extremism and to remove controversial Muslim clerics from influential positions (Jupp 2006).

Islam in Australia is formally organised under the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC) and is hierarchically structured at the national, state and local community levels. AFIC was established in 1964 to address the needs of the Muslim community in Australia but it never had formal religious authority in Islamic law, theology or in the education and appointment of clerics to religious office or mosques. At the state level, leadership conflicts have seen splits forcing the national committee to shift its support to new state-level organisations. For example, over the past decade three different state bodies have represented AFIC in New South Wales: the Muslim Council of NSW replaced the Supreme Islamic Council of NSW, which in turn replaced the Islamic Council of NSW (Morris 2003). The struggles within AFIC reflect the tensions between an umbrella body seeking to establish authority over ethnically differentiated local community-based Muslim organisations and mosques. Attempts by AFIC to get member associations to drop the ethnic signifiers from their association names failed. Disputes over religious leadership, especially the position of mufti, an Islamic legal authority AFIC created when they appointed Sheikh Taj ad-Din al-Hilaly from the predominantly Lebanese Sunni Lakemba mosque in Sydney in 1988, have revealed the limited influence and authority of AFIC. Not all communities recognised the authority of AFIC to create the office of mufti and many rejected the authority of the mufti. In particular, the Turkish Muslim community never recognised the authority of the mufti and set themselves apart from the Lebanese and Arab politics that surrounded the struggles over Islamic religious leadership. In June 2007 Fehmi Naji El-Imam, imam of the Preston mosque in Melbourne, was appointed mufti by the Australian National Imams Council (ANIC) for two years.

In contrast to the role the Turkish DİTİB played as the representative of Islam in Germany, it played no such role in Australia, even though Turkish Muslims were the second-largest Muslim ethnic community. On the whole, Turkish Muslim communities in Australia set themselves apart from the politics of Muslim leadership, especially in AFIC. Nevertheless Australian political leaders held Turkish Muslims and Islam up as a model of moderate Islam – by which they meant secularised. Another dimension of the recognition of Turkish Muslim immigrants as moderate was the special historical relationship of Turkey to the Australian state forged during the First World War. The Gallipoli campaign in 1915 provided the founding myth of the independent Australian nation-state while the Turkish military victory at Gallipoli advanced the career of Kemal Ataturk, the founding leader of modern secular Turkey (Prior 2009). As a consequence, Turkish Muslim immigrants have been seen as “moderates” and allies in the national social cohesion project. Groups such as the Affinity Intercultural Foundation, a largely second-generation Turkish Australian group, have been active in programmes to promote youth activities and inter-faith dialogue.
The July 2005 London terrorist bombings prompted the Australian Government to hold a Muslim Summit to forge new Australian Muslim organisations to domestic Australian Islam. They formed a Muslim Advisory Council to encourage moderate Muslims to speak out against extremists and promote an Australian Islam but this was criticised by Australian Muslims as neither representative of communities nor inclusive of the different Islamic perspectives in Australia (McGrath 2006). One recommendation of the Muslim Advisory Council was the creation of a new Australian National Imams Council (ANIC), constituted as a public company and established as the primary Islamic religious authority in Australia based on the membership of qualified imams. The Australian Government also established forums for the education of imams about Australian society as well as programmes for the religious training of imams in Australia. The logic was that to create an Australian Islam it was necessary to have locally trained imams, not foreign ones largely ignorant of Australian society and values. The Presidency of Religious Affairs in Turkey responded to the growing push for locally trained imams by passing a law to allow the recruitment and training of imams from Australia (McDonald 2007). The indigenisation of religious training to restrict the influence of radical political ideas has a historical parallel in the imperial management of Catholicism in Ireland. The British Government established St Patrick’s College (Maynooth) as a National Seminary of Ireland in 1795 to prevent the radicalisation and stimulation of anti-British sentiments among Irish priests who had until then been trained in revolutionary France (Whelan 1983).

The domestication of Islam through state sponsorship of moderate leaders and representative institutions has had ambiguous outcomes. Thus while ANIC was established as a register of imams so that they would be accountable to more than their mosque communities, it also had the effect of creating institutions with greater Islamic legal authority which in turn have become the focus of religious and political patronage from overseas Muslim states. For example, Griffith University, where Mohamad Abdalla is director of the Islamic Research Centre (and heads ANIC), has come under criticism for accepting funding from the Saudi Arabian Kingdom to promote conservative Wahabi Islam (Kerbaj 2008). Rather than sponsoring an Australian Islam through new government-supported initiatives such as ANIC, it has been seen by some as sponsoring the global integration of diaspora Islam under Saudi guidance. Similarly the ANIC proposal to create Boards of Imams at national and state levels has been criticised for trying to establish a new source of sharia legal authority, plural law, in Australia (Bridge 2007). In a study undertaken by the Islamic Women’s Welfare Council of Victoria, funded by the Australian Government, the Victoria Board of Imams was accused of condoning rape within marriage, domestic violence, polygamy, welfare fraud and exploitation of women (Zwartz 2008). Whether a fair assessment or not, these conflicts point to the limitations of state sponsorship of moderate diaspora Islam.

14 The Griffith Islamic Research Centre at Griffith University is the Queensland node of the newly established Aus$8 million National Centre of Excellence for Islamic Studies, a consortium with the University of Melbourne and the University of Western Sydney.
The domestication of Islam through intervention in Islamic religious leadership and institutions and reorganising them has been accompanied by a policy of integration and cultural domestication of Muslims as immigrants and citizens. Muslim cultural difference is viewed as distance from citizenship (Rosaldo 1989). The former Prime Minister John Howard explicitly targeted Muslims for their alleged unwillingness to integrate by not learning English and not adopting Australian values, especially in regard to treating women equally (Kerbaj 2006). The comments of the former Treasurer Peter Costello on “No sharia in Australia” reinforce a very essentialised view of Islam as culturally backward, intolerant and separatist, quite unaware of what sharia might actually mean in practice for Australian Muslims – i.e. primarily concerned with family law and inheritance (Costello 2006; Koutsoukis 2006). Cultural difference is now also constructed as cultural resistance and in the case of Muslims “extremist” views represent the risk of radicalisation and extremist violence.

3. Conclusion

The securitisation and domestication of Muslims and Islam in the West is the response of the state conceived “as a body endangered by migrants” (Bigo 2002: 68). This led to increased surveillance and policing of a particular social category to manage the impact of risk engendered by globalisation on territorial sovereignty in which the state is faced with the circulation of dangerous invisible threats – terrorists, transnational criminals, pandemics. The state’s reaction has been to intensify its practices of ordering and classification to govern and assert its political legitimacy as a protective entity. Securitisation and domestication have made Muslim migrants transnational objects of suspicion whose transnational governance now consists of a mediated transnational public sphere formed through witnessing risk events and the transfer and harmonisation of policy and law.

A major issue in the regulation of Muslims in the West has been the ethnic diversity and the localised nature of religious organisation of Muslim communities, often based on mosque communities. The project of domestication and nationalisation of Islam has sought to promote a nationally ordered rather than internationally networked form of organisation and attachment. In Appadurai’s (2006) terms, it seeks to reinforce vertebrate over cellular forms of global organisation. The case of the Turkish Muslim diaspora communities in Germany and Australia are distinct however because of the role of state-to-state relations in the initial recruitment of Turkish immigrants as workers and in the bureaucratic religious organisation of diaspora Islam by the Turkish state to try to regulate religious orthodoxy. In Germany the role of the DITIB has been particularly prominent because of the German state’s perspective, until 1998, that Germany was not a country of immigration and that Turkish diasporic Islam and Muslims were a temporary presence. With the securitisation of Islam after 2001, the DITIB played a new role as the chosen face of moderate Islam and the main representative of German Islam. However with the arrival of Chancellor Merkel the domestication of Islam took a different direction under the Integration Summits and the German
Conference on Islam (DIK). The state became directly involved in creating a new Islamic organisational structure to facilitate integration and broader representation, especially “secular” Muslims. From the perspective of EU harmonisation, German Islam was going to be designed in Germany, not Turkey.

In the Australian case the religious needs of the Turkish immigrants were also largely administered by the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs in contrast to the autonomous local ethnic organisation of Islam in many other Muslim immigrant communities. Although they were the second-largest Muslim community, the public face of Muslims and Islam in Australia was shaped by the immigrant experience and settlement problems of the Lebanese Muslim immigrants. The turbulent politics around Islamic religious leadership in the Lebanese-dominated mosques and struggles over who should represent Australian Muslims as mufti was in marked contrast to the administration of Turkish diaspora Islam by the Presidency of Religious Affairs.

The impact of securitisation post September 11 placed Muslims at the borders of citizenship and the object of cultural domestication. Muslims were constructed as culturally determined bodies whose culture needed adjusting for them to be integrated. Hence their social marginality and potential for radicalisation were constructed as largely a cultural question. Domestication of Islam and Muslims for both the German and Australian governments involved promoting “moderate” Muslim leaders and organisations and rejecting “extremists”. It was in the domestication of Islam that the Turkish Muslim diaspora was constructed as moderate and a model for Islamic integration in Western societies. In Germany Turkish Islam was made the vehicle of religious moderation through the DİTİB until the German Islam Conference embarked on the construction of German Islam made in Germany and not Turkey. In Australia the institutions of the Turkish Muslim diaspora were not able to play the role as representative of Islam and the Australian Muslim community because the Lebanese Muslims demographically dominated the ethnic, cultural and political face of Islam in Australia.

References


BOWEN, J. 2003. “Two approaches to rights and religion in contemporary France”. In: R. A. Wilson and J. P. Mitchell, eds,


JASCH, H. 2007. “State-dialogue with Muslim communities in Italy and Germany – the political context and the legal frameworks for dialogue with Islamic faith


About the author

Michael Humphrey holds the chair in sociology at the University of Sydney (Australia). He has published widely on the themes of Islam in the West, Lebanese emigration, the anthropology of globalisation, political violence and terrorism, human rights politics and reconciliation. A major theme in his work has been the relationship between the individual, collectivities and the state. His main publications are Islam, Multiculturalism & Transnationalism: From the Lebanese Diaspora (IB Tauris 1998) and The Politics of Atrocity and Reconciliation: From Terror to Trauma (Routledge 2002). E-mail: michael.humphrey@sydney.edu.au
Turkish Communities in the Russian Federation

SERGEI V. RYAZANTSEV
Institute for Social and Political Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

This paper examines the two largest Turkish communities in the Russian Federation. Belonging to the first community are Turkish-language speakers who are usually Turkish citizens working temporarily in Russia. The second community consists of Meskhetian Turks who in different periods of history have been known by various names, including Georgian Muslims, Muslim Meskhetians, Meshs, Meskhetian Turks, Turkish Ahiska and Ahalczihk Turks. These communities essentially differ in their origin and identity, settlement and migration, way of life and spheres of employment. These differences are outlined and the adaptation and integration of these communities into Russian society discussed. Also considered are the implications of their experiences for the development of Russian migration policy in relation to temporary labour migration.

According to United Nations data, the Russian Federation has become one of the leading immigration receiving countries based on absolute number of immigrants. According to available data from international comparisons between 1990 and 2000 Russia ranked second among immigrant receiving countries with a flow of 13.3 million persons. This placed Russia behind only the United States, which received around 35 million immigrants over the same period. Between 1995 and 2000 in Russia the mid-year net annual average level of migration was 176 per 1,000 persons. This compared with the United Kingdom at 205 per 1,000 and Germany at 204 per 1,000 and was ahead of Canada (145 per 1,000) and Italy (121 per 1,000). The highest level of net migration was in the US, which received 1,249,000 immigrants (Denisenko et al. 2003: 8). The main migrant flow to Russia is channelled from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. From 1993 to 2007 Russia received 6.5 million persons from these former USSR countries. For the most part (59 per cent) the migrants were ethnic Russians (see Table 1). In 2007 the special state programme to stimulate the return of fellow nationals started to be implemented. According to our estimates (Ryazantsev and Grebenyuk 2008: 32), at present 16–17 million Russians live in CIS and Baltic countries. Of these, 3–4 million constitute the potential for migration to Russia in the medium term.
Table 1: Share of Russians in the migration flow from CIS countries and Baltic states to the Russian Federation (1993–2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5 300</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>3 225</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share (%)</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is possible to identify two principal causes that determine immigration to Russia. The first is internal: the Russian economy has developed in a relatively successful way, demands for expanding the labour force have increased and relatives of Russians who formerly lived in the USSR are now living in CIS countries. The external cause of immigration to Russia lies in the fact that Russia has potent demographic resources nearby. China, India and the Central Asian states represent this potential (Osipov and Ryazantsev 2008: 545). At present these countries are home to nearly half of the world’s population. Among numerous consequences of large-scale immigration to Russia is the formation and increase in the numbers of ethnic communities that occupy “niches” in some branches of the economy where they enjoy solid positions in business.

1. Turkish communities in Russia: size and settlement

It is much easier to determine the size of the Turkish community in countries that have not changed their frontiers for a long time and which possess well-established systems of migrant registration based on country of origin. There are considerable difficulties in assessing the number of Turks resident in Russia. At first glance it may seem that the strict definition of ethnic origins used in the Soviet Union and in recent Russian censuses provides a basis for ascertaining the precise numbers in the Turkish population. However, peculiarities in the census organisation have seriously distorted assessments of the real numbers of the Turkish population in Russia. In particular, in the course of the 2002 census in various regions different ethnic groups were designated as “Turks” while a considerable part of the Turkish population was not counted separately.

One reason for this problem is that in Russia several groups are assigned to the category of “Turk”. In addition to ethnic origin these groups are often grouped on the basis of spatial location. For example, in the course of the most recent All-Russian census (2002) groups of Turkish populations were identified as Ottoman
Turks, Meskhetian Turks, Batumi Turks and Sukhumi Turks. Moreover, the census also registered citizens of Turkey who resided in the territory of the Russian Federation. It is also known that due to various circumstances members of the Turkish community in some regions were assigned to other national groups even though Turks were alien to such groups. Field studies we performed in the late 1990s in the North Caucasus showed that, for example, many Meskhetian Turks were characterised as Azerbaijanis or Turkomans during the 1989 census. Therefore, one should be cautious about the results of the 1989 census in respect to the assessment of the number of Meskhetian Turks. Figure 1 demonstrates this quite vividly and it is important for understanding how, in the 2002 census, the size of the Turkish community increased several times.

**Figure 1:** Size of Turkish population in the USSR/Russian Federation according to census figures (1970–2002)

![Bar chart showing Turkish population figures from 1970 to 2002.](source)

In the most recent All-Russian census of 2002 more than 92,000 individuals styled themselves as “Turks”. According to the Russian Committee of State Statistics, Ottoman Turks, Batumi Turks and Sukhumi Turks were included in the category of “Turks”. In addition, 3,000 Meskhetian Turks were registered as a distinct ethnic group. However it is obvious that a considerable methodological error has been committed in their case. Research studies undertaken in 2004 on the 2002 All Russian census confirmed that there were many more Meskhetian Turks in the country, no less than 72,000 persons (Trier and Khajin 2007: 26). An incredible discrepancy of no less than 74,000 persons arises! This suggests that in recent USSR and Russian censuses in some regions Meskhetian Turks were recorded as Turks. Yet it remains uncertain what questions and processes were used in counting members of Meskhetian Turkish communities. Consequently it remains
unclear how individuals made their choice between reporting that they belonged to
one of the two categories: “Turk” and “Meskhetian Turk”. The most likely
explanation is that either the enquiry was carried out incorrectly or the census
officers did not attach particular significance to dividing the “Turks” into the two
distinct groups.

**Figure 2:** Settlement concentration of Turks in the Russian regions (2002 census)

![Map of Turk concentration in Russia](image)

*Source: Russian Committee of Government Statistics.*

It should be also noted that the 2002 census recorded only the permanent
population of Russia, i.e. only those persons who stayed more than a year in
Russia. This led to a significant under-registration of temporary migrants who
worked in Russia for relatively short periods. Moreover, migrants who stayed in
Russia without any legal status, on an irregular or semi-regular basis were not
included in the census. For example, such persons could be registered at their
places of residence but had no work permit. Or they had no registration and no
work permit. According to our estimate under-registration of various immigrant
groups in the 2002 census could amount to 5–10 per cent of their real numbers.
Data on temporary migrant movement from Turkey vividly demonstrates the
problem. According to the 2002 census about 5,000 Turkish citizens resided in
Russia (the majority of them were temporary labour migrants). The Federal
Migration Service data for the same year attest that no less than 15,000 labourers
from Turkey worked in Russia. A simple calculation demonstrates that the census
did not take into account 60 per cent of the Turkish migrant workers who were
living in Russia at the time of the census. In addition to the workers there are also
students. For example, in 2007, 790 Turkish students were studying in Russian institutions of higher education (Dmitriev et al. 2007: 18). Based on these considerations it seems that the real size of the Turkish and Meskhetian Turkish communities in Russia may constitute no less than 120,000–150,000 persons.

The Turkish communities in Russia are predominantly settled in the south of Russia (the regions of Ciscaucasia, North Caucasus, along the Volga, in Rostov and Krasnodar regions, Kabardino-Balkaria Autonomous Republic, Stavropol and Volgograd regions, Kalmykia Autonomous Republic and North Ossetian Autononous Republic). A not inconsiderable part of the Turkish community resides in Central Russia, for example, in Belgorod and Voronezh regions and Moscow city (Figure 2). However, if Meskhetian Turks dominate the Turkish community structure in the first, southern zone of settlement, then the ethnic Turks who are temporary labour migrants dominate the structure of the Turkish community of Central Russia. Some territories with relatively small numbers of Russians have the greatest concentration of Turkish population. Such regions actively employ labour migrants from Turkey (the most obvious examples are Chukotka, Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets autonomous districts, Tyumen region and a number of other Russian territories).

There are several Turkish communities in Russia and these communities represent very different ethnic groups. Here we deal only with the two largest Turkish communities. The first consists of the citizens of Turkey, representatives of the Turkish nation who speak the Turkic languages of the Altaic family of languages, and the second of Meskhetian Turks who in different periods were referred to as Muslim Georgians, Muslim Meskhetians, Meskhs, Meskhetian Turks, Akhska Turks, Akhatsikhe Turks, etc. The community of Meskhetian Turks is divided over their group’s origin. There is the “Georgian version” which argues that historically the group resided in the territory of Georgia and was forced to accept Islam and be “Turkised” under the Ottoman rule. Proponents of the “Turkish version” argue the group is a sub-group within the Turkish nation and historically had close connections with the Eastern Anatolian Turks who still live on the border of Turkey and Meskhetia (a region of Georgia). Taking into account the distinctive origin, identity, ways of life and characteristics of the Turks and Meskhetian Turks migration, these two Turkish communities should be considered separately. It also should be noted that in Russia these two Turkish communities do not interact directly, although it is known that some of the Meskhetian Turks emigrated to Turkey because they regarded Turkey as their motherland.

2. Community of Turkish labour migrants in Russia

During the 2000s Russia witnessed a steady increase in Turkish worker numbers. The particularly rapid increase started from 2003. As data of the Federal Migration Service demonstrate, the numbers of labour migrants grew, on average, by 30–50 per cent per annum. These are quite high rates of labour migrant increase. By 2008, over 130,000 Turkish citizens worked in Russia. That means that every tenth
labour migrant in Russia originated from Turkey (Figure 3). Turkey occupied the fifth position among those countries supplying foreign labour to Russia behind only Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China and Ukraine (Ryazantsev 2007: 113).

**Figure 3:** Number of labour migrants from Turkey holding official labour contracts in Russia (1994–2008)

![Graph showing the number of Turkish labour migrants in Russia from 1994 to 2008]

*Source: Federal Migration Service of Russia.*

Half of the Turkish labour migrants worked in the Central Federal District and every fourth Turkish migrant worked in Moscow. Recently, however, the geographical location of the Turkish labour force in Russia has expanded considerably. Now Turks are concentrated in Moscow, Tatarstan, Sakhalin, Krasnodar, Yamalo Nenets autonomous district, Saint Petersburg, Nizhni Novgorod, Khanty-Mansi autonomous district and Sverdlovsk region (Figure 4).

In some Russian regions the Turkish labour migrants are an important component of the population of foreign workers. For example, according to our calculations, Turkish workers comprised 56 per cent of foreign workers in the Autonomous Republic of Udmurtia and over 47 per cent of foreign workers in Chukotka. The Turkish migrant workers comprised about 34 per cent of foreign workers in Nizhni Novgorod region, 32 per cent in Yaroslavl region and more than 31 per cent of all foreign labour migrants drawn to the regional labour market in 2006 from abroad (Figure 5).
**Figure 4:** Distribution of labour migrants from Turkey in the Russian regions (2006)

![Distribution of labour migrants from Turkey in the Russian regions (2006)](image)

*Source:* Federal Migration Service of Russia.

**Figure 5:** Percentage share of temporary labour migrants from Turkey in total foreign labour force in the Russian regions (2006)

![Percentage share of temporary labour migrants from Turkey in total foreign labour force in the Russian regions (2006)](image)

The increased geographical spread of the Turkish migrant labour force attraction is a result of the construction boom in Russian cities which became apparent in the 2000s. Over 84 per cent of all Turkish labour migrants are employed in the construction sector (Figure 6). At present over 330 Turkish companies are doing business in Russia. These companies specialise in the construction of offices, trade and business centres, hotels, social infrastructure facilities, and housing estates. About 90 per cent of Turkish companies operate in Moscow, the remaining 10 per cent work in other regions of Russia. The Turkish workers are recognised as responsible, disciplined workers who carry out very high-quality construction. For example, Turkish workers were invited to construct the Europe-Centre in Kaliningrad, Samara-Baltica brewery, water park, Moskovski mall and Samaraneftegaz office centre in Samara region, the Saving Bank building in Stavropol and many other facilities.

Figure 6: Percentage distribution of labour migrants from Turkey by sectors of the Russian economy (2006)

[Diagram showing percentage distribution]

Source: Federal Migration Service of Russia.

Recently the global economic crisis has affected the Turkish labour migrants in Russia. Some construction companies have gone into bankruptcy and labour migrants have lost their jobs. The most recent case was recorded in Ekaterinburg in July 2008, when 122 labour migrants from Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan found themselves with no employment, wages or shelter. Despite the problems, prospects for the use of Turkish workers in Russia are good. According to data from the Federal Migration Service of Russia, no less than 1 million workers will be required to construct the Olympic facilities in Sochi where the winter Olympic Games will be held in 2014. It is planned to draw labour migrants from Turkey and China. According to the International Olympic Committee’s requirements, forty-six sports facilities are to be constructed as a matter of high priority. The Olympic construction will cover 7,000 hectares along the Black Sea shore. The Olympic
Committee of Russia and the National Olympic Committee of Turkey have already signed an agreement on cooperation.

Living and labour conditions for temporary labour migrants from Turkey are better than for labour migrants from the CIS countries. This is determined by the way that labour migration from Turkey is in most cases organised and regulated. Turkish companies were among the first foreign companies that started to invest in the construction of settlements for labour migrants. For example, Enka, the Turkish construction company which has operated in Moscow for a long time (specialists of the company took part in the restoration of the Russian Government building, the so-called “White House”, construction of the International House of Music and several buildings in the Moscow-City complex). The company has built three special camps for temporary labour migrants. At present there are 13,500 workers at various construction sites of Enka in the Moscow region. The largest camp, for 1,800 temporary migrants, is located in Taganka precinct. Various buildings have been constructed for workers, engineers, managers, and employees with families. For example, a room for workers is designed to accommodate four persons, and a toilet and shower are installed at the end of the corridor. Every room is equipped with a refrigerator and TV set and has a basic level of comfort. A company responsible for the recruitment of labour migrants pays for their accommodation in the camp. The camp provides labour migrants with board, laundry services, medical services, an exercise room and billiards. Workers are transported from the camp to the construction sites. A Turkish worker’s monthly wage comprises, on the average, 20,000 roubles (US$670–700); an engineer’s monthly wage is 30,000 roubles (approximately US$1,000). The company is also responsible for registration of migrants, and obtaining visas and work permits for the labour migrants. The authorities intend to publicise and extend this arrangement elsewhere in Moscow and other regions. For example, the capital city authorities have decided to construct temporary administrative and on-site quarters for foreign workers employed in housing and utilities construction in Lefortovo, Mar’ino and Vykhino precincts. This method of settlement suits only temporary labour migrants who come to Russia for relatively short periods. But if we are referring to migrants who stay in Russia for several years it is desirable to disperse them and assist their learning of the Russian language and the basics of the Russian culture.

In addition to construction, a proportion of the Turkish labour migrants (about 5 per cent) is employed in trade, services and public catering. There are Turkish restaurants and snack bars in Russia. For example, the Turkish restaurant “Flora-Burger” has opened in Stavropol city. The restaurant offers only Turkish cuisine adapted to the Russian tastes and it is popular among city dwellers. Traditional Turkish snack bars (kebabs) are widespread in West European cities, but they have not yet become a mass phenomenon in Moscow and other Russian cities. The Turkish cuisine experiences serious competition from Central Asian and Transcaucasian cuisines (Uzbek, Tajik, Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, etc.) in Russian cities. For example, “Shaurma” booths are widespread in Moscow. According to results of a study performed by Magram Market Research, about
58 per cent of the capital’s residents polled use the services of these booths, and about 57 per cent use hot-dog and grilled chicken booths. In popularity ratings these fast-food small enterprises are surpassed only by McDonald’s and Roadsticks restaurants (http://www.magram.ru).

A little more than 2 per cent of Turkish labour migrants work at industrial plants. For example, a large electric furnace steelmaking plant will be constructed in Pervouralsk town in Sverdlovsk region. The Turkish company Gama, which will employ Turkish migrants on a rotational basis, has been invited to take part in the project. Another group of Turkish labour migrants works in agriculture. These migrant workers are seasonal workers employed in harvesting the cereal crops in the south of Russia. For example, Turkish combine harvesters and the labour of Turkish combine operators have been used in Stavropol region for several years. According to local authorities, this practice allows harvesting with less loss of production.

Despite the extensive use of Turkish workers in Russian regions their role in the total structure of the employed population in regional labour markets is insignificant. The highest level is in Chukotka where there are 66 Turkish workers per 1,000 employed persons. The same index in Sakhalin is 18 Turkish workers per 1,000 with, about 6 per 1,000 in Yamalo-Nenets autonomous district and about 5 per 1,000 in Tatarstan (Figure 7).

It is important to note that there is a great gap between information derived from the official sources that register labour migrants and the real numbers of labour migrants to Russia because of the presence of illegal or undocumented individuals. Assessments of irregular labour migration vary considerably, sometimes by millions. Representatives of state structures offer rather high estimates of irregular labour migrant numbers in Russia. For example, representatives of the Russian Federation Ministry of the Interior estimate irregular immigration to Russia amounts to 10 million persons (Ryzantsev 2003: 153). Some politicians have aired another figure and said there are 15 million irregular migrants in Russia. As the state structure did not undertake studies of irregular labour migrant numbers, these estimates are only tentative. The Federal Migration Service in 2005–06 tried to carry out a study of irregular migration but, unfortunately, the attempt was limited to interviewing experts from the academic community. The only assessment of the number of irregular labour migrants which seems to closely approximate reality are data obtained in the course of the 2002 census. As noted earlier, the census identified about 2 million “excessive” people, the majority of whom may be unregistered labour migrants. Our calculations show that there may actually be at least 5 million irregular (unregistered) migrants in Russia. Citizens of the CIS countries constitute the majority of these irregular migrants. These people enjoy the right to come to Russia with no visa but then they do not obtain registration at the place of residence or work permits. Many of these people live in Russia for several years or sometimes return periodically to their native countries. As the experts note, it is possible to identify three groups among irregular labour migrants in
First, there are seasonal migrants who work in Russia for six to nine months. They are citizens of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Moldova who are employed mainly in construction. Second, there are labour migrants who work in Russia for short periods. As a rule, these people are petty traders resident in districts adjacent to the Russian border who are cross-border traders. The third group consists of migrants from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Vietnam and some other countries. These people do not visit their native countries (countries of their citizenship) and virtually live permanently in Russia. If they are found in the course of checks organised by the Federal Migration Service these people are normally deported to their native countries. But the official data on the number of deported Turkish irregular migrants are not published in Russia. Media reports in Isvestiya state that officers of the Federal Security Service Directorate for Saratov region deported forty Turkish citizens for violation of immigration regulations as their visas had expired. Initially the foreigners were detained because their visas had expired. Moreover, counterfeited stamps certifying the crossing of the Russian border were found in one passport. The results of an investigation found that citizens of Turkey

**Figure 7:** Percentage share of temporary labour migrants from Turkey in employed population of the Russian regions (2006)

arrived in Russia after they had bought working visas in order to work at one of the
construction companies. According to the law they were meant to leave Russia and
then return to Russia with “working” visas in order to find employment. However
employers decided to evade these requirements. Passports of labour migrants were
sent by mail to Turkey and then a Moscow company invited migrants back to
Saratov with new visas. Eventually these Turkish citizens were expelled from
Russia and a criminal prosecution was initiated. In autumn 2008, officers of the
Federal Migration Service Directorate for Saratov region detained ten Turkish
citizens in Zavodski district of Saratov city. These Turks worked on the
construction of the Real hypermarket without work permits which violated the
regulations on foreigners staying in Russia. As documents were checked it was
found that the foreigners arrived to Russia in September, 2008 at the invitation of
Moscow Promstroikomplekt, a limited liability company that carried out repair and
construction works. It was found that the Turkish citizens were registered in
Moscow while actually living and working in Saratov which violated regulations.
Besides that, the Turks worked paving tiles in the building under construction
without work permits. Each of the arrested labour migrants was fined for violation
of the Russian migration laws and paid a penalty of 8,000 roubles. A manager of
the company responsible for the foreign workers staying in Russia was fined
500,000 roubles for illegal engagement of foreign citizens.

Unfortunately, such examples occur in various regions of Russia. This
demonstrates that the problem of irregular labour migration has not been resolved.
Signing of inter-state agreements between Russia and Turkey on regulation and
control of labour migration and the prevention of irregular migration may play an
important role in prevention of irregular migration. This has been the case in
Russia’s relations with other countries. Bilateral agreements are effective
instruments of labour migration regulation. In some Russian-Turkish documents
migration is mentioned as an important process with social-economic effects. At
the same time, according to data provided by the Bank of Russia, the aggregate
amount of money remittances of the Turkish migrants from Russia to Turkey in
2005 was US$37 million. According to data of the Federal Migration Service,
between 1992 and 2005 about 900 natives of Turkey became “new” citizens of
Russia, i.e. obtained Russian citizenship (Federal Migration Service 2006: 10). In
the Joint Declaration on the extension of friendship and the multidisciplinary
partnership between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey (December
2004) and in the Agreement on cooperation between the Russian Federation
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Turkey
(December 1992) problems generated by migration are mentioned. Unfortunately,
Russian-Turkish migration relations are not yet covered by special protocols or
agreements on the regulation of labour migration. Meanwhile migration flows
between the two states are soaring. Not only are Turkish workers coming to Russia
but many Russian citizens work and spend vacations in Turkey. Signing
agreements on labour and irregular migration could make a significant positive
contribution to relations between Russia and Turkey.
3. Community of Meskhetian Turks in Russia

During the Soviet period in 1944 about 120,000 Meskhetian Turks were deported from Georgia (Meskhetia, Javakhetia, Adzharia) to the Central Asian republics where they were settled mainly in the Fergana Valley, Tashkent and Samarkand regions of Uzbekistan, in Chuisk (Bishkek) and the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan, as well as in the southern regions of Kazakhstan. In 1968 the Meskhetian Turks partially regained their rights. In the late 1970s and early 1980s several hundred families returned to Georgia. In June 1989, the Meskhetian Turks became the victims of riots in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan. More than 100 were killed and around 17,000 Meskhetian Turks were evacuated to Central Russia. The evacuation was performed on the basis of secret and unpublished directives of the USSR highest authorities. Resolution 503 of the USSR Council of Ministers and Resolution 220 of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic were dedicated to issues of material and organisational-technical aid to the people evacuated from the Fergana Valley to the Central part of Russia. In 1990–91 more than 70,000 Meskhetian Turks who resided in Uzbekistan and were afraid of violence left Uzbekistan for Azerbaijan, Russia and the Ukraine of their own accord while a small number moved to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Trier and Khajin 2007: 17). In the early 1990s some Meskhetian Turks also began to move to Turkey. In addition the organised migration of Meskhetian Turks from Russia to the United States has now begun. This migration is carried on with support from the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Recent studies show that the total number of Meskhetian Turks is about 450,000. Of these, 75,000 are resident in the Russian Federation (Table 2; Trier and Khajin 2007: 26).

Table 2: Approximate number of Meskhetian Turks by country of residence (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Meskhetian Turks</th>
<th>Share of total number (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>75 000</td>
<td>16.0–17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>137 000</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>130 000</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>35 000</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>33 300</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>20 000–25 000</td>
<td>4.0–5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>9 200</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>450 000–455 000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At present there are Meskhetian Turks resident in some thirty regions of Russia. Two-thirds of them are concentrated in the southern part of Russia where their number may amount to approximately 50,000 people. Of these, there are around 18,000 in Krasnodar region, about 16,000 in Rostov region and no less than 7,000 Meskhetian Turks in Stavropol region, while about 5,000 live in Kabardino-Balkaria. Meskhetian Turks also live in other regions. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Stavropol and Krasnodar authorities invited Meskhetian Turks to work in agriculture and did not impede their resettlement. For example, chiefs of some collective and state farms (the collective agricultural enterprises that existed in the USSR) visited various regions of Uzbekistan to recruit settlers to work on tobacco farms, crop-growing and livestock farms in Krasnodar and Stavropol regions (Osipov and Cherepova 1996: 11).

The migration of Meskhetian Turks to the southern regions of Russia became substantial after riots in the Ferghana Valley that occurred in 1989. Over a few years about 15,000 Meskhetian Turks arrived in Krasnodar region and about 2,000 came to Stavropol region. Although Meskhetian Turks actually were refugees their resettlement took place within a single state, the USSR. Meskhetian Turks did not cross the state’s borders and did not leave the country. In 1990–92 mechanisms of registration and refugee admission began to emerge in Russia. Usually this process was defined by the regional rules introduced by local executive bodies. Most often local rules were of a restrictive and sometimes discriminatory character because the authorities did not want to accept responsibility for the forced migrants and to provide them with necessary help. In the southern regions of Russia this unwillingness manifested itself particularly strongly. Meskhetian Turks could not obtain registration and Russian citizenship in the southern regions for a long time. According to studies, by 1992 between 11,000 and 13,000 Meskhetian Turks were denied registration in Krasnodar region. The same fate befell 400–700 Meskhetian Turks in Kabardino-Balkaria, 400–500 in Stavropol region and 700 in Rostov region (Osipov 2007: 305).

The greater part of Meskhetian Turks nevertheless obtained their registration later: in Rostov region in 1992–93, in Stavropol region in 1996–97. Then, following simplified procedures for naturalisation provided for former Soviet citizens in the period from 1992 to 2000, Meskhetian Turks were entitled to get the Russian citizenship. However the local authorities in Krasnodar region and Kabardino-Balkaria Autonomous Republic still hinder resettlement of Meskhetian Turks and do not allow their registration. Consequently, Meskhetian Turks cannot become citizens of Russia. About 10,000–11,000 Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar region and some 400–700 Meskhetian Turks in Kabardino-Balkaria are de jure Russian citizens based on Article 11 of the Law on Citizenship but actually remain stateless persons. Some categories of Meskhetian Turks (retired persons, veterans of the Second World War, veterans of the Afghan war, persons who took part in alleviating the effects of the Chernobyl disaster) succeeded in getting registration in Krasnodar region. However sometimes their immediate relatives are often denied the registration. Vatan, a society of Meskhetian Turks, regularly submits
petitions to local authorities in favour of retired persons who cannot receive their allowances without registration. Some Meskhetian Turks obtained registration as a result of judicial decisions. However not everybody goes to the courts because they are afraid of the expense, the exacerbation of relations with local authorities and bureaucratic problems. Meskhetian Turks were citizens of the former USSR. They resettled to the Russian Federation territory in 1989–91. The Russian law on citizenship that came into effect on 6 February 1992 specified that all citizens of the former USSR resident on Russian territory who did not renounce Russian citizenship within a year of the law coming into effect had the opportunity to obtain Russian citizenship.

Lack of the legal status of citizenship generates problems that the migrants confront as they try to register real estate deals. Many Meskhetian Turks purchased homes in Krasnodar region from the Crimean Tatars and Greeks. In a majority of cases they made the purchases and sales on the basis of undocumented transactions that were not certified by notaries. Considerable difficulties with registration of dwellings arise. Lack of registration does not permit young adults to get passports and actually shuts access to higher education institutions. Moreover, such young men are not drawn to the military. Without registration it is impossible to get allowances for children and other allowances and the opportunity to move even within a single district is restricted. People are unable even to register their marriages or register a child by their father’s surname. Lack of citizenship and registration makes it impossible to vote in elections.

These problems prompted the US authorities to launch a special programme of resettlement for Meskhetian Turks who had no Russian citizenship from Krasnodar region to the United States. By the end of 2005 about 7,000 Meskhetian Turks moved there and were resettled in thirty states. In addition, more than 14,000 persons meet the programme requirements and will move to the US in the near future. Experts think that the population of Meskhetian Turks in the US will grow in the forthcoming decade in much the same way as other ethnic groups have increased their size. As they adapt to American life and acquire US citizenship, Meskhetian Turks will start to facilitate the immigration of their distant relatives still living in the former USSR territory. The development of small businesses among members of this group will also bring about further labour migration of Meskhetian Turks to the US (Koryushkina and Sverdlov 2007: 269).

Some of these Meskhetian Turks from ex-USSR countries including Russia have moved to Turkey. In 1992, at the initiative of Turgat Özal, the President of Turkey, the law on migration and settlement of Meskhetian Turks in Turkey was passed. This law permits migration of two categories of person: a person may migrate either at his/her own discretion or join resettlement programmes provided their number do not exceed a certain limit. In 1992, 150 families of Meskhetian Turks moved to Turkey, and were followed in 1993 by another 350 families of Meskhetian Turks. These people got civil rights and found jobs that corresponded to their skills and qualifications. In addition to resettlement initiated by the state a
considerable part of Meskhetian Turks immigrated to Turkey on their own. Many Meskhetian Turks came by using tourist visas and then became irregular migrants as their visas expired. As experts note, the impression exists that the Turkish authorities in no way hinder the Meskhetian Turks’ presence in Turkey and even welcome it. At present over a half of the Meskhetian Turks who moved to Turkey do not have Turkish citizenship. Nevertheless from 1997 to 2004 the Council of Ministers of Turkey by a series of resolutions granted residence permits to 32,500 persons. According to laws operating in Turkey, Meskhetian Turks are considered as “national refugees” (Aidyngyun 2007: 241).

On the basis of this examination of the situation of the Meskhetian Turks in Russia it is apparent that several conditions are required for their successful integration. First, it is necessary to formalise their legal status as without it they are deprived of many civil rights. This contributes to a negative attitude among the migrants towards the state and creates uncertainty about their future and creates opportunities for discrimination which impedes the integration of the migrants in the receiving society.

The second important condition for integration is to provide assistance to settle comfortably in migrants’ new residential locations. It is important to provide assistance to them on a basis of parity with the local population. Investments in social infrastructure facilities (schools, hospitals, nurseries, water supply systems, etc.) are quite effective vehicles for promoting migrant integration because such facilities are used both by migrants and local people. Supporting housing construction and the development of individual businesses through loans is another effective vehicle of integration. This particular measure also has to treat the interests of migrants and the local population equally so as not to aggravate material differences. For several years the Danish Council for Refugees carried on an “Integration” programme in the southern part of Russia. The principal aim of the programme was to integrate the forced migrants into a new community by supporting a strategy of active migrant adaptation, nurturing the local population’s friendly attitudes towards the migrants and shaping tolerance within local communities. One of the programme’s emphases included social projects that facilitated migrant adaptation and the formation of tolerance in the region and providing small interest-free loans to the families of forced migrants and other socially unprotected groups in the population to launch small businesses.

In the southern part of Russia, Meskhetian Turks specialise in growing vegetables and young plants: carrots, capsicums, tomatoes, cabbages, eggplants, potatoes and salad vegetables. The overwhelming majority of Meskhetian Turks lease land in “dying” collective farms and pay rent partly from the harvest and/or in money obtained from the sale of their goods. Employment is seasonal. Meskhetian Turks earn only in summer and autumn. During the season all members of a family work in their fields because only persistent unremitting labour provides the income which will be consumed in the off-season. Marketing of the produce is carried on in several ways. The first is trade along busy motor roads. Such major unregulated
markets can be seen along busy main roads in Stavropol region (Figure 8). They consist of primitively equipped points of sale with counters nailed on boards and trees. Marketing of produce right in the fields is also common. Sales of vegetables in this case are either wholesale (vegetables are sold to dealers, middlemen) or retail.

**Figure 8:** Meskhetian Turk roadside vegetable market in Stavropol region near the town of Blagodarny (August 2008)

The second way of marketing is by selling at established markets. In markets in the southern part of Russia marketing of produce is the responsibility of Turkish women. According to drivers of long distance vehicles Turks also deliver part of their produce to Moscow, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Saint-Petersburg and a number of other cities. This type of trade is fraught with considerable risks and expenses: it is necessary to pay for transport and bribes to trade at the markets and the cost of cartage of cargo over the roads. Besides that, not all kinds of products are in demand in cities of Central Russia.

In the course of field studies in Kurskaya district (Stavropol region) we found that 300 to 400 able-bodied Meskhetian Turks make permanent seasonal migrations to the near-border villages of Kurskaya district from adjacent districts of the Chechen Autonomous Republic where they have permanent residence. Such migrations are
connected with field work on farms in the Kurskaya district. Normally Meskhetian Turks lease land to cultivate vegetables and live in temporary dwellings until the end of harvesting. We established that Meskhetian Turks make seasonal and family migrations among Kabardino-Balkaria, Rostov, Krasnodar and Stavropol regions. The migration of Meskhetian Turks from regions in the North Caucasus to some regions in Central Russia for marketing of vegetable produce is similar to the migration described above. According to drivers of heavy vehicles sometimes Meskhetian Turks hire them to get produce to regions in Central Russia and now and then escort their cargoes alongside the drivers. It is difficult to assess the scope of such migration because it is irregular and casual.

The third prerequisite for successful integration of migrants where they are concentrated involves the implementation of a policy of “cultural integration”. Such policies may be implemented at regional and local levels and be a genuine instrument of rapprochement between the Meskhetian Turks and the local population. Programmes of cultural integration may be considered as the most effective way of preventing inter-ethnic conflict. It is not by chance that the UN High Commissioner for National Minorities declared that “money invested in prevention of an inter-ethnic conflict is an exceptionally profitable investment. In humanitarian, financial and political terms conflict prevention will cost far less than efforts aimed at peace settlement or post-conflict reconstruction of a society” (Ryazantsev 2003: 227).

Programmes of cultural integration might include support by humanitarian organisations to assist regional media to cover the history of ethnic minorities, for projects carried on by educational institutions and aimed at the language adaptation of ethnic migrant children, the holding of various exhibitions and days of national cultures. In the countryside schools might be centres of such activities. Education traditionally has been the basis and the force for unifying different nations. Educational system not only raise the level of education but act as a “social filter”. Facilitating the school education of all groups of the population can defuse ethnic and religious conflict. Media may also play a considerable role in the formation of positive attitude towards migrants.

As this paper has shown, the exact population size of the Turkish groups in Russia is unknown. However, it is obvious that it exceeds the numbers in the official data and is at least 120,000–150,000 people. The two largest communities, Meskhetian Turks and the temporary labour migrants from Turkey do not have direct contact with each other. Each community has its own origins and identity, pattern of movements and settlement, way of life and employment. Those from Turkey are settled in the Northern Caucasus, the Volga region and Central Russia. These territories with their own rather small populations now have the major concentrations of labour migrants from Turkey whom they employ. Labour migrants from Turkey are mainly employed in construction, manufacturing and agriculture and focus primarily on their temporary employment and plans to return to Turkey. Meskhetian Turks who are mainly employed in agriculture and most
would like to remain permanently in Russia. However, they face problems with the administration and government which complicates their integration into Russian society. The Russian migration and integration policies should consider these differences. This will facilitate strengthening understanding between different ethnic groups and may increase knowledge of neighbours’ national and cultural traditions. Ultimately, this will accelerate the process of migrant integration into their new places of residence and decrease the risks of inter-ethnic conflicts emerging.

References


About the author

Sergei Ryazantsev is a doctor of economics, professor and head of the Centre for Social Demography and Economic Sociology, Institute for Social and Political Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. His field research concerns migration processes, ethnic communities and migration policy in the Russian Federation. E-mail: riazan@mail.ru
“Soft” and “Hard” Landings: the Experience of School under Contrasting Institutional Arrangements in Australia and France

JOEL WINDLE
Faculty of Education, Monash University

Turkish migration to France and Australia has followed a similar pattern, and the children of these migrants can be found in similar sites in the academic hierarchy present in both countries. However, important differences in the management of ethnic and religious identities and in the organisation of schooling have produced contrasting experiences for families and their children. The research findings presented here reveal processes underpinning the maintenance of “dreams” in Australia and hastening “disillusionment” in France. In Victoria, academic judgements are deferred and students remain in a comprehensive system in which all can at least aspire to the most academically demanding professions. By contrast, the attitudes of students in the French system are formed by examinations and separation into specialised vocational sections by the age of 15. Combined with more rigid pedagogical approaches and heightened ethnic tensions, this tends to produce a sense of disillusionment among students in France.

My purpose in this paper is to show how the different social and policy contexts of Australia and France shape the interactions of Turkish migrants and their children with schooling. While the sociology of educational inequalities is a well-developed field (Bernstein 1975; Bourdieu and Passeron 1964, 1970; Duru-Bellat 2002; Teese and Polesel 2003; Willis 1977), the study of how these social processes relate to experiences of migration and ethnic boundaries can benefit from comparative research which extends its conceptual reach. My aim therefore is to extend the theoretical framework developed by Bourdieu, in particular, to allow a fuller consideration of ethnicity.

In order to better understand the relative weight and interplay of influences pertaining to ethnicity or to institutional and political factors, the study focused on
the subjective experiences of students from a single ethnic group identified as being educationally disadvantaged in two distinctive settings. Turkish-background students provided a suitable group for a comparison between France and Australia – selected as contrasting institutional and political settings – in the light of similar patterns of migration, settlement and educational difficulties. The Turkish community in Australia and France brings to their engagement with school distinctive cultural values and family structures, but these are also shaped by the distinctive conditions of reception offered by the two countries.

A number of “ethnic qualities” are relevant to an investigation of school experience (ethnicity is understood here as a situated process of social construction (Fenton 2003). It has been argued that the Turks, in common with labour migrants, pass on to their children a distinctively strong desire for social improvement through education and devote particular energy to their children’s education (Inglis et al. 1992). At the same time, parents’ interaction with schools and support of children is limited by lack of confidence, language skills and low levels of participation in the labour market. Community bonds remain strong in the Turkish-background populations of Australia and France, with Turkish migrants geographically concentrated in particular areas. This has led to the maintenance of the Turkish language and certain cultural traditions, some in modified form, across generations. Ethnographic research has shown that distinctive gender roles, sexual norms and sets of kinship obligation remain important in both national settings (Irtis-Dabbagh 2003; Elley 1985). These traditions have been viewed as limiting the chances of girls at school, or alternatively as propelling girls to see education as a means of avoiding onerous social or sexual norms (such as early marriage).

Through a comparison of the Turkish experience in two contrasting institutional settings, the study therefore sought to answer the following questions:

1. Do Turkish-background students perceive and manage the demands of school differently to students from other backgrounds?

2. Is it possible to speak of distinctively “Turkish” responses to schooling?

3. Do the different institutional conditions represented by France and Australia lead to different adaptive strategies?

1. Policy contexts

1.1. Victoria

Each Australian state is responsible for managing its own education system, although the Federal Government also provides some funding. The study reported here took place in Victoria, where secondary education begins at the age of 12, after seven years of primary education (see Table 1). Secondary education in
Victoria takes place in a single school structure, although some senior campuses are physically separate from junior campuses. Schooling is compulsory until the age of 15 (16 from 2007), but offers no qualification prior to the Year 12 leaving certificate, taken at the end of six years of secondary study at the age of 18.

Table 1: Age progression through Victoria (Australia) and French systems (year of sample in bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Victoria</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kindergarten</td>
<td>Ecole maternelle: Petite section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kindergarten</td>
<td>Moyenne section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Primary school: Prep</td>
<td>Grande section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Grade 1</td>
<td>Ecole élémentaire: CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Grade 2</td>
<td>CE 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Grade 3</td>
<td>CE 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Grade 4</td>
<td>CM 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Grade 5</td>
<td>CM 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Grade 6</td>
<td>Collège: 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Secondary school: Year 7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Year 8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Year 9</td>
<td>3 Brevet des collèges*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Year 10</td>
<td>Lycée général et technologique: Seconde générale et technologique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Year 11</td>
<td>Première générale or technologique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Year 12 VCE*</td>
<td>Terminale générale or technologique Baccalauréat générale or technologique*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Qualification obtainable at end of year level.

The Victorian Certificate of Education (VCE) is a two-year leaving certificate theoretically accessible to all students. The study took place at the time of the introduction of an alternative Victorian Certificate of Applied Learning (VCAL), which has a more vocational focus and involves time spent in industry. Around 5 per cent of students in the Victorian sample of the study presented here were enrolled in VCAL.

At the end of Year 10, students in Victoria choose individual subjects, but must retain the core subject of English and undertake a minimum of other subjects from
the humanities and sciences. Students may also complete some vocational studies which contribute to their VCE.

In the Victorian system, educational inequalities are managed “softly” through the choices students are encouraged to make, the resources afforded to them, and the level of cognitive difficulty attributed to different subjects of the curriculum. Students who remain at school are not explicitly sorted in preparation for particular positions in the labour market until they learn their examination grades at the end of the final year of schooling.

Schools and teachers in Australia are able to limit student alienation somewhat by virtue of the deferral of external academic judgement to the very end of secondary education. Nonetheless, there is some evidence of student alienation from the dominant middle-class cultural and cognitive demands of the curriculum (Teese 2000; Teese and Polesel 2003).

1.2. The management of cultural diversity in education policy in Victoria

From the late 1960s, under the pressure of problems confronting existing migrants, the policy discourse moved from cultural assimilation of new migrants and indigenous populations to “Anglo” cultural norms towards a policy of multiculturalism. School policy documents in Victoria, as in other Australian states, promote the acceptance of cultural difference, and indeed its celebration (Department of Education 1997, 2001, 2003, 2006). Teachers are encouraged to acknowledge cultural difference in the classroom, and to include diverse perspectives in their lessons. Schools also acknowledge cultural diversity through the marking of a yearly “multicultural week”. State schools are directed to develop school uniforms which can accommodate the requirements of different faith groups, including Muslims.

Although education policies have remained largely unchanged, in the last ten years resurgent right-wing populism has again presented cultural difference as a threat to social cohesion. Racism and xenophobia expressed in the political field and the media, particularly around the arrival of “illegal immigrants”, impact on the awareness of teachers and students of the place and acceptability of ethnic-minority migrants in Australian society.

1.3. France

Secondary education in France follows five years of elementary school, with students beginning junior secondary school (collège) at 11 years of age. Many students will also have attended nursery school, which forms part of primary school, from the age of 2 or 3 (see Table 1).

In the final year of junior secondary school (collège), students are directed towards either academic studies in a lycée général or vocational studies in a lycée
professionnel (which translates in English as “vocational” rather than “professional”). The choices are made based on negotiations between families and schools and on results. At the end of three years of study attending the academic lycée général, students sit the leaving certificate or baccalauréat (baccalaureate). Meanwhile, students at the lycée professionnel first prepare a two-year diploma known as a CAP or BEP\(^1\) before either leaving school or staying for another two years to complete a baccalauréat professionnel (vocational baccalaureate).

Not only are students in the French education system at age 16 separated by the type of school they attend and the diploma they are preparing, but they are also separated into classes based on their curriculum stream or specialisation. While movement between streams and structures is possible, in reality it is rare. Better-off parents seek to place their children in streams and schools, usually “good” government schools but occasionally private schools, which protect them from weaker or socially suspect students. The different modes of organising the senior years in France and Australia are important to remember in considering the differences between the two countries which emerge in student responses.

By senior secondary school in France, the place for individual choice and dreams is reduced, and future aspirations must be named and defended. In theory, students are placed in learning environments which match their abilities and interests, but in practice students recognise a clear hierarchy of pathways and weak students tend to be “relegated” to vocational streams. The mutual accommodation of students and teachers in disadvantaged localities is perhaps less prevalent in France than in Australia, and conflict between teachers and students who reject the values and content of formal education is evident (Debarbieux 1996; Debarbieux et al. 1999).

1.4. The management of cultural diversity in French education policy

French education policy relating to migration has been framed by the politics of colonialism and decolonisation. The arrival of large numbers of Algerians with French citizenship in the 1950s was followed in the 1960s by waves from other former colonies, marking the beginning of mass labour migration. In the twenty years following 1954, the number of “foreigners” in France doubled. The North African countries of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco have provided the greatest number of migrants, while within Europe, Portugal, Italy and Spain also provided workers to France. Currently Turkish nationals comprise the largest number of foreign children attending school apart from those from North Africa. (Eurydice European Unit 2004: 4).

The working-class character of migration is stronger in France than in Australia and nine out of ten migrants began working in France on the factory floor or building site. A quarter of migrant-background workers remain unskilled labourers compared with only 8 per cent of French-born (Richard and Tripier 1999: 181–82).

\(^1\) CAP: Certificat d’aptitude professionnelle (Certificate of vocational aptitude); BEP: Brevet d’études professionnelles (Diploma of vocational studies).
In all, close to 80 per cent of migrant fathers are, or were, manual workers (Simon 2003: 1104). The rise of the National Front and social tension around immigration is based upon the pressure felt by non-migrant workers who have understood their increased economic precarity as associated with the increased presence of migrants.

The “non-European” second generation in France has become the target of racist and xenophobic political attacks through a vicious cycle of social exclusion and heavy-handed law-and-order responses. Turkish-background youth are not a distinctive object of public concern, but tend to be amalgamated into the more generic category of “migrant youth”, which in turn is interchangeable with the descriptions “Arab” and “Maghrébin”.

Table 2: French and Victorian education systems compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Victoria</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers (training,</td>
<td>Focus on pedagogical innovation</td>
<td>Focus on expertise in content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>philosophies,</td>
<td>and student well-being,</td>
<td>area, little role outside the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perceived roles)</td>
<td>responsiveness to student</td>
<td>classroom, expectations that all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>differences in learning styles</td>
<td>students be treated alike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum content</td>
<td>Traditional academic subjects</td>
<td>Traditional academic and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and assessment</td>
<td>dominate in examination</td>
<td>vocational streams. Marking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>practices</td>
<td>results, “newer” and vocational</td>
<td>varies between schools but is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>subjects attempt greater</td>
<td>severe with many students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>proximity to student lives</td>
<td>repeating years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of</td>
<td>Common leaving certificate</td>
<td>Specialised leaving certificates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>differentiation and</td>
<td>prepared in single school</td>
<td>offered in specialist senior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hierarchy</td>
<td>structure. Social divisions</td>
<td>schools. Social divisions between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>between geographical areas and</td>
<td>types of senior school, academic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>school sectors</td>
<td>streams, and geographical areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of student</td>
<td>“Open” selection by students,</td>
<td>Pathways partly “closed” by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pathways (grades,</td>
<td>weak students discouraged</td>
<td>grades at year 9; difficult to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vocational guidance</td>
<td>from certain areas. Students</td>
<td>move out of certain non-academic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>gain entry to tertiary education</td>
<td>streams. All students in academic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>on the basis of marks in</td>
<td>streams may gain entry to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>competition for limited places</td>
<td>university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of</td>
<td>Official policy of multicultural</td>
<td>Official policy of secular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>difference</td>
<td>and recognition of diversity.</td>
<td>universalism: to create equal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some forms of cultural diversity</td>
<td>citizens all signs of community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>accepted in school, racism</td>
<td>belonging should be left out of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>considered to be a problem</td>
<td>school. Racism and sectarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>considered to be problems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cultural expression among visible minorities has also been the source of considerable anxiety as a consequence of the assimilationist ambitions of the French state. The maintenance of traditions has been cast as a rejection of “French
values”, described as *le repli identitaire* (inward-looking). In this perspective, the Turkish community is seen as putting up a symbolic boundary around itself (Tribalat 1995). While concern about cultural integration is reflected in academic work, the isolationist thesis is taken furthest by Tribalat, who even condemns Turkish youth for favouring “folkloric music” over the pop music preferred by French youth (Tribalat 1995: 48).

Education is a key site for the playing out of these tensions, resulting in part from the historical role of schooling in the promotion of a particular “universalist” model of citizenship. This has resulted in debates about the exclusion of ethnicity and religion from the realm of schooling, culminating in the banning of headscarves in schools (Windle 2004). This controversy revolves around the prohibition of expression of ethnic or religious dimensions of identity which are largely non-controversial in Australia.

These tensions are connected to a broader distinction in the role of the teacher, which in France is tied closely to subject expertise, and in Australia more closely to pedagogical expertise and concern for the student as a “whole person”, including private dimensions such as religion. Table 2 summarises key differences between the two education systems. Rather than removing the salience of ethnicity from schooling, this tendency has reinforced expressions of cultural difference as practices of resistance (Lorcerie 2003).

### 2. Study design and methodology

As the focus of the study is on educational inequality in contexts of ethnic diversity, the primary data were drawn from twelve schools located in areas of relative social disadvantage and which cater in some part to Turkish-background students. The northern suburbs of Melbourne in Australia and the surrounds of Strasbourg in France were identified using census data on income, nationality, country of birth and home language to select the geographical area and schools that were sampled. The findings presented here thus do not extend to French and Australian schools generally, but reflect the specificities of certain “peripheral” sites (van Zanten 2001). This type of data is naturally limited by students’ conscious appreciation of the school environment.

The participating students came from the year level equivalent to the second-last year of mainstream secondary schooling, a time when decisions about subject choices and streams have been made. Students were thus aged around 16, although many in the French sample were older, having repeated multiple years of school. Half the students in the French sample were enrolled in a BEP structure, with 35 per cent studying for a *baccalauréat général* and the remaining 15 per cent preparing a *baccalauréat technologique*.

A majority of participants were of working-class background, and parental participation in the workforce was low (see Tables 3 and 4). In the light of the
concentration of parents in lower blue-collar occupations, three categories were identified to capture socio-economic status. The father’s occupation and work status (or the mother’s where this was missing) have been used. The first category consists of those parents who were not working, due to unemployment, ill health or retirement. The second category consists of labourers, factory workers, shop assistants, cleaners and other blue-collar or unskilled workers. The final category is the most diverse, with most of those in it engaged in intermediate occupations, commercial activities, and associate professions. A small number in this category were managers or in the liberal professions.

Turkish-background students were identified as those living in a home where Turkish is spoken or who had at least one Turkish-born parent. Arabic-background students were those who speak Arabic at home, or who had at least one parent born in a country where Arabic is the official language. This group consisted mainly of students of Lebanese background in Australia, and North African-background students in France. Other non-dominant language-background students were grouped together in a separate category. They were more often first-generation migrants than is the case for Turkish and Arabic-background students, who were primarily second generation (more than 80 per cent). In both Australian and French samples, students in the “other” category came from over thirty national origins, mainly in South-East Asia and southern Europe. The label “dominant language-background students” has been used to describe students who are monolingual speakers of the national language, a small minority of whom migrated from a country with the same national language, such as those from New Zealand in Australia.

Parents from ethnic-minority backgrounds were more likely to be out of work in both national settings (Tables 3 and 4). Many of those fathers who were out of the workforce previously worked in industries that are in decline, and where workplace injuries are not uncommon. It is noteworthy that the proportion of students from middle-class families was noticeably higher among dominant language-background students than among other groups in France, but not Australia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dominant language (%)</th>
<th>Turkish (%)</th>
<th>Arabic/Berber (%)</th>
<th>Other backgrounds (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployed/pensioner</strong></td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blue-collar/unskilled</strong></td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower-middle class and higher</strong></td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>n</strong></td>
<td>174</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Occupational status of parents by students’ ethnic background (France)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dominant language (%)</th>
<th>Turkish (%)</th>
<th>Arabic/Berber (%)</th>
<th>Other backgrounds (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed/pensioner</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collar/unskilled</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-middle class and higher</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A distinctive characteristic of the Australian setting is the presence of two private schools in the sample area. Sixty-nine students from the Australian sample are studying at these schools (Özel and Kuzey) (see Table 5), which cater mainly for the Turkish community and have been set up in the last ten years. One is an Islamic school, and the other a nominally secular private school established by a Turkish foundation with a strong focus on preparing students for their final school examination.

In addition to varying in size and philosophy, the ethnic composition of the Australian schools varied considerably (Table 5). Turkish-background students were a majority at both private schools, and at one state school (Livingston) but in a small minority at two other state schools. This is important to remember in considering the forms of peer sociability and identity formation discussed below. There was somewhat greater uniformity between schools in terms of social composition. More than two-thirds of the sample from each school were the children of lower-working class or unemployed parents. Thus in Australia, unlike France, the parental occupational backgrounds are similar for all ethnic groups.

Table 5: Ethnic composition of schools (Australian sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Dominant language (%)</th>
<th>Turkish (%)</th>
<th>Arabic/Berber (%)</th>
<th>Other backgrounds (%)</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Özel College</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuzey College</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westhill College</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livingston College</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayfield College</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clydebank College</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viewpark College</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestwick College</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
French urban peripheries host larger and more specialised schools than their counterparts in Australia. A smaller number of schools were thus included in the French sample, and each is a distinctive type: Lycée Professionnel Dumas is a technical college catering primarily for girls studying secretarial and economics courses; Lycée Professionnel Molière is a technical college catering mainly for boys; Lycée Claudel is a large “polyvalent” school with separate academic and technical wings; Lycée Voltaire is an “academic” school located in a town close to Strasbourg.

As in the Australian sample, dominant language-background students account for less than half of all students in most of the French schools (Table 6). The proportion of Turkish-background students was, however, much smaller. This composition also has an influence on identity formation, school attachment and peer sociability, which is discussed further. The socio-economic composition of the schools indicated that parents whose children attend the schools with “academic” tracks were somewhat more likely to have higher status occupations, as well as being less frequently from a minority ethnic group.

Table 6: Ethnic composition of schools (French sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Dominant language (%)</th>
<th>Turkish (%)</th>
<th>Arabic/ Berber (%)</th>
<th>Other backgrounds (%)</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dumas</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudel</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molière</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voltaire</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A primarily closed-choice questionnaire was distributed to all students at the relevant year level, and 927 completed surveys were received (n = 927). Students were asked to provide information on support available to them, coping with schoolwork, expected results, future plans, relations with peers and teachers, and the quality of the school. Semi-structured group interviews provided more in-depth responses on the same topics. The interviews were transcribed and analysed for emerging themes over the course of the research (Bryman and Burgess 1994). Interview groups were selected on advice from schools with a view to including gender balance, academic and behavioural mix, and ethnic diversity (see Table 7). At each school VCE co-ordinators (Australia), CPEs² (France), careers advisors, and a teacher from each major subject area were also interviewed. Participation was voluntary and pseudonyms have been used throughout for students and schools.

---

² CPE: Conseiller principal d’éducation: non-teaching position with responsibility for welfare and discipline.
Table 7: Number of students interviewed, by school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Özel College</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuzey College</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westhill College</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livingston College</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayfield College</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clydebank College</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viewpark College</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestwick College</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lycée Professionnel Dumas</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lycée Professionnel Molière</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lycée Polyvalent Claudel</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lycée Voltaire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Findings

I will limit my discussion of the study’s findings to a brief presentation of some of the dominant themes to emerge in interviews and questionnaire answers, drawing on quotations selected to illustrate common responses. The survey responses showed that Turkish-background students do indeed perceive and manage the demands of school differently to at least their non-migrant peers (many students from other migrant backgrounds share the views/strategies which Turkish-background students bring to their education). This is most sharply visible in aspirations for future study, the variation in which also points to the influence of the differences between the French and Australian education systems. I argue that the strong desire for pride and respect, which is often seen as an ethnic attribute embodied in notions such as *namus* (family honour) (Elley 1985), can be directed towards academic success in the Victorian setting, but in France is redirected elsewhere once academic hopes crumble. The more bruising and often humiliating experience of school in France results in alienation both from school and from wider society, and an increased importance given to peer solidarities based on an urban youth culture.
3.1. Aspirations and pathways

In Australia, the survey findings show that Turkish-background boys aspire to university almost five times more frequently than in France (Table 8). The size of this margin is boosted by the additional supports offered by private community schooling in Australia (attended by a small proportion of the sample) but it remains wide even when only government/state schools are considered.

Table 8: Proportion of students planning on attending university

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>n</th>
<th>Dominant language (%)</th>
<th>Turkish (%)</th>
<th>Arabic/Berber (%)</th>
<th>Other backgrounds (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% increase from France to Australia</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% increase from France to Australia</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Differences between ethnic groups are significant across nation and gender at p<0.05.

For Turkish-background girls, the gap was not quite so wide, and in both countries girls more frequently express hopes for university studies than boys. Although the increase was smaller than for boys, the proportion of girls planning on attending university still more than doubled from 40 per cent in the French schools to almost 90 per cent in Australia.

Some of this difference in the “Turkish outlook” may be attributed to the higher proportion of lower-middle-class parents in the Australian setting and to the absence of even the formal possibility of university for those in lower streams. However, the optimism of Turkish-background students in Australia is distinctive, even relative to the outlook of their counterparts in the academic streams of the French system. In Australia, Turkish-background students distinguish themselves by the constant theme of “trying hard”, “staying focused” and “doing your best” as elements of a successful life. The following example from a written response illustrates the value placed in the power of dreams and effort:
Another student’s aspirations apparently encompass every possible angle of success and professional prestige valued by Turkish parents:

Firstly I’d like to become a doctor, and along with that I’d like to do a double degree. I’m interested in finance and building so I want to get into that as well and hopefully earn some money and actually establish a business or something (Turkish-background boy).

However, at another Australian school, girls report that parents attempt to motivate them but:

Because they’re not educated, they don’t know how hard it is really. It’s just, like, “get 90”\(^4\) or “get this mark” and they don’t know how hard it is to achieve that mark (Cemre, Turkish background).

As a consequence, high parental hopes can provide unwelcome pressure. Students also mention parents’ lack of understanding of the difficulties of study arising from their poor ability to communicate in English.

Whereas in Australian schools mediocre performances are tolerated with few sanctions, in France they result in the repeating of years of school and relegation to low-status curriculum streams. As a result, the high aspirations of Turkish parents in France only survive into senior secondary school when children remain in the academic stream, and even in these cases parental dreams rarely carry through into individual student aspirations. Indeed it appears that Turkish-background students in France pay greater heed to the overt messages being broadcast to them by schools than do their dominant language-background peers in the same schools. For example, when asked what occupation their teachers believe they will enter, many report such wry responses as “unemployed”, “a beggar”, “homeless”, or “drug-dealer”.

These messages from school tend to reinforce for French Turkish-background youth that they are poor students and have limited prospects; just as in Australia messages from school reinforce the importance of effort and the potential for any dream to come true. Mayfield College’s charter, for example, states that the school aims “to maximise each student’s future expectations”. In both France and Australia, a lack of resources and independent sources of knowledge on the education system among Turkish families makes their children more reliant on, and sensitive to, formal messages coming from schools than are their non-migrant peers. However, this sensitivity appears to be only partial in the Australian setting, where the positivity of the formal messages allow informal and covert messages of discouragement to be “filtered” out, a type of insulation identified previously

---

3 Responses have been edited for errors, as my purpose here is not to examine student writing, however colloquialisms are retained.
4 A university entrance rank (ENTER) of 90 out of a highest possible score of 99.95.
Experience of School under Contrasting Institutional Arrangements

(Martin and Meade 1979). Other non-migrant students, whose parents have experienced the same school system and are more likely to be in paid employment, pass on to their children different types of knowledge about how to interpret the messages coming from school, and in Australia this appears to make them more alert to the informally transmitted messages of discouragement which Turkish parents ignore.

3.2. Pride and alienation

The higher educational aspirations among the Turks in Australia appear to be related to the ability of education to bring pride and honour to the family, which is anchored in traditional norms. In most cases, it does not reflect a more favourable objective academic position, except in the case of Özel College, which is discussed further below. Instead, relative “over-confidence” was supported by the efforts of schools to maintain engagement and limit the severity of academic judgement. Further, apart from older siblings or relatives, many Turkish-background students were also unable to draw on broader social networks for information on the professions they aspire to and to form a more “realistic” appraisal of their academic level. Some Turkish families have sought to overcome these barriers through the academically selective Özel College. A small cohort of the academically strongest students received intensive support in this private school through long hours of in-class and after-school examination preparation. Family ambitions are magnified, but are also made real through the college’s performance in examinations, although through a strategy which offers limited scope for expansion since it relies upon exclusivity.

In France, the greater pessimism of Turkish-background students can largely be attributed to their concentration in vocational “relegation” streams, where they are prepared for blue-collar occupations. For boys in particular, pride and honour in the French settings must often be sought in a peer sociability which falls outside the academic realm that has found them lacking. Some students saw the values of honour and solidarity idealised in a “gangsta” rapper sub-culture to be more appealing than the commercial values and manipulation they see as animating the mainstream economy (Klein et al. 2001).

However school structures on their own do not account for the pessimism among students in France. Migrants in France are also subject to particularly intense external political messages about their deficiencies and the need to culturally assimilate in order to fully participate as citizens. The tensions generated by these demands, coupled with the reality of social exclusion, are reflected in school interactions and work to reduce faith in the promises of meritocracy. Rates of employment which exceed those in Australia do not appear to offer any comfort in this regard, perhaps because this employment was more likely to be low status than in Australia (Tables 3 and 4 above).
Without the institutional faith of their Australian counterparts, and faced with a labour market seen as hostile and racist, some students sought to divorce their future happiness from professional status or satisfaction:

[Having a successful life is] living with the person I love, with lots of babies, money and sex. And a beautiful car. You know, a successful life (female bac economics and social sciences, North African background).

Their lack of faith in the system strengthens a critical posture, and the formulation of political demands for a more inclusive society. The idea of staying true to oneself and having pride in one’s distinctive identity is explicitly linked to resisting social pressures to conform in the following written response:

[A successful life is] … starting a family and not hiding your difference. And not becoming like the people that you see on TV (homeless people, politicians, druggies) And above all not falling into delinquency and being led by others to do something that you don’t want to (male BEP industriel student, Tunisian background).

This critical posture is further visible in claims for respect and living conditions as political rights, which must be fought for and defended, in evidence the responses of many migrant-background students:

By trying to gain everyone’s respect, to respect [others], to start a family, to earn money, to feed my family, to have rights, to fight for these rights. That would be a successful life (male BEP industriel student, Turkish background).

This affirmation of economic and identity rights reflected a collective notion of struggling for more than individual success, which can be distinguished from the Australian emphasis on personal effort and luck as determining success. A sense of entitlement to justice and fairness from society portends a more critical attitude towards school, its agents and promises. The call for social change as part of a successful life was at its strongest in demands for an end to discrimination:

[A successful life] is being paid every month, having a car, an apartment, a wife, mates. That there be no more discrimination of any kind, that people be seen for their level and not their sexuality, colour, religious beliefs, their [illegible]. More tolerance, less oppression, more help for the unemployed, less scorn for the lowly, for those on the streets, no more “labelling”) (male BEP industriel Senegalese background).

---

5 [Réussir sa vie] c’est vivre avec la personne que j’aime, avec plein de bébés, d’argent et du sexe ! Et une belle voiture. Réussir sa vie quoi.
6 [Une vie réussie c’est] … de fonder une famille et de ne pas cacher ses différences. Et de ne pas devenir comme les gens qu’on voit à la TV (SDF, homme politique, stone …) Et surtout de ne pas sombrer dans la délinquance et être incité par les autres à faire quelque chose qu’on ne veut pas.
7 En essayant de gagner le respect de tout le monde, de respecter, de fonder une famille, gagner de l’argent, nourrir ma famille avoir ces droits, se révolter pour ces droits là, la vie serait réussie.
8 [Une vie réussie] c’est qu’on a une rentrée d’argent tous les mois, une voiture, un appartement, une femme, des potes. Qu’ils n’y ait plus de discrimination d’aucune sorte, qu’on voit les gens pour le
The students cited above appear to be calling the system to account for the contradictions between its claims to French Republican ideals of equality and the reality of persistent inequalities. Some migrant-background students were also calling into question the demands made by the system that in order to receive equal treatment and participate fully as citizens, students must abandon distinctive parts of their identity of which they are proud.

3.3. Conflict and solidarity

As we have seen, aspirations focused on personal effort in the Victorian setting frequently gave way to calls for a fairer system in France. The framing of national identity, expressed in state ideology governing schooling, appears to play a part in aggravating feelings of discrimination in France. However, even in Australia, sentiments of discrimination, fuelled by international developments, are also apparent, and racism towards Muslims in particular was on the rise (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 2004; Poynting 2002).

In the Victorian setting, having high proportions of students from ethnic-minority and backgrounds at a school is understood by students and teachers alike as both providing the basis for such conflicts, but also for their minimisation. At Livingston College, interviewees suggest that the critical mass of Turkish-background students means that there is no issue with racism or ethnic conflict. Solmaz, a Turkish-background girl, observed: “I don’t think it’s a big problem at this school, everyone’s Turkish, well most of them, and like they’re all wogs, most of ‘em.”

Some students also express the view that ethnic identities remained strong because they were under attack, resulting in those of migrant background being more defensive of their identities than “Aussies”. Defensiveness has been strengthened by recent international events such as September 11 and the second Gulf War. Halil (male, Turkish background) reported that with the emergence of terrorism as an issue, people in class made racist comments to particular students about their nationality and called them terrorists. Others agreed that such comments were in fun, but that some students took it too far. Also at Westhill, Paul (non-migrant background) identified common jokes about “coming over on a boat and stuff”. An example on this kind of jibe was provided by Bella (female, Italian background):

I know a girl, she’s from Iraq and people say to her “you love Saddam Hussein, blah, blah, blah” and she’ll just laugh at them and laugh about George Bush and stuff.

niveau qu’ils ont et non leur attirance sexuelle, leur couleur, la croyance religieuse, leurs [illegible]. Plus de tolérance, moins d’oppression, plus d’aide pour les gens au chômage, moins de mépris pour les gens d’en bas, ceux de la rue, plus de ‘catégorisation’.

9 Term of derision for non-Anglo-Saxon Australians of migrant background.
Despite the existence of racial taunts, students generally felt that mutual respect was widespread. The Victorian data showed that 84 per cent of students felt that students respect each other at their school. Discrimination was more likely to be seen as coming from either teachers, or wider society.

Overall, fewer than half the students agreed that everyone in Australia is respected regardless of ethnicity or religion, and only one in ten students strongly agreed. However, students from minority backgrounds, and particularly Turkish-background students, more often agreed that Australia is a fair place than did dominant language-background students. While this may at first appear puzzling, many Turkish-background students were without experience beyond the local setting, where the strength of the Turkish community often shelters them from situations in which ethnicity could be revealed as a source of conflict and discrimination. At the same time, dominant language-background students may have been sensitised to discrimination both as the targets of anti-discrimination education campaigns, and as witnesses to privately held expressions of prejudice outside the hearing of minority students.

Students in the Victorian setting had stronger faith that “everyone is respected, regardless of race or religion” than did their counterparts in France (Table 9). Overall, fewer than one in three students in France agreed with this proposition, compared with closer to one in two in Australia. Turkish-background students differed the most between the two contexts, with 30 percentage points separating both the boys and the girls. Dominant language-background students were most in agreement: between 30 per cent and 40 per cent believe that everyone is respected regardless of race or religion. In France, a similar proportion of Turkish-background girls agreed, but in Australia, that figure doubled to make Turkish-background girls the most idealistic of any group of students.

The students in France, like their Australian peers, more often saw tensions as coming from wider society rather than from the neighbourhood. Fewer than 30 per cent of students in the sample believed that everyone in France is respected regardless of race or religion. Those students who had been relegated in the system felt this lack of respect most intensely. Thirty-five per cent of vocational BEP students strongly disagreed that everyone in France is respected regardless of ethnicity or religion, compared with 25 per cent of students studying for an academic bac. Within the BEP cohort, minority-background boys studying for a BEP industriel (industrial diploma), felt the greatest sense of alienation. Two-thirds of Turkish-background BEP industriel students and close to half of Arabic/Berber-background students strongly disagreed with the proposition compared with one in five dominant language-background students. In all, just one in ten Turkish-background students enrolled in a BEP believed that everyone in France is respected regardless of ethnicity or religion, while one in five Arabic/Berber-background students are of the same opinion (perhaps reflecting their slightly more favourable purchase on hierarchy of streams). Dominant language-background students and those from other minority backgrounds had greater faith in society,
with one in three believing that there is no discrimination on the basis of race or religion.

Table 9: Agreement with the proposition “in France/Australia, everyone is respected regardless of race or religion”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dominant language (n = 433) (%)</th>
<th>Turkish (n = 184) (%)</th>
<th>Arabic/Berber (n = 151) (%)</th>
<th>Other backgrounds (n = 159) (%)</th>
<th>Total (n = 927) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% increase from France to Australia</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% increase from France to Australia</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A trend emerged of widespread alienation from the institution, on the one hand, and on the other a feeling of respect among peers; a split that was strongest among minority-background boys. In total just over nine in ten students believe that there is mutual respect among students, and the intensity of this feeling is highest among minority-background students. Turkish- and Arabic/Berber-background students most strongly agree that students respect each other at their school, rates which mirror those in Australia.

Although the small sample size for Turkish-background students in the French setting suggests great caution in interpreting the survey figures reported above, combined with interviews they point to a trend towards alienation from the academic functions of school which has the potential to undermine institutional legitimacy and produce wider social conflict. Indeed such conflict appears already to be in evidence in the urban riots of 2005.

4. Conclusion

The findings presented above suggest that, while ethnicity can play a distinctive role in shaping the experience of educational disadvantage, a powerful role is played by institutional arrangements and political climate. These mediating influences render almost unrecognisable the school experiences of Turkish-background students in France compared with those of their cousins in Victorian schools. Specifically, the structure of the senior years of schooling appears to be
decisive in shaping students’ academic self-esteem and creating either a “soft” or a “hard” landing for students who struggle academically.

While these institutional factors weigh on all students, Turkish-background students appear to be particularly susceptible or vulnerable to the “overt” messages sent to students more generally in disadvantaged schools. In Victoria they are most receptive to the efforts of teachers to promote a sense of achievement, in part because this fits in with community pressures to bring pride and honour to the family. Part of this success also comes from the presence of Turkish-background teachers, which when combined with academic selectivity and intensive examination “cramming” at Özel College, is translated into academic success. Kuzey College, also a private school, offers a lesson in contrast as its open-door policy and religious rather than academic focus see student outlooks and results which mirror those in the surrounding government schools. In France, streams rather than individual schools have the greatest influence. Turkish-background students hear most loudly the message sent by streaming and harsh pedagogical judgements that they are not academically able, and so direct their investments in pride and honour away from the alienating world of academic conformity.

The contradictory messages of encouragement and discouragement are common responses by school systems and teachers to the continued production of educational inequalities, and the retention within the education system of students perceived to be academically weak. These are the students Bourdieu and Champagne (1992) refer to as being “excluded from within”, but who sociologists of education have not adequately understood as being shaped by the interaction of ethnicity and institutional structures. The contribution of this study to our understanding of the impact of institutional structures is through the comparison of two education systems as they are experienced by those situated at their margins. In drawing on cross-national comparison it builds on current work on the second generation across a large number of countries (Crul and Schneider 2009), and which relies primarily on retrospective perspectives on school experience. The findings of this study suggest that further research is needed to explore how these attitudinal differences in school relate to employment outcomes and lifelong learning.

References


CRUL, M. and SCHNEIDER, J. 2009. Children of Turkish Immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands: The Impact of Differences in Vocational and Academic Tracking
Experience of School under Contrasting Institutional Arrangements


About the author

Joel Windle is a lecturer and post-doctoral fellow at Monash University, Clayton (Australia). His research is in the field of the sociology of education, and analyses the implications of cultural diversity for pedagogical and social relations across institutional settings. He is currently working on projects investigating school choice among ethnic minorities and transition programmes for students with interrupted schooling. E-mail: joel.windle@education.monash.edu.au
Educational Progress of Children of Turkish Descent in the Netherlands

MAURICE CRUL
Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam

The educational position of children of first-generation Turkish parents is widely considered problematic both in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe. Together with children from the Maghreb, Turkish children occupy the lowest position on the educational ladder. This however masks the fact that in twenty years spectacular gains in education have been made. More than a quarter of Turkish youth now enter higher education. This article describes these gains and tries to explain how they came about. A crucial factor is the changing attitude towards education in the Turkish community. Education increasingly has a positive connotation. Equally important is the growing expertise and knowledge available within the community. In the close-knit Turkish community, educational resources find their way to more and more youngsters in the form of help and support by older siblings and community projects.

After Germany and France, the Netherlands hosts the biggest Turkish community in Europe with around 372,700 people with a Turkish background (CBS 2008: 33). The first Turkish labour migrants came to the Netherlands on their own initiative in the early 1960s. Many of them had worked briefly in Belgium or Germany before trying their luck further north or west. The continuing demand for low-skilled workers in the Dutch textile and metal industries triggered a process of chain migration by relatives and friends. In 1964, the Netherlands signed an official agreement on labour migration with Turkey. The peak of labour migration occurred between 1970 and 1974, after which officially organised migration was halted.

Dutch industry had needed low-skilled labour, and indeed the majority of these first-generation Turkish “guest workers” were recruited from the lowest socio-economic strata in their home countries. In the rural areas where most of them originated, virtually the only educational opportunities were at primary-school level (Coenen 2001). The majority of first-generation Turkish men had finished no more than primary school; most Turkish women had even less schooling or were illiterate (Crul 1994). After arriving in the Netherlands, most men worked for fifteen to twenty years in factories, shipyards or the cleaning industry, before the industrial restructuring of the 1980s put many of them out of jobs. Today some
80 per cent of the Turkish male population aged 50 or older are outside the Dutch labour market. The majority of families live from minimum incomes (Martens and Weijers 2000: 73), and many children grew up with fathers who were unemployed by the time they were entering secondary school (Crul and Doomernik 2003). Children of Turkish labour migrants grew up in a very unfavourable situation. From the beginning they were considered one of the most disadvantaged groups in the Netherlands (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). This reality also translated into their position in education. The general picture in many research reports since the late 1980s has been that they are overrepresented in the lowest school tracks, they have high drop-out rates and relatively few make it into higher education. This picture masks the fact that at the same time the educational position of children of Turkish descent showed a steady improvement. This development over time is the subject of this article. Instead of looking at the gap with regard to the native population, which is still large although declining, this article looks at the development of the educational position of youth of Turkish descent in the Netherlands over the last twenty years, thus introducing a whole new perspective. If we compare over time we see a spectacular improvement in their position in school. This also raises different questions. Rather than explaining their disadvantaged position compared with the children of native-born Dutch parents the article tries to explain the improvement in their educational position. Admittedly there is still a huge gap with children of native-born parents but, as the improvement in the position of Turkish youth is hardly commented on in the literature, we focus on that.

The change over time does not seem to be unique to the Netherlands. In other European countries similar processes are taking place. The rate of change may be different but there are considerable improvements in educational outcomes in all European countries where a large Turkish community is settled (Crul et al. 2009a).

1. The education system in the Netherlands

One of the pillars of the Dutch education system is the freedom to choose a school according to one’s own preferences, be they religious or ideological. All schools in the Netherlands, including those that are religious, are state-funded. Children are officially expected to enter primary school when they turn 4 years old. Primary school consists of eight grades, so children usually leave at age 12. At the end of primary school, all children must take a national examination that is crucial for their further school career in secondary school. On the basis of their test result and the recommendation made by their teacher, they will be assigned to follow a specific track in the secondary-school system.

Figure 1 summarises the current education system in the Netherlands and provides an overview of the many ways to navigate it. Pre-vocational secondary education (VMBO) is the lowest stream of secondary education, where children with the lowest recommendation from primary school are placed. Most children continue to study after they have gained their secondary-school diplomas. The children with a
VMBO diploma usually go on to middle vocational education (MBO). This could mean a one-, two-, three- or four-year course (either full time or part time). The one- and two-year MBO tracks have an important component of two- to three-day weekly apprenticeships. Pupils with a HAVO diploma can go on to higher vocational education, while pupils with a VWO diploma usually go on to university.

**Figure 1:** The education system in the Netherlands

A unique characteristic of the Dutch school system is that pupils can easily move from one stream to the other, as Figure 1 shows. In principle, a pupil could start at the bottom and move up, step by step, to the highest stream (taking the “long route” through the education system). Although it will take between one and three years longer for such a student to reach the highest stream than for those in the pre-university VWO stream, many children of immigrants have moved up the educational ladder in this way (Crul et al. 2009b).

An impressive amount of research is carried out in the Netherlands to assess and explain the socio-economic status of migrants and their children. The public authorities promote these research efforts directly and indirectly. Several periodic surveys have been conducted to gather data for developing and evaluating government policies. The most important survey that assesses migrant educational status is the Social Position and Use of Facilities by Ethnic Minorities Survey (SPVA), conducted nationwide every three to four years since 1988.¹ These data enable us to assess the socio-economic status of the four largest migrant groups in the Netherlands.² This provides a unique opportunity for an overview of development over a period of twenty years.

The only restriction for giving a complete overview is that publications reporting the results of the different surveys sometimes use different age categories or education indicators. This is partly related to the fact that in 1988, for example, children of Turkish descent were still young. So in 1988 the information is only available for those children still in school. In that year, 71 per cent of the 15–24 age group were found in primary school or the lowest level of secondary education (VMBO) (Veenman 1999: 50). That is, almost three-quarters of the children of Turkish descent in 1988 were at the very bottom of the educational pyramid. With this score they, together with children of Moroccan labour migrants (86 per cent), occupied by far the worst educational position in the Netherlands. Only 22 per cent of children of Dutch descent were found in this category in 1988.

Table 1: Highest level of diploma obtained by pupils of Turkish descent aged 5–24 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only primary-school diploma</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMBO diploma</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBO diploma or higher</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: SPVA (1998), figures from annual report on minorities (Tesser et al. 1999: 66, 67); SPVA (2002), figures from annual report on minorities (Dagevos et al. 2003: 42); SCP, figures from annual report on integration (Dagevos and Gijsberts 2007: 76).

Ten years later, in 1998, this picture had already changed considerably (see Table 1). In 1998, a majority is still found in the lowest streams of education (only primary-school diploma or VMBO diploma) but the percentage has dropped by

¹ The SPVA survey is broadly representative of the ethnic minority population in the Netherlands (see Roelandt et al. 1992: 202).
² The categorisation of ethnic groups corresponds to the definition used by the Netherlands Interior Ministry. Ethnic origin is determined on the basis of the place of birth of one or both parents. The definition thus also includes second-generation offspring with one immigrant parent.
about 10 per cent to 60 per cent. Compared with 1988, twice as many Turkish students in 1998 continued their studies in middle vocational education after finishing lower vocational education.

After another four years, in 2002, the picture has again changed significantly. The group that left school without a secondary-school diploma (the primary-school level group) was reduced by 9 per cent. The group which has achieved a middle or higher level of school education (54 per cent of the total) now forms the majority. In the same period, children of Dutch descent hardly moved up in the percentages in the MBO+ category (Tesser et al. 1999: 66, 67; Dagevos et al. 2003: 42; Dagevos and Gijsberts 2007: 76).

**Figure 2:** Students in higher vocational education (HBO) and university (WO) aged 18–20 (1995/96 to 2005/06)

The category MBO+ is a rather diverse one. In 1998 it consisted mostly of students in middle vocational education (MBO). The recent TIES survey that targeted second-generation youth of Turkish and Moroccan descent in Amsterdam and Rotterdam from 2007 shows that the group in higher vocational education (HBO)
is as large as that in MBO now (de Valk and Crul 2008). This is also evident if we look at the participation of students of Turkish descent in HBO. In ten years, from 1995 to 2005 their numbers have doubled from 11 per cent to 24 per cent, as shown in Figure 2.

At the same time, there is a rise in participation in higher education among students of Dutch descent. The rise for those of Dutch descent is similar (about 5 per cent) in university (WO) participation to that for those of Turkish descent. However, in tertiary higher vocational education (HBO) the participation of students of Turkish descent has more than doubled from 11 per cent to 24 per cent whereas for Dutch students the increase has been less dramatic, from 31 per cent to 38 per cent.

For the first time, in 2007, young women of Turkish descent are also better represented than young men in higher education (see Figure 3). This development brings the Turks into alignment with participation patterns for the Dutch and other major ethnic groups.

**Figure 3:** Students in higher education aged 18–20 (1995, 2000 and 2007)

Key: Autochthonous; Non-Western autochthonous, total; Turks; Moroccans; Surinamese; Antilleans/Arubans; other non-Western. Each group is divided into men and women.


---

3 The acronym TIES stands for the The Integration of the European Second Generation project. The TIES survey is conducted in eight countries among second generation youth of Turkish, Moroccan and ex-Yugoslavian descent and a comparison group in the same age category (18–35). In the Dutch part of the TIES survey, 500 second-generation Turks and 500 second-generation Moroccans were interviewed in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The respondents were sampled through the population register (Crul and Heering 2008).
The overall development that becomes clear from all the tables and figures is that whereas in 1988 many pupils of Turkish descent did not even finish the lowest level of secondary education, by the 1990s many more finished lower vocational education and entered middle vocational education. However many dropped out at that level after a few years (Crul 2000). Now, more and more students are finishing middle vocational education with a larger group then going on to higher vocational education. The first representatives of those with higher vocational education diplomas are now entering the labour market (de Valk and Crul 2008).

Turkish girls have particularly improved their levels of educational attainment over twenty years. In 1988 three-quarters of Turkish girls left school without a secondary-school diploma, far more than Turkish boys. In the most recent cohorts the situation has been reversed. The girls are now surpassing the boys, with more Turkish girls than boys in middle vocational education or higher.

Other indicators of educational attainment show similar improvements. In the last year of primary school all the children take a national test, the so-called CITO test, which is used to allocate students to further education. Table 2 shows how the gap has narrowed between 1994 and 2004. If we compare the Turkish children with those of Dutch descent whose parents had a low level of vocational education, the gap of 6 points is reduced to 2 points. Also the gap between the Turkish students and those of Dutch descent with parents who have a diploma at the middle or higher level is reduced from 14 points to 9 points. As a result more and more Turkish youngsters now directly enter the academic rather than the vocational track in secondary school (CBS 2008).

The development of the educational position of youngsters of Turkish descent to a large extent parallels the change of generations. Many of the pupils in 1988 were immigrants themselves. These children usually arrived at primary-school age. They had to change schools, learn a new language and adjust to very different teaching methods. This of course drastically reduced their chances in school.

Table 2: Scores on the national CITO test by ethnic group (1994–2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th>Surinamese</th>
<th>Antillean</th>
<th>Dutch-low</th>
<th>Dutch-middle and high</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>524.1</td>
<td>525.1</td>
<td>527.1</td>
<td>526.8</td>
<td>531.9</td>
<td>538.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/97</td>
<td>525.2</td>
<td>526.4</td>
<td>527.4</td>
<td>525.6</td>
<td>531.2</td>
<td>537.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/99</td>
<td>526.9</td>
<td>526.9</td>
<td>529.2</td>
<td>525.6</td>
<td>530.6</td>
<td>536.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td>527.3</td>
<td>527.4</td>
<td>529.8</td>
<td>524.8</td>
<td>530.5</td>
<td>537.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/03</td>
<td>527.3</td>
<td>528.3</td>
<td>528.3</td>
<td>524.7</td>
<td>530.6</td>
<td>537.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>527.0</td>
<td>527.7</td>
<td>527.9</td>
<td>524.5</td>
<td>528.9</td>
<td>536.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ITS/SCO/NWO (Prima ’94’96’98/’00’02’/04) SCP, from annual report on integration (Dagevos and Gijsberts 2007, Supplement p. 4).
The second generation, born in the Netherlands, do not face these obstacles which can hinder access to secondary school and higher education. Some, whose parents had little or no primary education, have made a spectacular intergenerational jump by entering higher education.

If we look at the extent of intergenerational mobility we can see that there is a considerable correlation between the educational level of the parents of Dutch descent and their children (Table 3), less so in the case of children whose parents are of Turkish and Moroccan descent. In the case of second-generation Moroccans the correlation is not even significant. Despite many of the first-generation parents having hardly had any schooling, their children have still been able to move up.

Table 3: Correlation between education level of parents and that of their children – Pearson correlation coefficients (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th>Surinamese</th>
<th>Dutch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children (second generation)</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.12 (n.s.)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SCP (CIM’06) weighted.

The first-generation parents were unable to help their children practically in school and often, because of the language barrier, were unable to communicate with teachers. Yet, as Section 3 shows, a change in the way the Turkish community viewed education has been important in explaining the recent gains in educational attainment.

3. The attitude towards education in the Turkish community during the 1980s and early 1990s

In the 1980s the attitude of Turkish parents towards education is often described in the literature as ambivalent. Marlene de Vries (1988) in her book Ogen in je rug (Eyes in Your Back) elaborates especially on the lack of support parents gave to girls. She carried out her research during 1984–85. Although education is not the main theme of her book, it is clear that strong social control of girls in the Turkish community frustrated the educational opportunities for a considerable number. Parents were generally mistrustful about their daughters going to school where they could interact with boys without supervision. Parents feared gossip about their daughter’s potential “misbehaviour”. A lot of parents also did not see the need for their daughters to study. Especially in the case of the girls of the so-called “in-between” generation, most parents did not attach much value to education. These girls were supposed to marry young and become housewives. Another consideration was that parents could reap better short-term payoffs from an early marriage, especially with a family member from Turkey, if their daughter did not

---

4 The term “in-between generation” refers to people who have come to the receiving country after the starting age of schooling but before they have completed their schooling.
extend her educational career. A marriage could bring benefits in terms of both the extended family income (the income of the young couple adds to the family household) and the family’s status in the community back home, as close relatives were able to send their sons to the Netherlands for marriage. Parents regularly evaded compulsory education (de Vries 1988: 70, 73). It was not uncommon for girls to receive a marriage proposal (often when on holiday in Turkey) at the age of 15 or 16, so some of the girls were already engaged when preparing for exams. Under these circumstances, the incentive to stay in school and finish their studies diminished. More importantly, parents often did not seem to care if this was the case.

According to a study by Coenen (2001) the attitude of the parents towards the children of the in-between generation can be accounted for by their own childhood and education.

During the period in which the parents had the same age as their school-going children do now, the daughters were helping with household chores and working on their hope chest. They were called evkiz, which literally means house girl. A description we can still find in the Turkish passport under “profession”. Their main activity consisted of “waiting” (a term literally used before, and still today in Turkish rural areas) for a suitable potential husband. Sons worked in the fields and were allowed to celebrate their youth more than daughters. For them the term delikan was used, which means “crazy blood”. Military service and the wedding just before or after that meant for them the start of an adult life with responsibilities (Coenen 2001: 59–60).

The parents of the children of the in-between generation applied a mixture of the old-fashioned way of thinking about goals in upbringing in a Turkish rural context and the new opportunities offered by Dutch education, relating to the life the children would lead when returning to the original country of the parents. For the daughters little changed in their own minds as in the Netherlands they above all else got the message that they should become a good spouse and a good housewife. Liesbeth Coenen describes how for the boys the parents often also had a clear idea relating to their return to Turkey.

It turned out that fathers used to have clearly defined wishes regarding the profession of their sons of the in-between generation, usually to become car mechanics. The prevalent idea was that sons with this profession could do useful work maintaining tractors in the improved peasant existence. Apart from that, they would be able to make a living fixing the Turkish cars that often broke down on their yearly exodus from the Netherlands to Turkey. But also the opening of a garage in the regional village was popular as a professional perspective (Coenen 2001, 110).

Turkish boys were also supposed to marry at a young age, although they were on average older than the girls. After marriage, they often left school or college to provide income for their new families (Alders et al. 2001: 47). In particular, youths with school difficulties or behavioural problems were pushed by their parents to get
married and find a job instead. Liesbeth Coenen (2001) has termed such attitudes of the parents towards their children “cultural carryovers” of the home country. Read (2004: 57) uses the term “patriarchal connectivity” to describe the phenomenon whereby women and men are socialised to see themselves primarily as part of a larger kinship structure that privileges male authority and dominance over female educational and professional achievements.

Lindo (1996) describes, ten years after the work of de Vries, the situation in the Turkish community more or less in the same terms. He discusses the negative influence of social control on the educational careers of the youngsters. He also emphasises the influence of (regional or village) networks, whose members are oriented mainly towards their own community and have little contact with the native Dutch. Lindo shows how, through social control, the norms and values belonging to these networks were strictly maintained and deviant behaviour was sanctioned.

4. Different choices and better chances in education

As described above, the school outcomes for Turkish pupils in the 1980s and early 1990s showed many Turkish pupils leaving school early. Reaching the age at which compulsory schooling stops often marked the end of their education. Lower vocational and lower general secondary school were often seen as the end of education. Only a few used the possibility offered by the Dutch education system to take the long route and climb step-by-step up the educational ladder. During the second half of the 1990s this gradually changed. The substantial increase of Turkish students in middle vocational education shows that Turkish youth were starting to study longer. The increase in the number of students in middle vocational training mirrors the decrease in the obstacles that previously blocked the continuation of their education. At the same time their educational space still seems to be limited, as obstacles are now raised in a later phase of their studies. Girls with the ability to go on to higher vocational education often opt for middle vocational education, because their parents do not want them to extend their studies for too long (Crul 2000: 135–38). Here we can actually see a gradual change in the way of thinking: from a position in which education was not considered important to a position where obstacles are raised only to a limited extent.

Coenen (2001) describes the change of attitude among the parents in her study as the idea of returning to the country of origin faded. For the future of their children parents now had to orientate definitively towards Dutch society. This attitudinal change practically coincided with the appearance of the second generation in secondary education. Other studies also confirm this change in attitude towards education (Crul 2000; Yerden 2001) The younger girls in the family now more often got the opportunity to continue studying or experienced less opposition. The experiences of the children of the in-between generation play an important role in this. Many of these children had left school without any diploma or were trained only at the lowest level. They became unemployed or had to be satisfied with jobs
at the low end of the social ladder. The importance of education for social mobility in Dutch society consequently became painfully clear for both the parents and the in-between generation children. The experiences of the girls who married early, often to someone they barely knew, were frequently problematic. This has lead to many matrimonial problems and an increasing number of divorces. These brought shame upon the family, a situation that the parents wanted to avoid in the first place. From this sort of experience both parents and children learned. Marriages are now taking place at a later age and parents increasingly give their children more freedom to choose their own partner (Yerden 2001).

The children of the in-between generation, because of their own experience, therefore often came to be strong advocates in their families for both the postponement of marriage and the importance of education (Crul 2000: 111–19). They often initiated changes in ways of thinking and behaviour towards education. The older in-between children had a big influence in the family, as their parents and younger siblings consulted them. This obviously did not always go without conflict. In their opinion, first-generation parents often lagged behind their in-between and second-generation children. Qualitative research showed how the successful Turkish younger daughters in the family are at the same time hindered by parental restrictions, whereas they receive support from elder brothers or sisters. Depending on the availability of support in their own environment, some youngsters found ways to carry through their wish to go on to higher education, even despite opposition from their parents (Crul 2000: 155–56).

The fact that more and more girls enter higher education in itself alters the attitude towards girls’ studying. On the one hand the girls show that it is possible to study and be respectable at the same time and, on the other, younger girls in the community start to see in these role models that it is possible for a Turkish girl to go on to higher education.

From the 2007 TIES survey, Tables 4, 5 and 6 show how important parents and siblings were for success during secondary school among different age groups. The importance of both mothers and fathers is greatest among the younger age groups (Tables 4 and 5). Table 6 shows the importance of support from siblings.

Overall we can discern that the attitude towards education in the Turkish community has changed over time. Yerden (2001: 17) even states that education has become a new status symbol in the Turkish community: “Girls who are studying nowadays have a special status within the family and the Turkish community; learned people are considered ‘to know all’ and possess more knowledge about everything.” Section 5 elaborates on how this changed attitude translates into everyday practice.

---

The Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) in The Hague and the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam have been responsible for TIES data collection in the Netherlands.
Table 4: Second-generation Turkish youth (18–35): mother’s importance for school success (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age groups</th>
<th>Not imp. at all</th>
<th>Not imp.</th>
<th>A bit imp.</th>
<th>Imp.</th>
<th>Very imp.</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18–19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5: Second-generation Turkish youth (18–35): father’s importance for school success (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age groups</th>
<th>Not imp. at all</th>
<th>Not imp.</th>
<th>A bit imp.</th>
<th>Imp.</th>
<th>Very imp.</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18–19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6: Second-generation Turkish youth (18–35): siblings’ importance for school success (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age groups</th>
<th>Not imp. at all</th>
<th>Not imp.</th>
<th>A bit imp.</th>
<th>Imp.</th>
<th>Very imp.</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18–19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5. The growth of support networks

Various research shows that successful Turkish youth (those attending the academic tracks in school) themselves attribute their success to their own abilities and persistence. They claim to have had no help whatsoever and to have reached higher education on their own (cf. Ledoux 1996; van der Veen 2001). They have made their own choices and followed their own path. In general people do tend to attribute their success to their own efforts and failure either to others or to specific circumstances. Some scepticism therefore seems appropriate. If asked about the practical course of events preceding important moments of decision in their school careers, successful students often report that they received incidental or regular help from people from within their own circles (Crul 2000). Usually the parents were important in giving emotional support. Most first-generation parents with
limited education could not give practical help or advise their children on their studies. In most cases it is other people in their surroundings that help practically, such as older siblings, uncles or aunts and cousins; people that in terms of generation are between the parents and the children. The support consists of advice, practical help and contact with teachers. Sometimes the help, although only incidental, can still have extensive consequences; for example when an older sibling advises enrolment in a comprehensive school rather than a vocational school. In a comprehensive school the younger sibling can still move up the educational ladder, while in the vocational school his or her career is more or less determined. Moreover, vocational schools have high drop-out rates because of the problematic school climate. Advice to avoid vocational schools can have a major effect on a future school career. Even if a given pupil had no further help whatsoever, this does not alter the significance of this single piece of advice for their entire school career.

Siblings can often also give some practical help with homework, especially in the first classes of secondary school. Sometimes they replace parents in meetings with teachers or they contact a teacher because their younger siblings have problems with a certain subject at school. They often partly or fully take over the role of educational support from the parents (see also Coenen 2001). Most of the older in-between generation siblings have not reached a high level in education themselves. They want their younger siblings to have the chances they themselves did not. They often say that they do not want their siblings to make the same mistakes as they did.

The essence of the success of this guidance from within the student’s own circle lies in the fact that the support is from people who can project themselves into the situation of the children at both home and school. The majority know the school system from first-hand experience. They attended school only in the Netherlands, or at least had part of their school education there, and therefore are aware of the many hindrances and obstacles in the Dutch system. It is also important that they usually give guidance for a lengthy period. A teacher can sometimes play a crucial role in facilitating achievements in a certain subject or class, but the next year the pupil may have a different teacher or may have dropped the subject. People from their own network, on the other hand, already support the youngsters in primary school, are often involved intensively in providing advice on the choice of secondary school, and keep up their support and guidance after these transitions. They are especially important at times when things are not running so smoothly in school, or when the motivation for school is dropping, and can motivate and help the pupil through difficult times. They also sometimes intervene when a pupil is at risk of repeating a class as they are better informed than parents about whom to turn to and how to arrange such things as extra lessons or tutoring. Older siblings sometimes also mediate in the case of problems with parents or school (Crul 2000: 105–28).
In the Turkish community, knowledge about the Dutch education system has been growing through years of experience. As more youngsters enrol in higher education, the quality of this knowledge increases. Ever more Turkish youngsters in primary or secondary school have family members in higher education. They can ask them for advice or practical help. The small group of highly educated youth in the community plays an especially important role in passing on knowledge, giving support and being a role model. Help and support prove to be more effective as the person giving it is more highly educated (Crul and Pasztor 2007). Siblings who have attended primary and secondary school in the Netherlands and are now in higher education know all the education pathways and their hindrances and obstacles. Moreover, the success of older siblings sets an important example.

The mechanisms through which older siblings provide help and support are also to be found in the increasingly numerous mentor projects established by Turks in the Netherlands. About fifteen years ago the first student mentor project was organised by higher education students of Turkish descent (Crul and Akdeniz 1997), in which Turkish students in higher education gave help and support to pupils of Turkish descent in secondary school. Now a range of Turkish organisations have set up mentor projects, homework classes, weekend schools and examination training. In the city of Amsterdam the Turkish organisation De Witte Tulp (The White Tulip) reaches about 700 pupils with their activities, which are listed on their website (http://www.stichtingwitte tulip.nl/). Most tutors and mentors are of Turkish origin themselves and as successful higher education students they act as a role model for younger children. With a total of about 5,000 students of Turkish descent in higher education, this group has become a potent resource for the community. One of the first national Turkish student organisations, Cosmicus, has recently shifted its focus of attention to found the first secondary school for academically gifted pupils. The Cosmicus schools aim to educate world citizens and cater for an ethnically diverse student population, although the majority of pupils are still of Turkish descent. The schools’ pedagogical principles are close to the Montessori school concept and they are part of the Montessori group. The fact that the Turkish community has a tight and well-organised social network starts to pay off in educational terms.

6. Conclusion

Changing views on the importance of education, together with increasing knowledge and experience of education are, together with the rise of the second generation, important factors in explaining the increasing levels of educational attainment in the Turkish community. To theoretically position these changes it is interesting to look at the debate on the so-called “new second generation” that is taking place in the United States. In that debate on migrant groups the question is being posed how groups who have a low socio-economic starting point find a way to rise from the ranks. The rapid success of Asian second-generation youth, whose parents are often poorly educated, particularly requires an explanation. The dominant notion that assimilation leads to success, which formed the explanation
for the success of Russian Jews and South European migrants, does not apply to the Asian groups. The closeness of the various Asian communities is striking and youngsters are brought up with the norms and values of their own ethnic group. The success of the Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese second generation even surpasses that of the most successful migrant groups from earlier migration waves to the United States. One explanation of their success focuses on the strong social cohesion of the group (Kasinitz et al. 2008; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Zhou 1997). The argument runs that strong group ties prevent Asian youth becoming involved with marginalised youth from other groups in school or in the neighbourhood.

Moreover, through the strong social cohesion within the group it is possible to rapidly exchange information on education, the quality of schools and the best way to access schools (Kasinitz et al. 2008). Also the parents strongly wish for their children to be high achievers in education (Vermeulen 2001). More than parents from other ethnic groups, these parents are willing to invest in education and their expectations of education are high.

The Turkish community in the Netherlands is also characterised by strong cohesion. The progress in the educational position of Turkish youth is however much less. Unlike the American Asian case, the Turkish network was at first indifferent, if not unfavourably disposed towards education. In the case of the in-between generation, the strong social cohesion of the network, combined with the negative messages on education in general, actually resulted in frustrating educational attainment. The second generation, however, increasingly takes advantage of multiple community support networks. The content of the messages on education has changed over a relatively short period. This happened as the first generation adapted to a changing context, and as the in-between generation was a daily reminder to family members of the limitations imposed by the lack of a good education. In addition, the second generation grew up under completely different circumstances and developed a different view of education. As Vermeulen (2001) states in his essay *Culture and Inequality* the normative content of the network is of great importance. This insight is crucial in explaining progress in the educational attainment of Turkish youth in the Netherlands. By expressing the appropriate message the network can develop an enormous force, a force that enables fast upward mobility because the accumulated knowledge, experience, guidance and support exceeds that of one’s own parents. Also, those parents who belong to the in-between generation show how the change in thinking about education continues within the Turkish community. They not only think quite differently about it, but they implement this thinking into educational support.

The case study of the Turkish community shows how important are viewpoints about education in a community. The role of the emerging education elite in the Netherlands Turkish community has been essential in altering the initial unproductive viewpoints on education. Projects set up by students from within the Turkish community have been of key importance in conveying a different educational message to parents of the first generation, showing that improvements
in educational results only come about if community members are actively involved in the process of change.

References


MARTENS, E. and WEIJERS, Y. 2000. Integratie monitor. Rotterdam: Erasmus University, Institute for Sociologic-


About the author

Maurice Crul is working as a senior researcher at the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research of the University of Amsterdam. He has published on school careers of children of immigrants in a comparative European and transatlantic perspective. He is the international coordinator of the TIES (The Integration of the European Second-generation) project that compares second-generation Turkish, Moroccan and former Yugoslavian youth in fifteen cities in eight European countries: http://www.tiesproject.eu/. E-mail: M.R.J.Crul@uva.nl
From “Kanak Attack” to the “GerKish Generation”: Second-Generation Turkish Narratives in German Culture and Politics

JENS SCHNEIDER

Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam

Most studies on young people of Turkish descent in Western Europe, i.e. the post-“Gastarbeiter” generation, present them as a homogeneous group without major changes over time. Research results from the 1990s are treated as current evidence, and little effort is put into longitudinal study designs. The only major internal distinction introduced recently has been the focus on the second generation. Yet definitions of second generation almost exclusively work with demographic criteria (either place of birth or age of entrance to the country), while even basic elements of generational sociology are not considered. This article approaches the Turkish second generation in Germany from the perspective of generational sociology in the Mannheimian sense, i.e. to look for generational identity and the main ingredients of young German Turks’ self definitions. This concept of generation introduces an important additional dimension, absent in most sociological research on migrants and their children: the dimension of time or history. Based on examples from the cultural production of the Turkish second generation, it is argued that even within the relatively short duration of Turkish immigration to Germany life experiences of young people of Turkish descent have fundamentally changed – and continue to do so. So what integration actually means depends not least on age and generational experience.

The native offers two reservations for the caraway. … Sweet little Ali is the true Kanak, because he serves himself between the buttocks of the native and cultivates the chocolate cover as a sort of identity. A Kanak is something like a red-skin, who is cheated with glass pearls and firewater, and still smiles like a tourist on a snapshot. Then there is a second reservation, in which the foreigner plays the part of the bold desperado, a real macho, who shoots as fast as lightning and who is also a fine stabber. In this reservation it’s the gold-chain bimbos and the moustache-caraways who hang around and hunt blond bitches.

I wish to acknowledge the useful comments on this text from Christine Inglis, Maurice Crul, Onur Kömünçü, Sangeeta Fager and the anonymous reviewers. Many thanks also to the copyright-holders of the illustrations for granting their kind permission to use them.
The above quote from Ali (age 23), member of the hip-hop band Da Crime Posse,\(^1\) is taken from the book *Kanak Sprak*, published in 1995 by Feridun Zaimoğlu, who was born in Turkey in 1964 and came to Germany at the age of 4. He studied medicine, but then began to write. For a while he was sort of the “wild Turk” of German TV talk shows and magazines, being very outspoken and with a look somewhere between a rapper and a pirate.\(^2\) *Kanak Sprak* is a collection of interviews with Turkish adolescents and young adults, and expresses the frustrations and anger of a group until then rarely noticed: Germany’s “homegrown foreigners”\(^3\).

The term *Kanake* seems totally out of place in this context, because it is, of course, the self-denomination of the original inhabitants of New Caledonia in the Pacific Ocean, part of the French Overseas Territories. How it entered German discourse is, as far as I know, a mystery. It was originally introduced by German neo-Nazis against all kinds of what they believed to be “Oriental” (i.e. Middle Eastern) – probably because it is easy to give it a contemptuous pronunciation, similar to the label “Fijis” for all Asians. But – perhaps best compared with the use of the word “Nigger” in American hip-hop lyrics – at a certain point it was also taken over by young Turkish Germans and other “foreign-looking” children of immigrants to make it a counter-symbol for their demand of recognition and place in German society. Zaimoğlu’s book was one of the very first public expressions of that (Tuschik 2000: 293).\(^4\)

Around 1998, Muhsin Omurca (born 1959 in Turkey) created the cartoon figure *Kanakmän*, beginning in a niche Turkish-German magazine in Berlin, but later reprinted in mainstream media as well (e.g. in the supplement *Perşembe* to the left-wing daily newspaper *Die Tageszeitung*). The first cartoon told the story of the Turkish immigrant Hüsnü who goes to psychotherapy because he entered an identity crisis after naturalising as German. So he tells the therapist about his dream: to possess both German and Turkish citizenships, which would turn him into a sort of “identity superman”: *Kanakmän*. In his dream, he goes to a group of

---

\(^1\) Translated by J.S. The term “caraway” refers to the common insult *Kümmeltürke* from the 1970s for first-generation Turkish labour migrants. Its origins are unclear, but they might have to do with the fact that certain spices, as much as garlic and olive oil, were not widely used in German cooking at that time. The original text is as follows: Der einheimische hat für’n kümmel ja zwei reservate frei. ... So’n lieb-alilein ist der wahre kanake, weil er sich dem einheimischen zwischen die ollen arschbacken in den kanal dienert, und den kakaöüberzug als ne art identität pflegt. ’n kanake ist sowas wie ne rothaut, die man mit bunten glasperlen und feuerwasser bescheißt und der grient dazu wie’n tourist auf’n schnappschußfoto. Dann gibt’s noch’n zweites reservat, in dem der fremdländer den part des verwegenen desperados übernimmt, ein richtiger mannskerl eben, der wie’n blitz aus der hüfte schießt, und sonst auch ’n feiner stecher is, und in diesem reservat lümmeln sich die goldkettchenbimbos und die schneuzerkümmel und machen jagd auf blonde weibchen.

\(^2\) [http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,grossbild-340650-326547,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,grossbild-340650-326547,00.html)

\(^3\) The book is very male-centred, therefore a couple of years later Zaimoğlu published a second volume with female voices – and invented the female form of the term *kanak*; see Zaimoğlu (1998).

neo-Nazis and provokes them with his Turkish passport, only to drag out his German one at the very last moment, “like garlic against vampires”. “Did it work?” asks the therapist, and Kanakmän answers: “I don’t know, at that very moment I woke up.” The reaction of the relieved therapist – “Thank God!” – indicates what would, of course, have been the answer (Figure 1).

In 1999, the German filmmaker Lars Becker transformed Zaimoğlu’s second book Abschaum (“Scum”; Zaimoğlu 1997) – it is the story of a 25-year-old second-generation German-Turkish drug addict – into a film with the programmatic title Kanak Attack. Interestingly, at the same time, this term also became the name of a movement and loose organisation of young intellectuals and artists of most diverse origins, with the aim of provoking debate through artistic and satiric actions. Their main topics have been – as in the Kanakmän cartoon – issues of citizenship (dual and by birth) and the ways in which “white mainstream Germany” was perceiving migrant culture and, especially, the multicultural society as such (see for example the film Weißes Ghetto (2002) on a “purely German” neighbourhood in Cologne).

1. Some theoretical clarifications

In migration studies it is very common to use terms such as “first”, “in-between” (or 1.5) and “second generation” (see e.g. Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Thomson and Crul 2007; Fernández-Kelly and Portes 2008). But differently from the demographic understanding of such terms in the sociology of migration, to belong to such a generation is not simply, or not even primarily a question of demography. The socio-historical conditions under which immigration happens and under which especially young people have to find a position and place, shape their perceptions and (re-)actions (see. King and Koller 2006). The issue I want to raise here is that – when looking at “generation” as a socio-cultural category for identification – these conditions may have been fundamentally different for the different age groups of young members of a given immigrant community – or even within the families.

---

5 http://www.kanak-attak.de
6 http://www.kanak-attak.de/ka/media_video.shtml
7 This does not mean that the use of generational terms in migration studies would be just technical or scientific. As Willem Schinkel noted, Migration Theory suffers from frequent and unreflected normative presuppositions, clouding the actual understanding of the social effects of migration and integration processes (Schinkel 2007; cf. Schneider and Crul 2010).
I exemplify this with an exploration into narratives as they are present in cultural productions coming out of the Turkish community in Germany, focusing particularly on cultural performers and other public figures from the “in-between” and the second generation. The aim is to see how changes in the specific moments in time of coming of age as a child of Turkish immigrants might have affected the process of finding a place in German society, and therefore also the identification
strategies and politics as they are expressed by cultural and political exponents of the Turkish German community.

Despite a steadily growing body of research on second-generation experiences in Western Europe, North America and Australia in general (see Thomson and Crul 2007) and in the Turkish German community in particular, to look at these experiences from a perspective of generational sociology (in the Mannheimian sense) and at generation-specific identity formation has not received any scientific attention yet – as far as I have been able to discern. It has not been included in any of the recent wider surveys among young immigrants or the second generation in Germany, so that there is also practically no empirical evidence available. 8 At the same time, there has been a boost of different forms of artistic and literary expression from a younger generation of Turkish German artists over the past years, of which one culmination has certainly been the Golden Bear Award for Fatih Akin’s film *Head On* (original title *Gegen die Wand*) at the 2004 Berlinale Film Festival.

To assess the generational dimension in the “integration experiences” of young Turkish Germans, two concepts in particular need some theoretical clarification: integration and generation. To begin with, “integration” is one of those social scientific terms that seem to have lost content and meaning proportional to its broadened use in scientific and political discourse. This makes it necessary to stress that integration is seen here not as an objective given, measurable for example by education outcomes, unemployment figures or intermarriage rates. Instead it is, on the one hand, a contextually differentiated function to structural participation and individual perspectives for personal development, and on the other, the subjective feelings of belonging to or being part of the place where one’s life is centred (cf. Schneider and Crul 2010). In this sense, it is relevant for this topic to highlight the following points:

First, second-generation Turkish Germans have spent the most decisive parts of their youth socialisation in Germany. They are neither “newcomers” nor do they represent an “outside view” on Germany. This is also true of the so-called “in-between generation”, here understood as children of Turkish immigrants coming to Germany as teenagers or in early school age. 9

Second, considering the different waves of large-scale migration from Turkey to Germany, children of Turkish immigrants were confronted with very different

---

8 See, for example, TIES (www.TIESproject.eu), the Integration Survey of the German Federal Institute for Population Research, the evaluation of the micro census 2005 by the Berlin Institute for Population and Development (Berlin-Institut … 2009), and the SINUS study on Turkish-German milieus (www.sinus-sociovision.de) – to name just some studies in which Turks in Germany play a central role.

9 Levels of segregation in neighbourhoods and schools are generally quite low in Germany (cf. Crul and Schneider 2009: 10); in that sense the Turkish community does not really represent a sort of “micro-territory” in itself, preventing Turkish-German youth from being socialised into German society as well.
institutional responses to the need to educate them – with education being in many cases the first and most important “contact zone” between their Turkish families on the one hand, and German institutions and peers of diverse “ethnic” origins on the other.

Third, this is related to profoundly changing perspectives within the Turkish German community and families, moving from the unquestioned expectation of return to Turkey to becoming in one way or the other part of German society. German institutions and public opinion needed quite a long time to recognise and accept this changing reality.

The concept of “generation” used here is based on Karl Mannheim’s understanding of generation as a cultural category for identification (Mannheim 1993). According to him, generations are:

... characterized by the fact that they do not merely involve a loose participation by a number of individuals in a pattern of events shared by all alike though interpreted by the different individuals differently, but an identity of responses, a certain affinity in the way in which all move with and are formed by their common experiences (Mannheim 1993: 381).

“Common experiences” occur under particular historical circumstances, and it is these circumstances which form the setting, in which generational identity is being constructed. But, as John Borneman observed, particular circumstances only acquire their significance and social meaning when there is a corresponding narrative and interpretation:

Objective processes become part of life constructions only through subjective interpretations. Meaning is not a thing that adheres in events, but always involves weaving those events into a story that is meaningful to us (Borneman 1992: 48).

“Meaningful stories” in the form of master narratives that are shared by groups of people create bonds between individuals which do not need direct personal interaction. In this sense the Mannheimian understanding of generational identity closes ranks with now well-established observations on national communities (Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1990) and ethnic groups (Barth 1969; Cohen 1994), stressing the role of representation in the creation of commonness and identities (cf. Schneider 2001: 33ff.). Generational narratives are not “true reflections of reality” (whatever that may mean), but representations of a social discourse, which reflects the sense and “plot” commonly attributed by a group of people sharing similar experiences.

The question that I want to pose here is whether there are different stories within the immigrant communities and families when referring to what is generally taken as one phenomenon: the consequences of large-scale labour and family reunion migration to Germany after 1955. The special appeal of entering the concept of “generation” into migration studies is that it forces us to include “the dynamic of
historical change” (Mannheim) into the analysis, in the sense that generational responses are always historically bounded and time-specific.

Now, the hypothesis here is that the migration experiences of the parents, growing up in Germany as some of the first children with migratory background to appear in school classes and the streets of the neighbourhood, represent “historical events” with a strong impact on the generational narrative of “in-between” and second-generation Turks. Yet these experiences have been fundamentally different in many ways between the first groups and later cohorts of children of Turkish immigrants, in the sense that the external conditions of growing up and going to school in Germany had changed quite substantially between the early 1970s and the late 1980s (and again over recent years).

Generational narratives cannot be addressed in any sort of representative way here. Artistic and literary expressions are certainly never “typical” for entire age groups, but they may be prototypical in the sense that they are referential to discourses and perceptions in the wider society. This is, of course, also true of political discourse and testimonial accounts. The samples from public expressions chosen in this article are prototypical, in the sense that they stand for themselves in many aspects (they are not typical), but they also share references and common narratives.

2. Early experiences

The “career” of the term Kanak (Attack) as spotlighted above somehow reflects the fact that growing up in Germany has not been an unproblematic experience for the early cohorts of the “in-between” or second generations. School plays a particularly important role in youth socialisation, and it also regularly shows up as the first and most central interface between “German” society and the Turkish families in many accounts. As these accounts show, the school did not put much effort into creating a sense of belonging among the first groups of Turkish children. Here is an example from the early 1970s:

In second or third class Arzu and I were pushed off to another school, supposedly to not forget our mother tongue. The school was further away from home, and all the pupils in the class were Turks. Most of them hardly spoke any German. There they told us that the first thing we should do is to learn German. That was pretty absurd. In my first school I had been the one to help my German classmates with their homework, and now I was supposed to learn German – in a class where everyone just spoke Turkish. I got very bored in the lessons and no longer understood the world.10

Indeed, at one time, school authorities created special classes to avoid what was officially termed the “consolidation of sojourn”, and to prepare the children for returning to “their” home country. Since the “guest workers” were expected to sooner or later be going back, so it was for their children. Frequently, neither

---

10 Ateş (2006: 62f.); translation of this and all following quotes from German by J.S.
school authorities nor parents considered it necessary or even desirable to provide these children with more than the compulsory period of education.

Seyran, the girl in the story above, managed to be allowed back to her old school with the help of her teacher. But it is easy to imagine the devastating effect that these “Turks only” classes had for many educational and professional careers of those children who did not escape. Seyran loved going to school, she was not only smart and a fast learner, school also meant an escape from a very repressive and gender-biased family situation: a violent father, a submissive mother who did not take sides with her, when she was beaten by her father or her brothers. Contrary to her brothers, she was never allowed to leave the apartment – except for going to school. As a consequence,

... in school I felt much better than at home, even though I was alone there too. But at least my teachers would not beat me, and I learned a lot. The teachers respected my achievements and complimented me. At home that was different: although my grades were always better than my brothers’, that was no reason for my parents to pay special attention to me. They would briefly look at the grades and then forget them. My parents were proud of me, but did not really support me. On the contrary, when I sat down somewhere in the corner to read a book, my mother always complained and told me that the apartment would not get clean from reading.11

School was a relieving escape from family repression, but it was still a predominantly ambiguous experience:

The director and other teachers produced me in front of the class. When I was the only one to know the answer he said: “Now a Turkish girl is telling you the right answer.” This phrase did not exactly help international understanding, and in order to avoid more deterioration of diplomatic relations, at some moment I began to take care that I was never the only one to raise my hand to a question.12

In my final oral exam there were more persons in the commission than for the other students. My teacher had asked for more examiners to avoid the allegation that he would give me a favourable treatment. Two classmates had regularly

---


12 Frau Güntzel war natürlich viel zu einfühlsam für so etwas, aber der Direktor der Schule, der uns auch unterrichtete, und andere Lehrer führten mich oft vor. Wenn ich die Einzige war, die sich meldete, hieß es: „Nun sagt euch eine Türkín die richtige Antwort.“ Ein Satz, der nicht gerade zur Völkerverständigung beitrug. ... Um die diplomatischen Beziehungen nicht weiter zu gefährden, passte ich irgendwann auf, dass ich nie die Einzige war, die sich zu einer Frage meldete (Ateş 2006: 60f.).
complained about my better grades. That was pretty brazen, but it did not help

For Seyran, as for many Turkish children and especially girls, growing up in Germany in the 1970s was a highly ambiguous experience. On the one hand, it offered a degree of freedom and possibilities for personal development that they would not have known in rural Turkey, and which was also frequently in opposition to the values and norms transmitted at home. At the same time, they were confronted with so many forms of barely disguised discriminatory behaviours by classmates, teachers, neighbours or public officials that feelings of belonging to that society were difficult to develop.

Seyran Ateş was born in 1963 in Turkey and is famous in Germany today: as a young woman, while working in a counselling bureau for Turkish women, she was shot and almost killed by a man with proven connections with an extreme right Turkish organisation. That man was moreover never convicted by German justice, because due to many police errors none of the evidence against him could be used in court. Ateş later became the first female Turkish lawyer in Berlin, and she is today a well-known activist against forced marriage, domestic violence, and so-called “honour crimes”. Her story is of course exceptional in many aspects, but it is also prototypical for what young Turks, and particularly Turkish girls, went through growing up in Germany between the late 1960s and early 1980s.

3. Change of scene

Fatih Akin was born in Hamburg in 1973 and he is ten years younger than Seyran Ateş. As much as she, Fatih Akin is a pioneer for the Turkish community in Germany, albeit in a very different way: When he went to school he was not the only Turk in class – together with students from other migrant origins they most probably represented a clear majority of the students. In public discussions his school director takes pride not only in his most prominent ex-student, but also in the high proportion of children of immigrants that his grammar school manages to launch into higher education.

Akin got the chance for his first film – a short movie entitled Sensin (It’s You, 1995) by the local producer Ralph Schwingel from Wüste Film in Hamburg who felt that it was time for a fresh and different cinematographic approach to German realities and that there was a market for it. Sensin is about a young German Turk looking for a girlfriend; his problem is that she has to be as much Turkish as a fan
of punk music and Robert de Niro – an impossible combination of criteria according to his friends. Akin’s first long movie *Kurz und Schmerzlos* (Short and Painless, 1998) became a commercial success in Germany; like *Kanak Attack* it featured likeable petty criminals of diverse ethnic backgrounds.

**Figure 2:** Fatih Akin presented on the cover of a regional student magazine as a “Hamburger with body and soul” (2007)

![Fatih Akin on the cover of a regional student magazine](image)

In almost all Akin’s films the main protagonists are Turks, and in a way Turkishness has even become more prominently featured in his later films, with Istanbul featuring as one of his favourite locations. Yet at the same time, the ethnic categories in his films are always contextual; they are basically about aspects of the human condition, like love and death – so their cultural or ethnic background just sets the stage among many other factors involved. In the comedy *Kebab Connection* (2005), co-authored by Akin and directed by Anno Saul, ethnic stereotypes stand central and are constantly played with. The story is about a young Turk dreaming of realising the “first German-Turkish Kung-Fu movie”. The problems begin when his girlfriend gets pregnant and his dreams are rudely confronted with reality. Playing with ethnic ascription already begins with the cast:

14 See also his music documentary *Crossing the Bridge: The Sound of Istanbul* (2005).
the main role is played by a second-generation Italian, while Sibel Kekilli (the award-winning main actress in Head On) plays an Italian friend. In one scene the pregnant girl is asked by her white middle-class German mother if she ever saw a Turk pushing a baby pram. The girl cannot really recall having seen this (and many spectators silently agree ...), but in the end it is not her mother nor her boyfriend, but the conservative Turkish father of the boyfriend who is with her at the moment of birth.

Like Ateş, Fatih Akin is an exceptional figure within his generation, but he is also not alone. He is prototypical of a different generational experience from that of the early second generation, because his success was also situated in a changing context at large — a change to which he contributed at the same time. Public discourse and the debate on migration in Germany have undergone some paradigmatic shifts since the mid-1990s. Citizenship and immigration legislations have been reformed — not as profoundly as many had wished for, but at least some significant steps have been taken. Only a couple of years ago the Federal Statistical Office incorporated the migratory background of respondents into population statistics which until then had only recorded nationality. When the office published its latest micro-census data in 2007, the statistical record of persons of non-German origin from one day to the next doubled from 9 per cent (foreigners) to 18 per cent (with migrant background). In the population younger than 25 this share is even more than a quarter, rising to 50 per cent in most urban areas (Statistisches Bundesamt 2007).

4. “Among other aspects, Turkish”

Differences between the two groups may seem small, but they are significant. For the earlier cohorts the main struggle was against ethnic categorisations. Zafer Şenocak (born 1961) wrote in 2000:

> The so-called ghettos are nothing else than second and third leagues in which the losers of consumption societies end up, independently from their ethnic belonging (Tuschik 2000: 287).

And Feridun Zaimoğlu added: “The ethnic group is only a reference for those who lost” (Tuschik 2000). In his anthology Morgen Land\textsuperscript{15} of “newest German literature” (subtitle) Jamal Tuschik from Frankfurt explicitly crossed any of these categories and brought together authors of most diverse ethnic backgrounds — and even one author ironically labelled as “Kanak Attrapp” (Tuschik 2000: 294). Most authors of the anthology share the fact of being born between the late 1950s and mid-1960s, most of them still in the country of origin of the parents. Their concern with writing is in explicit distancing in two directions: On the one side against so-called “migrant literature”, the books written by the immigrants themselves, and,

\textsuperscript{15} The title is a play on the German word for “Orient”, which with its two components separated translates into “tomorrow land”.


on the other side, against “mainstream” authors without a migration history in the families:

The luck of later birth spared them the intellectual spasms of their predecessors of the so-called generation of migrant authors, who still had to publish their stuff in a context of a “foreigners’ culture” oriented towards helping to survive. In this scene it was the social workers who dictated the tone. ... Those born afterwards directly use their doubled chances for cultural choices. They are ahead of their competitors not only with regard to language. While German standard circumstances in their dozen do not bear any secrets for them, the adversaries don’t know anything about their hinterland, for example the familial exclaves of the Almancilar-Germans on two continents. They dispose as easily over a floating perception of origin & difference as over a trump which always wins: the Aleman buys into many stories (Tuschik 2000: 284f).

The “younger” second generation feels that it belongs to this society, and it does not struggle against being classified as Turkish. It is certainly still not always an easy relationship, but Fatih Akin and his generational peers do not allow room for doubts about their Germanness. Their concerns are similar to those of the earlier generations, especially with regard to continuing dominant stereotypes on Turks and issues of citizenship, be it legal or social or cultural citizenship. But they are no longer fighting against the niche of migration and integration politics or culture, they have simply left it.

Figure 3: A collection of essays and stories edited by journalists Ayşegül Acevit and Birand Bingül.

Five years after the Morgen Land anthology of Jamal Tuschik the younger generation also published a collection of essays and stories (Figure 3). Most

16 Almancilar is the word used in Turkey for the Turks living in Germany (the word for Germans is different: Almanlar!). It has a rather negative connotation in the sense that emigrants to Germany are mostly thought of as poorly educated, “uncivilised” peasants. It is part of the “hybrid” experience of many Turkish Germans to be seen mainly as “Turks” and “foreigners” in Germany, and as “Germanics” in Turkey.
authors of this book, edited by journalists Ayşegül Acevit and Birand Bingül, were born between the late 1960s and the mid 1970s, and here the reference to Turkishness is not only not avoided, but made the central focus: “What do you live? Young, German, Turkish – stories from Almanya”, where Almanya = Germany (Acevit and Bingül 2005). The cover features the main title in the typical styling of a golden Islamic necklace pendant with the moon and star from the Turkish flag against a red background. Yet the focus is on the many realities or dimensions of Turkish lives in German society today (Acevit and Bingül 2005: 7; see also Acevit 2008).

And this is actually the provocative statement here: to claim Germanness, but without any neglect of the Turkish heritage in the family:

The society makes you problems?
Don’t care about them, you are dark and beautiful.
You ask yourself, which path is the right one?
You’ll find it, you are dark and beautiful.
You dance between the old and the new world.
You fight for a living as you like it.
It is different to come from there, but to be born here,
to try to fit the expectations of everyone, but still to be free.

Aziza A. [born 1971 in Berlin]: Kendi Yolun – Your Own Way 17

One of the stages on which cultural producers of Turkish background in Germany have been particularly successful is political cabaret and comedy – maybe because widespread German attitudes towards immigrants, as much as the situation within many Turkish families, provide so many elements of Realsatire. In her bestselling book Einmal Hans mit scharfer Soße (Hans with Hot Sauce for Me, Please) Hatice Akyün (2005) describes the struggle of her parents to transmit Turkishness to their children, and her own difficulties to find a suitable husband – ideally a German with “oriental temperament”. The actual topic of her book is the mutual stereotypes between “Turks” and “Germans” and how certain expressions of Turkishness in Germany are the result of reactive identifications to these stereotypes among young Turks.18

A completely different way of dealing with this simultaneity of both references is presented by the comedian Serdar Somuncu (born 1968 in Istanbul). Somuncu published a CD with the title Hitler Kebab, making a telling and provocative connection between two elements rarely thought of in any joint discursive context. Somuncu became famous for touring Germany with a satirical


18 While the subtitle to Akyün’s first book is “Living in two worlds”, her second book says “Living in a new world”. Here she describes how her search ended with finally marrying a (German) Turkish man (“Ali for dessert”; 2008).
Second-Generation Turks in German Culture and Politics

reading of Hitler’s Mein Kampf and a dramatic performance of some key scenes in that book. On the one hand it is difficult to imagine anything more “German” than making a programme about Germany’s historical top villain. On the other hand, his Turkish-German perspective obviously adds something new, not only because no “normal” German would have actually dared to read Mein Kampf in public (and would probably have had problems with justice). He also did the performance in places where neo-Nazis and other kinds of racists and nationalists were part of the audience – torn between being scandalised that a Turk reads Hitler, applauding the public reading of their hero’s book, and the ambiguous feeling of learning about the ridiculousness of a text they hardly knew before.19

Figure 4: Serdar Somuncu being (not quite) Hitler

This playfulness and light-handed way of unmasking the absurdities of German public discourse and politics are also found in a clip from the TV comedy show of another second-generation Turkish comedian, Kaya Yanar. In the clip the owner of a döner kebab snack bar is furious because the meat on the skewer has been burned, and he indicates a notice in the Turkish language which warns that the grill should not be hotter than 180 degrees Celsius. But his apparently “ethnic German” employee does not understand Turkish and fears being fired now. The boss is shocked that he had not even noticed that lack of language skills over all these years, and decides that something should be done about it. The sketch finishes with a voiceover telling us that “more than 60 million people in Germany do not speak Turkish properly. Don’t be an idiot, learn Turkish!”20

19 See http://www.somuncu.de; a brilliant portrait of Serdar Somuncu by Josh Schonwald can be found in Otium (Vol. 2, No. 4, 2006) at http://otium.uchicago.edu/articles/hitler_humorist.html. Somuncu’s reading of Mein Kampf is available on CD, also in English.

20 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WVJC9FOMxM. This sketch, a parody of a nationwide TV campaign against alphabeticism (http://www.alphabetisierung.de), triggered a series of follow-up parodies for “East German” (i.e. Saxon dialect) and other regional German dialects.
But, as the title to this section has already indicated, being Turkish is also just one aspect among others. For this reason, on some occasions the public exponents of the Turkish-German second generation have also opted for not making any reference to their Turkish background, especially when exactly this had been expected. To give an example: when the Bavarian comedian Django Asül (civil name Uğur Başğışlayıcı; born 1972 in Deggendorf) was invited to present the traditional political cabaret at the end of the Catholic fasting period in Munich – itself already a remarkable step – Bavarian integration politics, the conservative opposition to the accession of Turkey to the EU, or similar likely topics were not mentioned at any point in his programme. Instead he targeted local, regional and national politics just like any other German comedian would have done.21 When he was invited by the prestigious German weekly Die Zeit for their regular column “I have a dream …” he imagined himself meeting the former Czech tennis player Ivan Lendl – a strong generational reference for growing up in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s, but certainly not particular to Turkish Germans.

It was fifteen years ago that Cem Özdemir (born 1965 in Bad Urach) became the first elected Turkish member of the Bundestag (federal parliament) and one of the most prominent figures in the German integration and multiculturalism debate. Although still regularly invited to speak on these issues, this is no longer the main field of his political activity. Since becoming a member of the European Parliament he is known as a specialist in foreign relations, and he was also recently elected as one of the two national leaders of the Green Party in Germany. This move away from integration issues did not prevent him, at the same time, from recently publishing a book on Turkey ( Özdemir 2008). Turkish German members of parliament (at federal and regional level) are still not truly representative of the actual share of ethnic Turks in the overall population, but their numbers are steadily rising. They have started to become organised across party boundaries (for example in the Network of Turkey-originating Mandate Holders; see Kiyak 2007),22 and they are receiving more attention in the media. Many more examples could be added: in recent years especially young German Turkish writers have gained access to the large German publishing houses and generally address a quite mixed audience during lectures.23

My last example indicates that “generation” can also be a meaningful term in the Turkish German context: The GerKish Generation (“Die deukische Generation”) is one of the latest steps in the context of creating common narratives among young second-generation Turkish Germans in Germany. Founded in March 2007, the

22 See also: http://www.mitarbeit.de/sm_projekt_netzwerk.html
23 It also helped that Turkey was the invited guest country at the Frankfurt Book Fair in 2008. Many authors from Turkey were translated into German for the first time, but also German Turkish authors received extra attention (see e.g. the series of lectures organised on that occasion in Hamburg: Jung, türkisch, Almanya – Festival deutsch-türkischer Literatur, 26 September – 30 November 2008).
programmatic impulse was very simple: “We are German and Turkish. We want to do something against the continuing false stereotypes about us adolescents of Turkish descent”. The GerKish Generation’s main preoccupation is the disproportional number of children of Turkish origin being selected too frequently and too early into the lowest qualifying secondary-school tracks of the German education system.

After “attacking Kanaks” and the somehow more ironic second generation, there is probably a new generation coming up particularly concerned with the continuing structural disadvantages of Turkish German youth. Their initiative is well-placed in a raging general debate (and fast-growing number of political initiatives) in Germany about necessary reforms of the education system after the devastating results in the PISA tests. One of the issues here is the apparent incapacity of the system to cope with social and cultural diversity, and to produce school careers independently of the social background of the parents (OECD 2006).

Turkish girls have probably benefited most in the transition from the “in-between” to younger second generations. Experiences such as those recounted by Seyran Ateş are certainly still to be found, but it is also unsurprising that the “GerKish Generation” was initiated by an 18-year-old female high-school graduate called Aylin Selcuk. It is in fact mainly the young women who best manage to bridge family and society, to be Turkish and German.

---

24 http://www.deukischegeneration.de/index2.html
References


About the author

Jens Schneider received his Ph.D. in social anthropology at the University of Tübingen (Germany) in 2000. He spent two years at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and lectured at several universities in Germany. He has extensive ethnographic fieldwork experiences in Chile, Germany and Brazil. His main fields of interest are national and cultural/ethnic identities, and the influence of the majority identity constructions on migrants and ethnic minorities. He is senior researcher at the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies in Amsterdam (Netherlands), and co-coordinator of the TIES survey on second-generation integration in Europe (www.TIESproject.eu). E-mail: sfager@gmx.de
The explosive rise in new forms of media and communications technologies has had a profound impact on the experiences of first- and second-generation migrants in multicultural societies. New possibilities for transcending old national understandings of community through the rise of globally linked networks of transnational ties invite closer examination. The globally dispersed Turkish diaspora uses a variety of new technologies to keep in touch with family, friends, acquaintances and colleagues across the globe. The networks arising through such activities have come to complement and sometimes to replace the traditional importance of face-to-face communities in the establishment of feelings of community, inclusion and belonging. A current research project in Melbourne has been investigating the Turkish community’s use of both old and new media to establish, assert and consolidate their own sense of community, beyond the limiting national frames of Turkish, Australian or even Turkish-Australian identity constructs.
Recognition of this has been slow to develop, however, especially outside the traditional immigrant receiving countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Implementation of explicitly multiculturalist policies probably peaked in the period from the late 1960s until 2001. Since that time multiculturalism has begun to be progressively wound back in many immigrant nations, leading some commentators to proclaim the death of multiculturalism. Yet cultural pluralism is rising, not falling, and living with difference will increasingly define the coming world order. The extent of globalisation today gives many more people this experience of difference, therefore “the diasporic experience becomes not so much a metaphor as the archetype for the kind of cultural adaptiveness that our era demands” (Sinclair and Cunningham 2000: 22). A respondent in my own research described how Australia, since the arrival of post-war migrants from many different countries, had become a “rose garden”, and suggested that migrants deserved more respect and acknowledgement from Anglo-Australians for effecting this transformation.

It is perhaps ironic, then, that the current concern with defining Australian identity has come at the very time that national identity in many places is coming under threat both from globalising forces imposing top-down cultural and economic hegemony and bottom-up assertions of sub-national collective identities. These globalising cultural forces include the media influence of Hollywood movies, popular music and television shows, some of which may be locally produced versions of global franchises (Pop Idol and Big Brother), multinational businesses taking over what were once local retail outlets (McDonalds, Starbucks, Krispy Kreme donuts) and the perhaps less obvious but more insidious effects of the developed world moving manufacturing offshore, more often than not to China, which now produces much of the world’s goods, and India, home of telecommunications and call centres. Globalisation is the outcome of a long-term shift in time-space relations, in which the impact of geography recedes (Moores 2005: 36) although it does not entirely vanish.

The media have a critical role to play in the fostering of civic engagement in the face of such globalising tendencies. Media also play a role in facilitating participation in liberal democracies within the sphere of the nation state (Bailey and Harindranath 2006: 304), including contributing to the creation of a socially inclusive environment for ethnic minorities in multicultural societies. Research has shown that “civic participation is, to a moderate degree, influenced by media use” (Livingstone and Markham 2008: 368). But participatory democracy can only work if the citizen is enabled to participate. This is where the migrant mediascape can play an important, though debated, role in the development of citizenship in both its cultural and political senses (Rigoni 2005: 575). It is important, then, to examine closely the mediasphere available to particular language groups in order to understand the complexity of migrant audiences’ experiences with mainstream and alternative media. It is not clear whether having a media sphere which is fragmented into ethno-diasporic media sphericules actually challenges the political and cultural hegemony of the mainstream or simply provides a means to opt-out of
the mainstream altogether. As Bailey and Harindranath show, “public sphericules are indeed vital to plural societies but the proliferation of subaltern counter spheres does not lead to a multiplication of political forces” (2006: 311).

1. Turkish diaspora in Melbourne

Transnational communities across the globe turn to the media for reassurance about their place in the world, but often find mass media, especially mainstream media in the new country, to be unsatisfactory. Alternatives have traditionally included community newspapers, local radio and video shops. Yet most of these media often do not keep pace with change at home and perpetuate old fashioned stereotypes (Karanfil 2007b: 61). More recently, satellite television and the internet have opened up new avenues of communication between the country of origin and the contemporary place of residence.

Of course it is impossible to generalise about the Turkish community in Melbourne, as if it exists as a single entity. An estimated 1 per cent of emigrants from Turkey ended up in Australia (Karanfil 2007b: 59), a small minority compared to the global diaspora, the major portion of which now resides in Europe, especially Germany. Yet the Turkish community in Australia, as it enters its third generation, includes nearly 60,000 persons who claimed Turkish ancestry at the 2006 census. As with any large social group, internal diversity in age, gender, class, ethnicity, language and religion cut across the social norms engendered by a shared country of birth. Yet the shared experience of migration and resettlement as a minority group in a foreign land also forges some unifying elements across these lines of diversity. Thus, as Karanfil describes, a Turkish video store in Sydney juxtaposes aspects of Turkish culture such as a picture of (the staunchly secular) Atatürk next to a quote from the Koran, and apparel for rival football teams hanging side by side. The shop also displays Kurdish and Armenian cultural items, which are not seen in the homeland at all and only exist openly in diaspora (Karanfil 2007a: 6–11). Thus there can be seen a tension between unifying and diversifying aspects of culture within the Turkish diaspora.

2. Methodology

A current research project in Melbourne has been investigating the Turkish community’s use of both old and new media to establish, assert and consolidate their own sense of community, both within and beyond the limiting national frames of Turkish, Australian or even Turkish-Australian identity constructs. The research involved both one-on-one and group interviews with Melbournians of Turkish descent, which have revealed interesting new patterns of worldwide connections made or enhanced through satellite television, radio, internet and long distance and mobile telephony. The individual interviews were conducted with producers of local radio programs broadcast in the Turkish language on both public and community radio stations in Melbourne. Focus groups were conducted with groups
of university students aged between 18 and 25, and with women aged between 30 and 70 who identified as Alevi. I do not claim in any way that these two groups represent the entire Turkish community in Melbourne. Rather, what I think is interesting is that they are both groups who, by virtue of age or religious difference, have thought or are thinking about their own identities and their place both within and outside an ethnic minority community within a heterogeneous nation. The research also involved a questionnaire-type survey of subscribers to Turkish satellite television services through UBI World Television. Comparative data drawn from similar research across Britain and northern Europe show how the Turkish community resists being pigeonholed through its consumption of diverse information and entertainment from a variety of media sources.

3. Turkish language mediascape

3.1. Local production

The ways in which ethnic minority communities have gained access to culturally and linguistically appropriate media have changed over time. Media are “present in the processes of representing and communicating identity and community” (Georgiou 2006: 12). Media are also major players in the emergence of the hybrid imagined community as electronic media bring together the various spaces of belonging at local, national and transnational scales. Diasporic media can help to shape a shared discourse with a diasporic community, contributing to the establishment and maintenance of that community (Georgiou 2006: 22). Many migrants in the West have been trying since the 1970s both to get involved in mainstream media to change it from within (“entrism”) and working to establish alternative productions (“separatism”) (Rigoni 2005: 571). Before that broadcasting in Australia, as well as overseas, explicitly aimed at promoting national unity and there were strict controls on foreign content (Morley and Robins 1995: 10). In Australia, as in Britain and the US, “broadcasting has been one of the key institutions through which listeners and viewers have come to imagine themselves as members of the national community” (Morley and Robins 1995: 11). Since the 1980s, however, this has changed and audiences are now explicitly addressed as consumers rather than citizens (Morley and Robins 1995: 11), with an expansion of cultural offerings appealing to increasingly diversified niche audiences.

The history of broadcast media in community languages in Australia is a rocky one, with Language Other Than English (LOTE) radio broadcasting beginning in a small way in the 1950s. At that time no more than 2.5 per cent of a radio station’s broadcast time could be in other languages and all such material had to be accompanied by an English translation (Bostock 1984: 99). Small increases

---

1 For a more detailed report on focus groups with young people, see Hopkins (2008). More reports on the Alevi women’s focus groups may be found in Hopkins (2009).
gradually occurred, but in the 1970s the cost of buying airtime suddenly rocketed, putting it out of reach of many of the smaller language communities. In 1975, therefore, 2EA in Sydney and 3EA in Melbourne went to air to provide dedicated community language services, beginning with seven and eight languages respectively. In three months they built a listening audience of 1.1 million people. Also in 1975, the publicly funded ABC introduced 3ZZ which allowed community access to production of broadcast content (Bostock 1984: 100). Two years later the federal government introduced the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), aimed at providing culturally specific broadcast services. SBS, which is also publicly funded, began with multilingual radio broadcasting and commenced television broadcasting in 1980 (Bostock 1984: 102–3). It now broadcasts radio in 68 community languages, as well as providing multilingual television through its free to air channel, which includes a selection of news programs from around the world screened at regular times during the day, as well as a local news service which airs nightly at 9.30pm, current affairs and a selection of serials, movies, documentaries and sport both from Australia and overseas. Community radio and television has also continued to grow and develop alongside government services. In 2002 there were over 1,700 hours per week broadcasting in over 100 languages, on more than 100 community radio stations across Australia (Forde et al. 2003: 11).

Currently in Sydney and Melbourne SBS radio broadcasts in Turkish for an hour a day, seven days a week, three days from Sydney, four days from Melbourne. Additionally there is a Turkish language youth programme on Sunday afternoons, alternating production weekly between Sydney and Melbourne. Other community stations also broadcast in Turkish, though with less hours of content. 3ZZZ, for example, currently produces five hours of Turkish programming spread over four days each week. Apart from occasional one-off productions for community channels, there are no current regularly produced television programs made in Australia in the Turkish language available through free to air services.

There are several current Turkish language newspapers produced in Australia and generally available free of charge in both Sydney and Melbourne, including Yeni Vatan, Dunya, Zaman and Australian Turkish News Weekly. Australian news content accounts for around 20 per cent in these. Their interest generally lies in their business advertising, rather than their news function (Karanfil 2007a: 137). Each is aligned with a Turkish media company in Turkey and much of their content is a direct relay of Turkish news. There are also online newspapers, such as AusTürkiye, an Australian, online-only edition, produced by the giant Dogan Turkish media group, reporting Australian, Turkish and world news. In the longer term, the Melbourne-based Turkish Report Weekly has been producing a weekly hard copy newspaper for more than ten years, apparently independent of any larger media corporation.

The continued viability of small scale, locally produced ethnic media has traditionally been thought to depend on either a continuing inflow of migrants from the home country, or a second and third generation which is sufficiently educated
in the home language to be able to consume media that is produced in that language (Zhang and Hao 1997: 4). Yet it is clear from a glance at the locally produced newspapers, both in hard copy and online, that a mixture of English is creeping into the Turkish-Australian language, most evidently in the advertising, but in the actual news and editorial content as well.

Arguments continue to rage regarding the necessity for public funding of niche media productions despite their comparatively low ratings as compared to mainstream media offerings. The producers of Turkish-language radio in Melbourne were generally pessimistic about the future of locally produced content, with the consensus being that once the first generation of migrants goes, there will be no audience left. The arrival of satellite television seems to have hastened this process, although there is an ongoing interest in some local content as one radio producer explained:

We do announce anybody who died. We do announce it. Some of our listeners, they do listen because they wonder if any of their friends passes away, you know. That’s another service that keeps us going.

Radio producers also see their task as inculcating Australian knowledge into the Turkish community and reducing isolation and insularity, especially among those who struggle with English:

This is one of the things that we are always trying to do, … try and talk about more Australian than Turkish, because the biggest problem with Turkish community, they are more focussed on Turkey than Australia. Like whenever we do functions we always invite first the Consulate General of Turkey, not the MPs from our local community but inviting someone from Turkey. … I did my own research on people, myself, I asked “Who is the foreign minister?”; for ten people. They don’t know Alexander Downer. I’m serious. I asked “Who is the treasurer?” They don’t know. Seriously. … I asked [about] a guy from Turkish magazine. They know. They know his girlfriend, everything. … [W]e are trying to solve this problem, make people more Australian oriented. You know read the news, be aware with the current affairs. Because you are in Australia, not Turkey, so you have to be aware of the things going on around you.

As recently as July 2007, a speech made in the Australian Federal House of Representatives (Ferguson 2007) noted the proliferation of transnational media available to migrant communities in this country, and countered that a boost in funding for Australian made community media in languages other than English would help to promote citizenship values in minority groups as described above. But the precarious financial situation of locally produced media becomes clear in this interview with a Melbourne based radio producer:

We don’t have back up, you know, like big businesses who give a lot of advertising, we don’t have that. I do advertise on radio. I put very low price, low radio price, $30 per spot only. Radio should be very high, but if I put higher price, they never give. I keep it lower so we get these … small businesses. They … don’t know how to advertise I think. We do have [big business], like, Crazy
236

Liza Hopkins

John’s. He’s Turkish, but he doesn’t deal with Turkish. He gives lots of advertising to, I think Carlton or other football clubs. He gives them money. But Turkish media can’t ask him to give something, and he doesn’t think. So we don’t have much. All the newspaper publishers they do lose money from their pocket.

Slade and Volkmer (2007) argue that Australian values can in fact only be inculcated through consumption of nationally produced media, and are undermined by the consumption of media produced in other countries. It is not clear, however, whether the ever increasing proportion of imported mainstream media programming affects citizenship values amongst English speaking Australians in the same way. Moreover the case for the influence of media, especially television, on the development of citizenship values may have been overstated. Political focus on the promulgation of Australian values through public school education has been to the fore in recent years, including the provision of $AU31 billion in schools funding which is only accessible to those schools flying the Australian flag (Government of Australia 2005). As the second generation of immigrants, born and raised in Australia, passes through the education system, norms and values are changing in the community as well as in the media.

3.2. International production

Turkey’s governments for a long time imposed total control over broadcast media through the Türkiye Radyo Televizyon (TRT) monopoly. TRT provided a voice for the government, but was also therefore highly vulnerable to government intervention. For many years “TRT has been an instrument for cohesiveness in an environment riven by alternate national identities” (Price 2002: 36–7). It is also part of TRT’s remit to disseminate “correct and beautiful Turkish” (düzgün güzel Türkçe) through broadcast news and local productions, and the dubbing of all imported material (Öncü 2000: 301). But TRT’s monopoly came to an end with the arrival of satellite TV in 1991, the year that private broadcasting from other countries into Turkey began (initially uplinked from Germany) (Karanfil 2007a: 108). Private broadcasting companies became legal in Turkey in 1994 (Karanfil 2007a: 109). This introduced a period of intense competition by consolidated holdings to acquire TV stations, newspapers, construction firms and banks. In three to four years the entire media sector was transformed (Öncü 2000: 303). With the ending of TRT’s broadcasting monopoly, the satellite TV which started coming into Turkey included radical Islamism from Germany and the Kurdish MED-TV channel from London. MED-TV is an interesting example of the creation of a virtual Kurdistan which “provided a culturally unifying function despite the lack of a Kurdish homeland or single territorial base” (Price 2002: 80). The satellite medium proved to be highly effective in this instance, as it did not rely on high levels of literacy or stable mailing addresses, avoided state censorship (for a while

\footnote{Crazy John’s is the name of one of Australia’s largest mobile phone retailers. The business was owned, until his recent death, by John Ilhan, a first-generation Australian, born in Yozgat (Turkey). In 2003 he was rated by Business Review Weekly magazine as the richest Australian under the age of 40.}
at least), was relatively inexpensive to access and was receivable in remote areas (Price 2002: 80).

The government initially responded to these challenges to its authority by banning programs, regulating dishes and intervening in the countries where the uplink took place. A seismic policy shift soon occurred, however, and Turkey began opening her skies to imported media from Turkic Central Asia and other material that governments found more acceptable such as commercial broadcasts appealing to the mainstream, but in competition with TRT. Turkey also began providing cable services in reply, to diasporas across Europe (Price 2002: 37) and now Asia and Australia. As Price has noted: “[a] media space filled with commercials is thus often preferable, from the perspective of the status quo, to one crowded with opposing alternate identities” (2002: 40).

Recent important changes in media ownership patterns in Turkey have progressed during the last five years after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power. This includes the increasing consolidation of many of the media companies into large holdings, often allied with banking and construction firms to produce powerful conglomerations, with control over the majority of advertising revenue concentrated in the hands of relatively few media barons. The proliferation of pro-Islamic national and transnational television channels during this period can be seen in the appearance of religious channels (also available in Australia) such as Kanal 7 and Samanyolu. Because of the small size of the Turkish community in Australia as compared to Western Europe, the Turkish Government was comparatively slower to reach out to its expatriates with religious, cultural and political support. Satellite broadcasting was available in Europe a decade before it reached Australia (Karanfil 2007a: 82). The last two decades of broadcasting in Turkey have thus seen the end of state-imposed views of what cultural forms were acceptable and seen the rise of a diversity, pluralism and heterogeneity. Yet more than 90 per cent of first-generation Turks in Australia left Turkey before these changes happened (Karanfil 2007a: 113).

Television ownership is comparatively high in Turkey, while newspaper circulation is generally quite low. Research in the 1980s found that Turkish print media, which were privately owned, were distrusted by respondents, but broadcast media, especially television, which was state owned, was more highly trusted (“because you can see what happened”) (Ogan 1987: 162). Yet after competition in broadcasting was introduced, TRT’s audience share fell to less than 10 per cent. “In the process, the ethos of broadcasting was transformed from public service to consumer choice” (Öncü 2000: 304). Turkish domestic television today is banal – a postmodern pastiche of imported programs, domestic versions of international hits, and global brand advertising, over sixteen nationwide commercial channels, conforming to “the common denominator of global consumer culture everywhere” (Öncü 2000: 296). Turkish intellectuals condemn this banality on the basis of its content of mindless sex (religious/conservative right) or mindless violence (intellectual left) (Öncü 2000: 296).
Turks are now the biggest consumers of homeland media in Europe. Turkey also has more private television channels than any other country in Europe, and all are carried by satellite and hence easily receivable across Europe on small antennae. In most cities in Europe with Turkish populations there are numerous daily newspapers and TV channels available in Turkish (Ogan and Milikowski 1998: 3). Watching contemporary Turkish transnational television allows viewers to see Turkish culture as dynamic, a point which was reiterated by several of the respondents in the Melbourne research. Without access to such contemporary images, identification with homeland culture and society becomes more difficult. This is particularly so for the second generation, born and raised in the host country, whose first-hand encounters with the parental homeland may well be limited to occasional family holidays and visits. The visions of Turkish youth available to Europe born youth on satellite TV shows that Turkish youth culture is both closer to Dutch youth culture than to the culture of the parents and that this closeness is stronger than parents believe (Ogan and Milikowski 1998: 14). For the second generation of immigrant youth, watching satellite television provides them with additional information which they use in relating to the parental generation and to their European-born peers (Ogan and Milikowski 1998: 15).

The development of transnational television flows from countries of emigration to diasporic populations in Europe is “an entirely new phenomenon, a development of the last decade, which has very significant implications for how migrants experience their lives, and for how they think and feel about their experiences” (Aksoy and Robins 2003: 89). Research into transnational television viewing in the Netherlands found that by as early as 1995, 50 per cent of Turkish families had satellite TV access. The Turks were therefore early and fast adopters of satellite broadcasting, as well as watching a lot (34 hours per week on average) and watching 80 per cent Turkish channels. The Turkish Government station TRT was also available on Dutch cable but people far preferred the commercial stations available by satellite (Milikowski 2001: 125). This sudden popularity of Turkish TV in Netherlands, however, became a source of anxiety for the mainstream of Dutch society. Yet the researchers note:

Now that eight years have passed since the first Turkish dishes were installed, it is evident that these fears have been unfounded. Turkish immigrants, though indeed watching a lot more television from their country of origin than immigrants from Morocco and Surinam, and identifying strongly with other Turks…, also take a closer interest in Dutch civic life and participate more actively in Dutch institutions…. It is not a matter of either/or, it seems. The explanation… is that civic interest and behaviour is a cultural resource in itself (Milikowski 2001: 128).

The introduction of Turkish satellite television services into Australia has occasioned much less public angst than that which has been seen across Europe. In fact few people outside of the Turkish speaking community would even be aware that such services are available. The Australian satellite service provider UBI has 27,000 subscribers and claims to reach 40,000 Turkish speakers. It is the largest Turkish service available outside Europe and the Middle East (Karanfil 2007a:
149). Subscribers to this service have a choice of two packages, including either the full subscription giving access to ten channels from across the nationally broadcast spectrum in Turkey, or a basic subscription to *Vizyon* (Vision), a locally collated collection of the most popular programming across UBI’s ten selected channels.

Unsurprisingly for subscribers to Turkish language television services, 100 per cent of respondents in my research survey rate their Turkish language proficiency as good or very good. Perhaps more surprising, given the anecdotal understanding of satellite television viewers as isolated from the mainstream, 74 per cent of respondents also rated their English language proficiency as good or very good, with only 2 per cent reporting that they spoke English not at all. A remarkable 97 per cent of respondents also reported that they or other members of their households watched free to air Australian television as well as their subscription to Turkish television.

72 per cent reported listening to local Australian radio (two specifically making a note that they listened in the car), compared with only 62 per cent who listen to the radio stations direct from Turkey which are accessible through their satellite subscription service (and therefore only available in the home where the set top box and satellite antenna are located). Ninety per cent of respondents also read an Australian newspaper regularly, of which 85 per cent read an English language newspaper. Fifty percent of respondents also reported reading one or more of the locally produced free Turkish language newspapers on a regular or occasional basis.

### 3.3. Online media

A further factor impacting on the place of ethnic media in the new global mediascape is the availability and accessibility of online and networked communication technologies. While mobile phone penetration has been explosive even in poor and disadvantaged countries such as Afghanistan (AFP 2006) for a long while internet penetration, relying as it did on expensive, bulky and electricity dependent hardware, took longer to establish. However the expansion in the numbers of public access points through internet cafes and the like has introduced internet access to large numbers of citizens in countries where access in the home is limited. The demand for public accessibility which has fuelled this rise in internet cafes indicates a public hungry for the skills which come from computer accessibility (keyboard, software and English language skills) as well as for the connectivity, information and communication possibilities which come from being connected to the global cybervillage. In relation to the Arab world, Wheeler writes:

One cannot help but wonder if increasing freedoms of expression and association online are somehow linked with overt public demands for reform. The fact that public demands for reform are often orchestrated through the active use of new media technologies such as mobile phones and the internet, gives reason to pay
closer attention to emerging forms of democratic experimentation supported by internet cafés throughout the [Arab] region (Wheeler 2006: 18).

In Turkey, too, internet access is largely made available through internet cafes. By 2001 there were 4500 internet cafes (Ogan 2003: 516) and in 2003 there were 1.8 million Turkish hotmail accounts (Ogan 2003: 517). By comparison, in 2000 only 12 per cent of Turks had a computer at home and only 7 per cent had home internet access, with these users being overwhelmingly from the urban, university-educated elites (Ogan and Cagiltay 2006: 805). Turkey has the highest rates of internet use and access of Muslim majority nations, but still falls far behind the rates found in Western nations (Bunt 2003: 9). Nonetheless it is precisely the educated, socially and geographically mobile young people who are fuelling the demand for internet access. Ogan’s 2006 study found that people who read a particular, popular Turkish confessions website did so for diversion/entertainment, but that they posted to the site in order to increase their opportunities for social interaction. This makes sense for the larger number of young people who use the site, as they are increasingly mobile, separated from family and friends and moving towards increasing individualism rather than the more traditional collectivist orientation of Turkish society (Ogan and Cagiltay 2006: 821). The government has, at various times, threatened to subject internet content to the same censorship as TV and newspapers but this has generally not happened. However in 2007, access to WordPress, which gets over a million hits from Turkey a month, was denied by the government due to a complaint made about content on one of its pages, while access to YouTube has been suspended on more than one occasion.

As Siapera demonstrates, much of the online networking of Muslims is indeed as banal as any other online group, in contrast to the fears sometimes expressed that it remains predominantly a breeding ground for jihadis (Siapera 2006: 337). Research in Melbourne, however, found that the internet is not a highly regarded source of religious information as the following exchange makes clear:

Respondent 1: I think the only reason why a person would actually check the internet is when … there are certain sects that obviously interpret some things differently than others. … Sometimes you do get people who ask you something in religion that they’ve heard – and you want to check it – like I’ve actually gone to the net a couple of times … and said “ok I’ve never heard this before but I’ll check it”.

Respondent 2: But that’s obviously open to whichever sect you’re talking about so – I mean Shiite and Sunni Islam is totally different and sometimes what one says doesn’t support the other and, internet sites, they’re all open anyway so a person can sit down and write anything.

Interviewer: Have you ever used the net to communicate with other Muslims for religious reasons?

Respondent 2: no, not religious purposes really … because religion is more of a spiritual thing, so you need to be face to face and sit down face to face and talk.
The internet, however, is widely used by Turkish Australians as a means of communication with family and friends, through email, online chat and webcams. In fact Australians of Turkish descent have higher rates of internet access than the general population, and even more so when traditional barriers to access such as levels of education and income are taken into account.

4. Situating the migrant mediascape

This richness of Turkish language media available to residents of Melbourne opens up a series of debates in the broader public sphere about the growing phenomenon of transnational communities. Portes’ account of transnational communities includes the following definition: people who live dual lives; speak two languages, have homes in two countries and make a living through continual regular contact (Portes et al. 1999: 217). Such communities may have developed more slowly in Australia than in Europe and perhaps even the United States, where regular physical trips to the home country may have been more easily achieved. In Australia, physical trips to the homeland were expensive and time consuming for a long time and even international communication was expensive (telephone) or slow (letters). More recently the introduction of cheaper international airfares, reduced rates for telephoning and the advent of online communication which is both cheap and fast, has made Australia’s physical isolation less of a hindrance to the development of transnational identities.

Critical mass may also be a factor in migrant communities’ experience of the country of immigration. In some parts of Germany, particularly certain suburbs of Berlin, for example, it is not necessary to speak German, as it is possible to get by wholly in Turkish (Küçükcan 1999: 66). Australia’s relatively small Turkish community has meant this situation is only very recently becoming a reality as the second and third generations of Turkish speakers establish themselves in business and the professions. A current university student describes the situation:

With the younger generation now, like we’re the generation that’s in Uni at the moment, but there’s the one generation that’s above us who have graduated and they’re working in many, many fields, you know, you’ve got your optometrists, you’ve got your physiotherapists, you’ve got your doctors, so literally to cover almost every aspect of life there is a Turk out there somewhere. And people will prefer them because they speak their own language. And its going to be the same with us, when in ten years time we’ll be working each in our own fields, you know, it’ll always be that whole, “Oh he’s a Turk, I’m going to go [to him]”. Even if I can speak English, I’ll go to him and help him out, why not, he’s one of us, that type of mentality. Especially that the older generation have.

Thus the Turkish community retains some cohesion, even in the face of loss of fluency in Turkish language. Another student summed up this process very nicely when she explained:

I think as the generations get younger, they use less and less, the Turkish that they use, even just in my family. My parents Turkish is very well, compared to mine
which is not as well, and then there’s my brother who really doesn’t prefer to
speak Turkish at all.

Negotiating identity is therefore something that happens on an everyday basis for
Australian Turks. The question of experiencing racism or feeling different from the
mainstream was variously addressed by some of the respondents that I spoke to.

I went to a private school where there were 400 students all up and there was only
five Turks and there was no racism but when it came to ANZAC day …³

The story was taken up by another teller:

Aw, ANZAC day, yeah when I was younger I made the mistake of um they were
talking about the war and you know you’re just a kid so it just seems so funny,
like I wouldn’t do it now but back then the teacher was explaining how Australia
had to pull out and I was like yes we won. I got grounded for that and stayed at
home for the next few months.

Having pride in one’s Turkish ancestry clearly does not override a commitment to
Australia. In fact research has shown that the development of new means of
communication allows space for the development of such flexible or transnational
identities (Portes et al. 1999: 223; Vertovec 1999: 451). Electronic communications
open the public sphere from a national to a transnational canvas, including
opportunities for political and civic action (Vertovec 1999: 454). Transnational
communities develop without spatial closeness, so there needs to be other close
relationships which “link through reciprocity and solidarity to achieve a high
degree of social cohesion, and a common repertoire of symbolic and collective
representations” (Faist 2000: 196). Research also shows that participation in
transnational practices enhances rather than diminishes political participation in the
new country as well (Portes 2001: 188; Guarnizo et al. 2003: 14). Young people in
particular, who are bilingual, technologically savvy, and constantly connected to
their friends and peers seem to have no difficulty in maintaining connections with
networks across the street, across the nation and across the globe.

The relatively recent, rapid spread and increasing accessibility of modern
communications technologies have contributed to increasing awareness of events
and beliefs within the globally dispersed population. “Diasporic communities
sustain and partly depend for their shared sense of identity on transnational
communications. But the national and local context where diasporic populations
live is equally important for the construction of meanings of community and
identity, especially as inclusion, exclusion and participation in the broader society
are largely grounded in national and local space” (Georgiou 2005: 490).

³ ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) Day, celebrated annually on 25 April,
commemorates the battle between Allied and Turkish forces at Gallipoli in 1915. Although the
Allies were eventually forced to retreat, the day is remembered for the heroic actions of Australian
troops, particularly in response to what is widely considered to be incompetence on the part of the
(colonial) British commanders.
Turkish Transnational Media in Melbourne

One of the respondents in my research articulated this dichotomy between local space and cultural identity very clearly, when he said:

You know because I grew up in a really ghettoey kind of suburb I was always reminded that I was Turkish from friends … like I’ve obviously had Australian friends and I’ve always been the Turk, so to a certain extent you definitely know that you’re Turkish but at the same time you know that you’re Australian. But to a certain degree I feel more Turkish just for the sheer fact that I’ve been reminded through the years that I am Turkish.

Yet the relationship to the country of birth is also important, particularly for ethnic or religious minorities, who may not feel any identification with the country of citizenship listed on their passport. One young woman who is Turkish born but of Kurdish ethnicity stated very simply: “I feel more Australian.”

The interrelationship between media use and ethnicity is shaped by numerous factors including material, social and individual parameters. In particular, there are significant differences between immigrant generations.

Although media do not determine identities, they do contribute in creating symbolic communicative spaces that either include or exclude, thereby affecting audiences’ media experiences and discourses about their identities. The media often create boundaries for inclusion and exclusion, and eventually for participation in a “common culture” (Madianou 2005: 522).

Perhaps it is in this indirect way that Australian media create the social environment in which the respondent above was constantly reminded of his outsider position by insider friends.

As has been noted above, since the introduction of Turkish satellite TV, Turks in Europe have been watching it a lot. The German and to a lesser extent Dutch response to this is that it leads to greater ethnicisation of Turks, or a stronger degree of ethnic identification and a lower degree of integration by reinforcing the cultural difference between Turks and Dutch (Milikowski 2000: 444; Aksoy and Robins 2000: 344). Yet mostly what Turks are doing with Turkish media is not being influenced by Turkish state nationalism, but “working through the complexities of Turkish culture and identity now” (Aksoy and Robins 2000: 345). Thus, for example, “Turkish commercial satellite television helps migrants, and in particular their children, to liberate themselves from certain outdated and culturally imprisoning notions of Turkishness, which had survived in the isolation of migration” (Milikowski 2000: 444).

It is also true to say that few if any transnational viewers are completely monocultural in their choice of viewing. The younger generation especially are as comfortable with American or international channels and programming as with local or homeland media. One of the respondents in this research explains how a diversity of news sources helps him to form his own opinion on issues:
I think when there are a lot of politicians coming … from Turkey, it doesn’t get as much … exposure as say for example the US president coming down. [The Australian media] don’t really see it as important. [T]here have been a lot of agreements being made but no one’s been talking about it so we have to do a bit of our own research to find out what they’ve agreed on, … so it’s really hard getting information. I remember when the president of Turkey came down and on one side The Age was actually explaining how well he fixed the country up and on the other side the other newspaper it had a small little blog and on that blog it had a really gruesome picture of him and it was talking about how Hardcore Islamic he was.

Thus, as has been found in research elsewhere in the world, Australian Turks use the variety of media sources available to them in sophisticated ways to sort out truth from spin and to negotiate some of the complexities inherent in establishing one’s own position, opinions and affiliation. Particularly for young people, there is thus a complex interplay of participation, active citizenship and the ability to establish and maintain a transnational identity.

Despite the interest in globalisation through high tech innovation such as internet, satellite TV, free trade in transnational goods and falling costs of international transport, nothing is perhaps more important in the spread of globalisation than the fall in the cost of international telephony. This is especially for those most likely to be socially excluded in their place of residence, such as migrants (Vertovec 2004: 219). Cheap telephone calls reinforce families’ abilities to collectivise and work together. Mobile phone penetration is very high in third world countries and in some countries higher than landline connections, although in Turkey most migrants are not from the really rural areas, so are more likely to be well served by existing infrastructure (Vertovec 2004: 222). Since the introduction of prepaid telephone cards, Deutsche Telekom has lost 190,000 Turkish customers. (Turks in Germany have telephone bills twice as high as average so they are desirable customers for telecommunications companies). Now there is fierce competition in the Turkish-speaking marketing between national and private phone companies (Vertovec 2004: 221; Çağlar 2002: 189).

5. Conclusion

Increasingly globalisation is blurring national boundaries, allowing for mixing, hybridity and transnationalism. It is no longer a matter of simply taking on a singular, monolithic cultural identity, called “Turkish” or “Australian” or even “Turkish-Australian”. This is not to imply, however that all choices are regarded as equally valid in the public sphere. One respondent noted the ambivalence of the position of Turks vis-à-vis other Australians: “I think there is a real deep respect on both sides but, um, it doesn’t always apply.”

Migration has always involved a negotiation of space and feeling, and identity has always been and continues to be shaped by numerous factors beyond the geographical and national. New forms of communication facilitate the global flows of information between individuals, networks, corporations and governments that
characterise the contemporary age. Yet it is clear that increasing transnational communication links, far from narrowing down identity options, actually open up the possibilities of multiple, complementary, active and participatory identities for the new global citizen.

As the first generation of Turkish migrants ages and the younger generations born and educated in Australia reach maturity, a more complex set of relationships is evolving within and across the transnational Turkish community in Australia. Older, national, cultural and religious identities are increasingly fragmenting and recombining in new ways as worldwide, mediated networks replace and augment geographically limited face-to-face communities. Transnational communities, with their long histories of producing and consuming media outside the national frame, are in the vanguard of a new way of looking at and thinking about identity, community and a sense of belonging in a globalised world.

References

AFP. 2006. “Mobile phones are Afghanistan’s success story”. The Age 25 April.


SLADE, C. and VOLKMER, I. 2007, “Transnational media and citizenship;


About the author

Liza Hopkins is an ARC-funded postdoctoral research fellow currently working on a project investigating media use, community formation and identity among Australians of Turkish descent. She completed a Ph.D. at the University of Melbourne (Australia) in 2000 with an ethnoarchaeological study of a settlement site in north-eastern Turkey. Since then she has been working at the Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, on a variety of projects investigating the intersections between new media, social inclusion and ethnic diversity. E-mail: LHopkins@groupwise.swin.edu.au
A “Condition of Homelessness” or a “State of Double Consciousness”? Turkish Migrants and Home-Making in Australia

BANU ŞENAY*
Macquarie University, Sydney

This article sketches out the shifting images and meanings of home as they are articulated by Turkish immigrants in Sydney. Rather than answering the question “which country is more ‘home’ than another?”, I investigate the issue of what makes any particular place home. The latter question has the potential to explore the idiosyncrasy of the experience of home as a fluid, shifting and contextual phenomenon. The narratives of Turkish migrants reveal that migration is not a process producing homelessness; instead it brings about multiple contexts that extend across spaces and evoke continuity and discontinuity with a past life.

In recent years, research on the meaning of “home” has grown exponentially (Blunt and Dowling 2006), as has discussion of processes of transnationalism. One reason for this interest has been the inequalities of “globalisation”, leading to an increasing mobility of people that has brought about the highest degree of physical restlessness ever. Millions of people live in countries other than their country of birth, becoming citizens of more than one country. Many seek asylum and refuge for better lives in national territories thousands of miles from their birthplaces. New technologies and increasing mobility and interactions across national borders have facilitated individual and group generation of new networks, social organisations and structures, leading in turn to transnational spaces in which various forms of subjectivity are produced. All these processes raise significant questions about identity and belonging.

Given these developments, what makes any particular place homely? A wide variety of descriptions have focused on different forms and meanings of the concept. According to Symonds (1997), an idealised vision of home contains peace and familial love, whereas Young (1997) identifies the normative values of home as safety, individuation, privacy and preservation. More broadly, Papastergiadis (1998) contends that “the ideal home, apart from its physical protection and market

* The author thanks Chris Houston, Amanda Wise, Christine Inglis and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments

ISSN 1817-4574, www.unesco.org/shs/ijms/vol11/issue2/art8 © UNESCO
value, is a place where personal and social meanings are grounded”. Home is both a material and an affective place (Blunt and Dowling 2006). It can be somewhere out there, far from where its inhabitants find themselves; it can be lived through the power of imagination, or through what Hage (1997) calls strategies of “home-building”.

But what matters as much as these varied understandings of “home” are the insights that subjects’ narratives of home allow into understanding migration and the formation of transnational spaces. Traditionally, many studies in the literature theorise migration as a process that concludes with settlement. In contrast, home narratives of transnational migrants shift the focus away from viewing migration simply as a geographical movement from one country to another, and towards recognising the continuities and discontinuities that take place in the migratory setting, which do not simply include the country of origin and country of destination, but the ongoing flow between these two contexts. In addition to providing knowledge about the spatial and temporal aspects of migration, home narratives also raise questions about the nature of the self. Here feelings about home are fluid, often shifting, and contextual, and they are continuously negotiated in the migratory setting.

With this in mind, this article addresses the notion of “home” as an analytical category through exploring the imaginings and meanings attached to it by Turkish migrants in Sydney, Australia. Rather than answering the question “which country is more ‘home’ than another?” for Turkish migrants, I investigate the issue “what makes Turkey or Australia (or more regional places) 1 home?” The latter question has the potential to provide a more adequate account of home for at least two reasons; first, for theorising the concept as a state of “becoming” rather than as a state of “being”, and second, for opening up the possibility for the simultaneous existence of multiple homes.

The organised intergovernmental migration of people from Turkey to Australia began with the signing of an agreement between the governments of the two countries in 1967. Numerous charter Qantas planes flew back and forth over the next six years between Ankara and Australia to carry the Turkish workers (as the Turkish Government called them) or Turkish assisted migrants (as the Australian Government saw them) to Sydney or Melbourne. For the majority of these pioneer migrants, the main reason for moving was economic. After the termination of the assisted migration scheme in 1974, thousands of unassisted migrants from Turkey have made their way to Australia through other schemes such as family reunion,

---

1 It should also be noted here that micro-level forms of homely belonging are also applicable for Turkish migrants abroad, although this is beyond the main concern of this article.
humanitarian programme, skilled migration and so on, all contributing to the formation of the Turkish community in Australia.

The empirical data used here have been gathered from two years of fieldwork conducted in Sydney during 2007 and 2008. My fieldwork was based on participant observation and in-depth interviews. Some twenty interviews were carried out with the first- and second-generation Turks living in suburban areas of Sydney. The respondents were selected not only according to their generational status, but also according to their gender and time of arrival in Australia. Nearly half of the interviewees were early immigrants who came through the assisted migration scheme of 1968–74. Additionally I also interviewed a number of other Turks who came after 1974 through other schemes.

1. Migration, transnationalism and home: theoretical reflections

The notion of “home” has been as significant an area of inquiry within the broader fields of human geography, housing studies, Marxism, feminism, cultural geography as it has been in the field of migration studies. The seemingly increased flows of people and the proliferation of transnational social fields pose questions about migrants’ competing allegiances to the countries of origin and destination, as well as their changing self of belonging. As Al-Ali and Koser put it, “the changing relationship between migrants and their homes has been an almost quintessential characteristic of transnational migration” (2002: 1). What does research on transnational migration have to offer to the wide literature on home? And equally important, how can thinking about home contribute to understanding mobility and migrants’ experiences?

In her article on the return migration of the Bulgarian-Turks, Parla argues that “the earlier, classic migration paradigm took for granted the world order of nation-states and its territorial definition” (2005: 7). Migration, in this frame, has been understood as a one-way movement from a country of origin to a country of destination that ends with settlement (Baldassar 2001). This view not only defined migration as a linear type of movement from one point to another, but heavily influenced by the modernist accounts, it also imagined immigration as a move from the traditional to the modern as if the sending and receiving countries could be placed and imagined on a continuum. Here the assumption is that those migrants who discard their existing cultural traits and reorient themselves to the appropriate

---

2 The political refugees from Turkey arrived during the 1980s, partly due to the military coup in 1980 and related to an ongoing declaration of martial law and accompanying state violence in the Kurdish regions of Turkey.

3 The latest Australian census in 2006 recorded that 30,490 people born in Turkey are resident in Australia. This number doubles to 59,402 when the size of the community is estimated according to ancestry. Half of the community (15,290 Turkey-born people) have settled in Victoria with a slightly smaller percentage (12,470) in New South Wales (DIAC 2007).

4 Here I am only looking at people who identify as Turks rather than as Kurds or Alevi, etc., who may have very different feelings about Turkey.
cultural traits of the new country are also successfully becoming part of modern society. Accordingly, those who fail to do so end up living in a mono-cultural isolation and in a state of “homelessness”. The modernist paradigm had a tremendous impact on the way that the post-war migratory flows to the traditional migrant receiving countries including Australia have been understood. For example, Kovacs and Cropley (1975: 30) assume that the cultural values of the sending and receiving country will automatically clash. A similar logic is prevalent in Birrell and Birrell’s *An Issue of People: Population and Australian Society* where the authors comment on the changing immigration policy in Australia in the early 1970s:

Adjustment to Australian standards will not take place overnight nor will it always be easy. It has not been easy for those of the Greeks, Italians and Macedonians, for example, who have emerged from traditional and limited life styles and it will not be so for some of the Turks (1981: 74).

What Birrell and Birrell mean by the “limited life styles” of these non-English speaking migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe is ambiguous; however clearly enough the authors view the two countries as located on a modernist continuum. The emergence of this interpretation of migration as a “modernising” process, however, has a much earlier pedigree. Daniel Lerner’s influential book on Turkey, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958), which was published just before mass Turkish emigration to Europe began, is another good example of how the modernist paradigm has contextualised international migration. Lerner divides the Turkish population into three broad groups. Taking this one step further, he provides a statistical breakdown of these groups within the whole population: the *traditionals* (comprising 60 per cent of the population), the *moderns* (10 per cent) and the *transitionals* (30 per cent). He describes the world of the *traditionals* as comprising the family, mosque and village and as a world that is resistant to change. At the other end of the continuum, he puts the *moderns* who had incorporated a Western style of living and were rationalist, secularist and individualist. This is the group that comprises the ruling elite of Turkey. In between these two groups Lerner describes a mediating category of *transitionals*, who although retaining elements of traditional culture had aspirations for better life standards, and better educational and vocational opportunities for their children. He argues that this is the mobile group in Turkey, both geographically and socially, moving from rural districts to small towns and then to larger metropolitan areas. However, because the *transitionals* cling to too much of their traditional characteristics, their attitudes to change are often ambivalent and they are often likely to experience value conflict as a result of migration. Undervaluing the agency of migrants as social actors and reducing the country of origin to its supposed place on the continuum linking the traditional to the modern, the modernist paradigm does not go beyond a deficit-model that calculates everything through the logic of modernity versus traditionalness.

In my view, this theoretical apparatus prevalent in the classic migration paradigm fails to offer fresh thoughts on the notion of “home”, as well on the phenomenon of
transnational migration itself. First, by assuming that migrants are organically rooted in one place, that is the country of origin, the paradigm reduces emigration to a process of displacement whereby migrants become detached from their “original” home or country. Second, the paradigm assumes that those migrants who are unable to integrate into the “host” society due to their traditional characteristics end up living in a state of homelessness given that they are believed to have a problematic relationship with the new country while no longer having any ties with their place of origin. Failing to take into account the complexities involved in any migratory context, this view standardises the idea of home as a state of “being” as if it is fixed and given. Home is seen as an immutable mode of belonging, a condition, which does not allow for the rearticulation of forms of individual agencies. There is no possibility for multiple “homes” or “homelands” to mutually exist in this frame of thinking. Therefore, people feel at home only in one single place to which they are primordially tied.

While these earlier approaches to theorising migration fail to highlight the fluid, contextual and pluri-local qualities of “home”, more recent work on mobility and the formation of migrants’ transnational practices has introduced alternative analytical perspectives, which have opened up possibilities of thinking about home in a broader sense. In its most basic meaning, the “transnational” implies “the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Baldassar 2001: 8). Since its emergence in the 1990s, research on transnationalism has encompassed a wide range of phenomena through which the relatedness between migrants and their original “home” have been continued. This has taken the form of study of the political economy of remittances (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001); of home-making strategies; of return visits to home (Baldassar 2001; Cinel 1991); of migrants’ long-distance nationalism (Anderson 1992; Skrbiš 1999); of home-town civic committees; of dual nationality; of the production of transnational socio-cultural spaces (Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Olwig 2003), and finally of migrants’ participation in the politics of their birthplace (Portes et al., 2002; Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). One reason for this growing interest in the research on transnationalism has been the cross-disciplinary shift away from structuralist accounts of social relations towards an emphasis on individual agency (Nancy Green, cited in ESF 2004: 7). According to Green, the growing emphasis on individuals and an acknowledgement of their partial authorship of their own actions has made analysis of transnationalism more explicitly a study of human agency. Extending Green’s argument, it is also possible to contend that this shift in paradigm – at least in migration studies – has been accompanied by a parallel shift in methodology. Ethnography, as anthropology’s key research method, has been increasingly utilised in accounts of transnationalism to explore the nuanced details of everyday life in transnational contexts (Wilding 2007). This can be interpreted as the appropriation of ethnographic fieldwork as a key research practice by scholars in different social science disciplines, rather than a shift in the importance of fieldwork within the discipline of anthropology.
The paradigm of transnationalism contributes to understanding the complex and dynamic face of population movements in a number of ways. In the first place it highlights the continuing interrelatedness between actors involved in a migratory context including the migrating individual, sending country and receiving country. In doing so, it points to the inadequacy of thinking migration as a linear process, one that is emblematic of imagined categories of “pre-settlement” and “post-settlement”. Mobility here is rather conceived as a continuing performative process, in addition to being a geographical shift. This assumption of transnational theory is antithetical to the fundamental assumption of the classic paradigm, which defines migration as a one-way movement that results in the gradual incorporation of migrants in the receiving country (Olwig 2003). Espiritu (2003: 3) notes that this has contributed to a shift away from the dualism inherent in the classic paradigm – the assumption that migrants move through bipolar spaces in a progressive time frame – to nonbinary theoretical perspectives that are not predicated on modernist assumptions about space and time.

In the light of these observations, it is relevant to see the potential of a critical transnational theory to provoke us to think of “home” beyond its limitations assigned by the earlier classic paradigm. By pointing to the processes that link the home and host countries, as well as the communities in both countries and immigrants, research on home and transnationalism raises questions that “destabilise a sense of home as a stable origin and unsettle the fixity and singularity of a place called home” (Blunt and Dowling 2006: 198). Home is not a fixed thing; but is a contingent process of “becoming” through which individuals’ previously held perceptions of belonging can be deconstructed and reconstructed according to what the new inhabited environment offers. This perspective not only allows us to recognise the unfixed nature of “home” (Massey 1992: 15), but also opens up the possibility for multiple homes to coexist. Individuals might feel “at home” in more than one place, while at certain times they might feel not at home. This however should not be conceived as a state of “homelessness” caused by mobility. Perceptions of home are context-bounded and open to change according to space and time. Moreover, research on transnational homes has also suggested that “home” is not necessarily a well-defined national space. It might intersect with a homeland, but home is also imbued with feelings and imaginations about places, people and social relationships. Doreen Massey’s (2001) rich conception of home, which addresses the concept as “intersecting social relations” highlights this point. Home, then, is not only a physical site where one lives or a country one was born in, but more than this it is an affective site imbued with emotions, memories, social interactions and feelings of belonging.

2. The notions of vatan and anavatan in Turkish nationalist discourse

When my respondents talked about their emigration experiences they often employed two key terms to speak of Turkey: vatan (homeland) and ana-vatan (motherland). Although in their simplest territorial meaning both terms imply one’s birthplace, there are fine distinctions between them. The meaning of vatan refers to
the French notion of *la patrie*. However, the term was rearticulated in the formative years of the Turkish state. In an attempt to replace an Ottoman-Islamic culture with a constructed Turkish national culture, the founders of the Republic searched for alternative origins of Turkishness and Turkish nation. As Navaro-Yashin notes in *Faces of the State*, in the interest of claiming connections with a certain past and a shared national culture, “the early nationalists began to suggest links between the Westernised (or “modern”) national culture that they wanted to institute and the culture of Turkic groups in ancient Central Asia” (2002: 11). Therefore, *vatan* in the new nationalist discourse was not confined to the official territory of Turkey, but represented a greater homeland including the Turkic nations in Central Asia. This definition was made explicit by Ziya Gökalp, who was the prominent ideologue of Turkish nationalism, in his poem *Turan*: “The country of the Turks is not Turkey, nor yet Turkistan. Their country is a vast and eternal land: Turan” (Lewis 1961: 345).

The term *anavatan*, on the other hand, carries somewhat different psychological associations. The first component of the term – *ana* – has two different meanings in the Turkish language: “primacy” and “mother”. These meanings give the term its connotation of a benign mother nurturing its citizens as her children. Put another way, the demanding and authoritarian imagery of statehood and sacrifice, which are very much present in *vatan*, are replaced by a more domesticated and caring representation of statehood in the term *anavatan*. However, similarly to *vatan*, *anavatan* has also been reproduced in the nationalist discourse. For example, the official state discourse situates the mainland Turkey as *anavatan* in relation to Northern Cyprus, which is depicted as “infantland” (*yavru vatan*) (Navaro-Yashin 2003: 122). A similar discourse is also employed when referred to the Turks in Bulgaria (Parla 2005) or Turks in Greece (Akgönül 1999).

Similar to the examples above, affiliation with Turkey as a mother country, as well as an *original* homeland was often voiced by the Australian Turks I interviewed. One of the pioneer migrants to arrive in Sydney forty years ago speaks about how he perceives both countries:

> I am a Turk, a Turkish Australian. The place that I first belong to is Turkey, which is my *anavatan*. Then comes Australia which is my new *vatan*, yet, it is very new to me. I cannot see myself only as an Australian. I am a Turk with Australian citizenship (Mustafa, 67).

A sense of superiority assigned to “*anavatan* Turkey” in contrast to “*vatan* Australia” was predominant in the migrants’ discourse. Australia was imagined as a homeland as well, but only when they spoke of Turkey as their motherland. Although it was less common, some respondents also used the term *ülke* (country) when referring to Australia. Clearly, this is a rather descriptive term that does not reflect a deep emotional sense of attachment to land and statehood as the other two terms do.

---

5 Vatan ne Türkiye'dir Türklere, ne Türkistan. Vatan, büyük ve müebbet bir ülkedir: Turan.
Although the tendency to appraise the country of origin as a real home was very common among the first generation Turks I spoke to, they often expressed a confrontation with Turkey as well in our later conversations. This was particularly the case with the assisted earlier migrants, who found out after coming to Australia, that they were recruited as permanent migrants. As the historiography of Turkish immigration to Australia shows, almost none of the early migrants were aware of their status as migrants, considering themselves to be guest workers at the time they departed from Turkey (Elley 1993; Içduygu 1991). This was apparently due to the unclear information provided to them by the Employment Service in Ankara, as well as the absence of any explicit or implicit statement about permanent settlement in the 1967 agreement. This, however, should neither be seen as an accidental mistake on behalf of the Turkish state nor as a natural outcome of the poor-planning of the scheme in the early years of its operation. The officials in Turkey deliberately gave them the impression that they were “guest workers”. This idea was even imposed on those migrants who migrated in the fifth year of the assisted scheme. As one informant explained:

I came to Australia in 1972. Before we came here a man gave us a lecture. He said: “They will call you migrants there. Don’t believe them. You are not migrants, you are workers. Go there and save money without eating or drinking anything. As soon as possible come back and be a blessing to your country and people” (Ömer, 55).

Feeling resentment towards the Turkish state for not informing them about their real migration status, the earlier immigrants depicted this situation as being “sold to a foreigner” as they worded it. Interestingly, I was also told by a substantial number of first-generation respondents that they were “adopted children” of the Turkish state:

All this time we haven’t received any support from Turkey. All they do is to provide services to the Turks in Europe. They are the real children of the Turkish state. We, on the other hand, are the adopted children (Zeliha, 59).

This narrative well reflects the sense of child-mother relationship embedded in the discourse of anavatan as mentioned earlier. Rather than being a relationship between equal parties, the discourse implies a relationship of dependency in which the well-being of the former is dependent upon the care provided by the later party.

The different connotations of vatan and anavatan are also reiterated through Turkish political and media discourse. Almost every representative of the Turkish state who visited Sydney for various social events during the course of my research would speak about Turkey as the migrants’ anavatan, explicitly to point out that there is an “original” homeland out there regardless of the migrants’ affiliation with the destination country. There can be second, even third, homes depending on what those new homes might materially provide, but wherever they may be, Turkey is the genuine eternal anavatan for the Turks abroad. In one example, Abdullah Gül, 6 Üvey evlat, that is a child who is not loved like real children.
President of Turkey, addresses the Turks in Australia in a letter – delivered by the Turkish diplomatic corps in Australia and printed in the Australian Turkish media – where he celebrates the 84th anniversary of the formation of the Turkish Republic:

We are proud and delighted to celebrate the 84th Anniversary of the Proclamation of the Turkish Republic. Although, I can not be there with you on this occasion, I am pleased to be able to convey my sentiments. I would like to underline that I share your excitement and enthusiasm on this important day, which constitutes one of the defining moments of history for the Turkish nation...There are around five million Turks and foreign nationals of Turkish origin living abroad. Among those, Australians of Turkish origin have a significant and respected place. We see each and every member of the Turkish Australian community as our voluntary representatives while keeping vital links with their homeland [anavatan].

The letter of the President, apart from illustrating a typical example of what Billig (1995) calls “banal nationalism”, shows how this nationalism transcends mainland Turkey and is reproduced in new places. Expanding the extent of its organic relationships with the Turks abroad, the state makes itself manifest outside its own official territories. There is no doubt that the state discourse embedded in the above examples is reified in the practices of the Turkish state attempting to nationalise its emigrant communities and to maintain their connection to the homeland. Such nationalist sentiments are reinforced through direct means such as homeland consular networks; through sending teachers to the host societies (Miller 1981: 41); through the Turkish mosques under the control of the Diyanet (Religious Affairs Directorate) (Fetzer and Soper 2005); through the institution of compulsory military service; and through the media sources owned by the state, as well as through indirect ways including the production of national culture; the celebration of national days; internet sources (i.e. the e-mail networks of the diplomatic corps; the Turkish state’s censoring of internet sources); sending representatives abroad to deliver talks and so on. The research on political transnationalism has shown that Turkey is not the only country that is actively seeking to maintain the allegiance of its migrants abroad. As Miller informs us much earlier in Foreign Workers in Western Europe (1981), the homeland governments have a direct interest in the maintenance of their emigrants’ identifications for ideological, as well as for economic and political reasons (ibid.: 32). However, he continues, even the fact that this is a common motivation among many migrant-sending countries does not normalise the attempts of those states to establish “virtual states within other states” (ibid.: 34).

3. What makes a place home?

Despite the power of nation-states to produce nationalist ideologies and discourses at home and abroad, individual migrants have ownership of their own autonomy, which allows them to bring their own understandings into the migration context. Many first-generation immigrants upheld the ideal of Turkey as a vatan where they were born. Similar to birth, death also has the potential to create both a physical and an emotional attachment to land. A couple from the first flight that arrived in
1968 told me that, like many others, they had no intention of staying permanently in Sydney during the initial years of their settlement. It was only after they lost their son in a car accident that they decided to settle permanently, because they could not countenance the idea of leaving his body buried in Australia and going back to Turkey. For them, home was no longer primarily Turkey. On the other hand, the interconnectedness between the place where the dead are buried and understandings of home are not produced only through the death of a known family member, relative, or close friend, but might encompass those “unknown” who had lost their lives in the name of the nation. As one respondent pointed out: “Australia can never be a vatan like Turkey. Turkey is sacred; our martyrs lie there.” Once more, this imagery of homeland approves and reproduces the Republican notion of vatan, as expressed by the homeland poet C. Kuntay in his popular poem As We Approach the Fifteenth Year written on the 15th anniversary of the Republic: “What makes a flag a real flag is blood on it. The land is made into a homeland if it has been died for”. Needless to say, martyrs are not seen as individuals in their own right, even if in their dying they beget the homeland.

Feelings of home are also linked to familial and kinship ties. Such perceptions were especially common among migrants who have many of their relatives in Turkey. Home was the land of kin and the land of their people. The geographical remoteness between Australia and Turkey was often experienced as an obstacle in making Australia home. Here, another of my interviewees, Hatice, who migrated to Australia thirty-four years ago, talks about how she only felt happy about living in Australia after her mother came to visit her:

I have been living in this country for such a long time and never liked this place. My mother came to visit me in 1996. After then Australia suddenly began to appear beautiful to me. Everyday I keep wandering in places that my mum did, and now I am keeping an eye on the flowers she planted (Hatice, 64).

Hatice’s narrative shows how her mother’s physical presence in her place in Sydney and how her mother’s bodily movements gave the place its identity and reproduced her relationship to the place, which in turn evoked a sensual environment of homely belonging. This sense of connectedness and homely belonging in the space is facilitated no longer by the physical presence of her mother in the place, but rather by the intrinsic relationship between place, memory and belonging.

For the majority of first-generation migrants then Turkey was seen as a home because it was their place of birth and place of kin ties. Following this logic, Turkey can be defined as a “virtual” home to which migrants are connected as a result of birth, death, kin and ancestral attachment. Yet importantly, these emotions can weaken or even dissolve through a comparative checking of what the country

---

7 On beş yili karışıklar. Bayrakları bayrak yapan üstündeki kandır. Toprak eğer uğruna ölen varsa vatandır (translated by the present author).
of origin and country of habitation offer. Return visits, in this sense, are of enormous importance for generating continuity or discontinuity with a past life.

The journey back (home) is an important component of the migratory process, which gives migrants the opportunity to compare realities, as well as possibilities. Through visits migrants construct a new knowledge about everyday life in the country of origin, which can help them to assess their success and monitor their own changing self-development. Moreover, the visits might bring about the disarticulation from an imagined local identity, while at the same time allowing them to assert their distinct Turkish-Australian identities to their non-migrant kin and friends. A willing informant, Ali talks about how his return trip is imbued with feelings of nostalgia:

When I went to Turkey in 2004 I first visited the town where I did my military service in Erzurum. Then I went to Rize where I worked for a certain time. Everything had changed enormously. I went to Antalya to see the house I lived in as a child. But I could not even recognise our street, it was not there anymore. Istanbul was my next stop where I went to high school. In my first year at primary school we had lived in Çanakkale [Gallipoli] because of my father’s job. That year Atatürk passed away. My father drew a portrait of Atatürk with two girls crying on both sides of him. He, then, presented it to the military unit in Çanakkale as a gift. I went there to see the portrait once more and to take its photo. But I could not find it. I took many photos of my relatives in Turkey and showed them to my sons when I came back. I told them to show the photos to their own kids in the future. These things are very important for the history of our family (Ali, 70).

Note that, in addition to telling us about how through the trip he gained knowledge about the transformation that took place in his country of birth, Ali also highlights the importance of photographs in the family’s history. Photographs perform tasks more than simply recording the momentous moments in life; as Noble (2004: 241) notes, “they offer a kind of ‘proof’ of personal and familial existence”. The passing of photographs on to the younger members of the family provides them with the possibility of reinventing the accumulation of the self within the broader historicity of familial life.

Visits back can also be a significant rite of passage for the second generation in helping them to gain cultural knowledge (Baldassar 2001). A number of second-generation respondents told me that they experienced a questioning of self following their visits to their “ancestral home”. They discovered that Australia was unable to compensate (on return) for their grieving for the warmth of close relative and neighbourly relationships they experienced in Turkey. However, in addition to providing the opportunity for getting to know more about their relatives and their ethnic identity, the visits were perceived as unsettling for some, who became aware of their differences with their non-migrant hosts and had to negotiate with them.

As much as sustaining or establishing continuity with a past life in Turkey, return visits may also result in a state of discontinuity for travellers. This discontinuity usually arises from migrants’ discomfort with “life conditions” (hayat şartları) in
Turkey. Whereas Turkey was seen more as a virtual home, Australia was appreciated in terms of the material advantages it provided such as security, comfort, better life standards, and a more hygienic environment. When some respondents compared Turkey and Australia on the basis of such material criteria, the imagining of Turkey as sole home became blurred, so that they began to feel that there was no such thing as a single home. Home was not a fixed place then, but rather became an ever-shifting landscape, remembered fondly when the migrant is not physically there. The reasons for many migrants’ discomfort with life in Turkey were varied. One respondent had this to say:

I was looking over Ankara from an elevated position, suitcase in hand. I asked myself “Is this my country, and are these people mine?” Everywhere looked very dark. The buildings were unpainted, whereas they would always be painted in Australia. This shows that even if we did not want it Australia has educated us. We can’t say that we haven’t learnt Australian culture. We see comfort in Australia and difficulties in Turkey. Yesterday [in Sydney] I saw a Turkish person parking his car in a prohibited space. The police gave him a fine. The man took the fine, ripped it up and swore at the police in Turkish. Do you know what the policeman said in return? He said “Sorry sir”. That’s what I mean by being civilised (Ahmet, 72).

This narrative illustrates how through the return visit the person becomes aware of the fact that he longer fits into the country where he was born. More importantly, it highlights to us that he has been inculcated, willingly or otherwise, with an Australian “culture”. When in Turkey, he questions things in a way that he would not have been able to if he had not migrated:

In Turkey social classes matter: upper class, middle class and lower class. But here [Australia] everyone has a car. Maybe it is not a Mercedes, but a Holden. Doesn’t matter, you know. But in Turkey it is not like that. They identify you as the daughter of the grocer or the son of the porter. Here on the train, I can sit next to a businessman dressed in a suit. Everyone is reading in the train, no noise. When I see this, I feel ashamed of my Turkishness (Ahmet).

Another respondent compared both countries from a different aspect:

During my visits to Turkey everyone was suggesting to me that I return to Turkey. Why would I? I no longer have any rubbish on my doorway. My electricity never cuts off. Neither does my water. What could I ask more in life? I have all these things in this country [Australia] (Ayşe, mid-60s).

While all these calculations of risk and benefit attribute to Australia its reputation to offer a more homely place to live in, some respondents complained about the fact such advantages were not accompanied by warm human interaction. They asserted that the reason they enjoyed various rights was not because they were “culturally” specific to Australia, but because they were outcomes of legal arrangements. By contrast, in Turkey, they contended, those formal institutions might have been absent, but that gap was compensated for by a state of more “human” conduct. This was understood as a cultural attribute. The narrative below illustrates this point:
Once in Sydney I went for a walk with my wife. On the way my wife had to go to the toilet. The only place we could find was a club. I asked the receptionist whether my wife could use their toilet and he replied back asking “Are you a member of this club?” We were not. So we were not allowed to use the toilet in the club. Such thing would never happen in Turkey. No one would ask you about membership. In Australia toilets may be more hygienic than those in Turkey, but social relations in Turkey are much more humane than those in Australia (Fikret, 56).

Another factor influencing talk about home for some respondents was the changing social composition of their living environment in Australia which, they said, affected their sense of homely belonging in a negative way. These narratives mostly referred to the changes in the suburban area of Auburn, which has been the primary residential area of the Turkish immigrants in Sydney. Located in Western Sydney, Auburn has historically been close to heavy industries and provides cheaper accommodation facilities. Since the late 1970s, the area has become a centre of Turkish community activities with a significant concentration of Turkish-speaking residents, as well as small Turkish businesses. It hosts many Turkish community organisations, as well the largest Turkish mosque in New South Wales. Although Auburn has long been known as “little Turkey”, its composition has changed substantially in the last decade or so. Today the Turkish-speaking people comprise only the third-largest group resident in Auburn following the Chinese and the Vietnamese communities respectively. In the interviews, however, it was evident that the respondents’ uneasiness with the changing composition of Auburn did not have much to do with its increasing numbers of Chinese- and Vietnamese-speaking people. Rather, it was connected to the presence of other, more recently arrived, Muslims.

Although I have been living in Australia for thirty-five years, I can not accept these newcomers. They are covered with veils. Why Australia is letting them in? People from the Middle East would be no good to Australia. The earlier migrants looked much better. Many Muslims have moved into Auburn. They see the Mosque and the two minarets and then come to Auburn. It has become a very bad place to live (Selim, 62).

Another informant said:

Auburn has changed a lot. It became a non-liveable place for us. The Afghanis, Pakistanis, Iranians and Iraqis have come to Auburn. Look at the way they dress, they behave. They put on clothes like dresses and have huge beards. Their young people do not work. They prefer Auburn because of the Mosque. It is getting harder to live here. The streets are full of rubbish (Cengiz, late 50s).

Indeed these two respondents’ feelings of discomfort with more recently arrived immigrants with Muslim background are informed by a broader discourse of home and aliens both of which are circulating in the broader Australian context and related to state discourse in Turkey. Although these respondents worrying about the newcomers are themselves Muslim, they are not pleased to be living closely with Muslims of different origins. This reveals that Turkishness, for at least some members of the Turkish community, does not operate merely as a source of
nationality or kin, but also as an input in the production of their religious faith. It is also important to note that the discomfort voiced about living together with other Muslim groups in Auburn, especially with the Arabs, was expressed not only by secular Turks, but also by many pious Turks who identified themselves strongly with their Islamic orientation. Unsurprisingly, they also complained about the media representations in Australia that put the Turks in the same basket with other Muslim migrant communities in the country. This was very much implicit in the rhetoric of many respondents, who defined themselves as “Turkish Muslims” and as “good representatives of Islam”. There is a resemblance then, between official Kemalist discourse about the virtues of Turkish Islam especially over the Islam of Arabs, and Turkish Australians’ own description of the backwardness or reactionary nature of the Islam of those groups.

4. Conclusion
The exploration of the meanings of home for Turkish migrants living in Sydney has revealed that the experiences of migration and settlement bring about new connections, as well as disconnections, with space and time. In the new environment of the migratory setting, migrants are embedded in different social contexts and relationships, which generate different senses of feelings of attachment to particular places and people, as well new social relationships. The anchoring points of the past life are either replaced with or accompanied by new ones through which human beings are centred and feel at “home”. Yet “feeling at home” is not static nor does it have an end point. Similarly home itself is not a static thing; it is not simply a physical location, but a metaphorical space imbued with imagination, feelings, desires, and future projections. And all these intangible constituents of “home” are produced and reproduced in various contexts.

The narratives reveal that perceptions and experiences of home are shaped by affective (emotional) and material discourses. The affective dimensions of home revolve around the metaphors of birth, death, ancestors, kinship, familial ties and so on. Turkey, in this sense, is perceived more like a virtual homeland. The context that produces such perceptions is tied to the national, ethnic or religious identity that the country of origin begets. On the other hand, Australia is imagined as an alternative home often on the basis of various material aspects: it is a home that provides a more comfortable and hygienic area to live in, better life conditions and standards. In brief, it is what the sending and receiving countries offer that results in multiple ways of imagining homeland.

Does this describe then what Edward Said (1979) claims to be a “generalised condition of homelessness”? Are migrants his archetypical homeless people? Or is it much more plausible to describe migration as a “state of double consciousness” in which migrants generate critical questions about different contexts and interpret and appreciate different aspects of life in both places? Perhaps what migration facilitates over time is the potential to use the substantive facts about one context to probe into the constitution of the other. Migrants become self-critical about the
conditions in the sending country while interpreting their new life in the society where they inhabit. Such criticism is a dialectic and a continuous comparative checking of reality against alternative possibilities, which is sustained through return visits or, more broadly, through various modes of transnationalism, including the attempted nationalism transferred by the Turkish state to its diaspora. What is at stake, then, is not a “condition of homelessness” or an “either/or” kind of situation, but rather a state of dual/multiple consciousness, which gives migrants a certain degree of flexibility to discover new possibilities and meanings in the process of daily living anywhere.

References


ELLEY, J. 1993. “I see myself as Australian-Turkish’: the identity of second-generation Turkish migrants in Australia”. In: R. Akcelik, ed., Turkish Youth in Australia. Melbourne: Australian-Turkish Friendship Society Publications.


About the author

Banu Şenay is a Ph.D. scholar at the Centre for Research on Social Inclusion, Macquarie University, Sydney. Her recent work explores the production of various forms of Turkishness and Turkish nationalism among Turkish migrants in Australia by elucidating some of the important ways in which the Turkish state nationalises Turks in the diaspora. E-mail: banu.senay@scmp.mq.edu.au