Super-diversity vs. assimilation: how complex diversity in majority-minority cities challenges the assumptions of assimilation

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Super-diversity vs. assimilation: how complex diversity in majority–minority cities challenges the assumptions of assimilation

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ABSTRACT

International migration changed large West European cities dramatically. In only two generations’ time, their ethnic make-up is turned upside down. Cities like Amsterdam and Brussels now are majority–minority cities: the old majority group became a minority. This new reality asks for an up-to-date perspective on assimilation and integration. In this article, I will show why grand theories like segmented and new assimilation theory no longer suffice in tackling that new reality of large cities, and I will question critically whether using the perspective of super-diversity is more pertinent for our analyses. Children of immigrants nowadays no longer integrate into the majority group, but into a large amalgam of ethnic groups. Next to the diversification of ethnic groups, we see diversification within ethnic groups in the second and third generations. I will focus on intergenerational social mobility patterns given that they are key to existing grand theories of assimilation. I will argue that super-diversity theory can only partially show us the way. To further build an alternative theoretical perspective, we also need to borrow from the intersectional approach and the integration context theory.

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Introduction

The term super-diversity was introduced by Steve Vertovec (2007) in his work based on his research in the city of London. Vertovec used the term first of all to describe the increased diversity in ethnic groups now living in large Western European cities. Forty years ago, migrants to these cities came from a limited number of countries; nowadays from all over the world. Cities housing more than 170 nationalities are more rule than exception. The increased ethnic diversity alone is, however, not a solid argument to now add ‘super’ to the established term diversity. So why should we consider using super-diversity instead? Blommaert and Maly (2014) argue that studying super-diversity stands for a higher level of analysis, superseding above and beyond single forms of diversity. The term alerts us to other axes of difference like gender, education, age cohorts and generations. Between and within ethnic groups there is a growing difference between generations, between men and women and between more and less educated people. This calls for a shift of focus from fixed entities like ‘the ethnic group’ to a dynamic interplay between different characteristics of individual members of ethnic groups and the fluid relationships between them; in other words: a shift from an ‘ethnic lens’ to a multidimensional lens.

Before I introduce the concept of super-diversity further, first I will point out the limitations I selected for this article. I will concentrate on super-diversity in relation to ethnic and migration.
studies. The concept of super-diversity travels well beyond this field into, for instance, linguistics, philosophy, public policy or health studies. Also, there are important topics within ethnic and migration studies like transnationalism and the use of the internet and social media that I do not cover here, but which are also relevant in creating the new complexities we study using the super-diversity perspective. Ideally, I would prefer looking at both the perspective of migrants and their descendants and people of native descent. I did this in an earlier publication on the topic of super-diversity (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013). However, in this article I choose to look at the impact of super-diversity on migrants and their children. I also choose to present quantitative findings rather than qualitative or ethnographic findings (cf. for ethnographic studies, Blommaert 2013; Wessendorf 2014). I made these choices because I want to juxtapose the principal claims of segmented and new assimilation theory that are primarily based on quantitative social mobility research to those where a super-diversity perspective is used. I will start the article with this discussion.

## Juxtaposing Super-Diversity to Grand Assimilation Theories

The idea of super-diversity has received very different reactions on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, an increasing number of scholars started using the concept in different domains within the larger framework of migration and ethnic studies. In contrast, the concept has hardly been taken up by scholars in the USA, where the framework of assimilation still pretty much kept its dominant position in the analyses of outcomes for migrants and their children. In Europe there is no similar dominance of one theoretical framework. This does not mean that super-diversity as a concept is uncritically adopted in Europe. The concept has, for instance, been criticised for its conceptual vagueness and the lack of a clear definition when to call a particular situation super-diverse (see for an overview, Meissner 2015; Meissner and Vertovec 2015). Another important critique is that super-diversity may describe a new reality, but does not provide a theoretical framework to explain differences in assimilation or integration outcomes.

The criticism of the conceptual vagueness of super-diversity, especially the lacking of a clear definition of what exactly is considered to be a super-diverse city or neighbourhood, is a fair critique. At what point does the increased diversification of ethnic groups become enough to apply the term super-diversity? What is the cut-off point to call a city or a neighbourhood super-diverse? The definition I operate in this article is provisional and largely instrumental for studying outcomes for migrants and their children because it is in this field that I want to make my contribution to the debate.

The unit of analysis one uses is also important. Here, I focus on the levels of both the city and the neighbourhood. The city level is important because a lot of the data analysis comparing different ethnic groups is made at this level. The neighbourhood level is important because it is where children of immigrants go to school, for instance, and interact with neighbours and friends. My first criterion for a city or neighbourhood to be labelled super-diverse is that there no longer is an ethnic majority group that is dominant based on its demographic majority position. So I will only label cities and neighbourhoods as super-diverse when they present a majority–minority situation. The second characteristic of a super-diverse city or neighbourhood is that in this majority–minority context, both number and size of different ethnic groups must be substantial. For this second criterion, it is more difficult to draw a clear cut-off point.

These two criteria are based on the increased differentiation between ethnic groups. This is the most commonly used way to describe a situation as super-diverse in the literature (cf. Vertovec 2007). I would add the importance of differences within ethnic groups, in terms of generation, gender, socio-economic status, religion or age cohorts. I think it is an especially important contribution of super-diversity theory to include, next to ethnic background characteristics, other background characteristics in the analysis of say education, labour market or housing outcomes. Additionally, my position is that a super-diverse city, neighbourhood or school is a reality that can be labelled neither as inherently positive nor as inherently negative. Research into the different types of
super-diverse cities or neighbourhoods—or schools for that matter—could indicate, for instance, which type of super-diversity promotes social mobility or social cohesion.

Then there is the question if the urban reality has become so different that we really need a new theoretical framework? Rightly so, academics are very critical towards the introduction of new theories and concepts. Is today’s situation really that different from 25 years ago? American theories have been dominant across our field of study in the last two decades. This is especially true for the segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). This grand theory has helped us to make sense of different assimilation outcomes intergenerationally across different ethnic groups. The authors claim that some ethnic groups are socially mobile because of their strong social cohesion and resistance to Americanisation and argue that other ethnic groups assimilate into the poor black American underclass. There is a fair amount of consensus now about segmented assimilation’s claim that there is more than one possible social mobility pathway, although it is disputed if entire ethnic groups can be fitted so neatly in one of the three segmented assimilation options (Waters et al. 2010). Alba and Nee (2003) in their book Remaking the American Mainstream remodelled and updated classical assimilation theory, emphasising that the main trend for all migrant groups in the USA is still assimilation into the mainstream over time. Alba more recently summarises his theoretical viewpoint in the following quote: ‘the social and cultural distance to the mainstream decreases, and life chances come to closely approximate those held by their peers in the dominant group, who are similar in socio-economic origin, birth cohort and so forth’ (Alba, Jimenéz, and Marrow 2009, 449).

The two mentioned American assimilation theories stem from an era in which the size of single ethnic minority groups was that big and the segregation of single ethnic minority groups was often so strong that this justified the talk about assimilation or integration on the ethnic group level. With the higher level of segregation in US cities, this theoretical frame was always more relevant in the USA than in Europe. Inner-city schools in many US cities usually would have a high concentration of two or three large ethnic groups. Migration and chain migration from a limited number of countries dominated the migration scene for at least three decades: Mexicans in the USA being the prime example.

Both grand theories—the newly formulated assimilation theory by Alba and Nee and segmented assimilation theory—have been crucial in our understanding of processes of incorporation in two ways. The first way is in the understanding of the processes in which ethnic minority groups adapt to the majority group or the mainstream. The second way is in analysing the patterns of social mobility of different ethnic groups compared to each other and compared to the majority population.

In this article, I will show how in these two principal themes super-diversity theory can improve our understanding beyond the existing grand assimilation theories. I will first scrutinise the relevance of super-diversity theory for the incorporation of migrant groups and their offspring with the example of the majority–minority city Amsterdam. My questions are: Is the incorporation of the children of new migrant groups so different that the existing grand theories are no longer adequate? And, if so, what sort of framework does super-diversity theory offer to study this new reality? Second, super-diversity theory so far has not provided a clear framework to explain differences in social mobility patterns in a super-diverse context. I will make a first modest attempt to explain different patterns of social mobility within ethnic groups across generations making use of the perspective of super-diversity. I agree that super-diversity theory can only partially show us the way there. To further build an alternative theoretical perspective, we also need to borrow from the perspective of intersectionality and the integration context theory. The idea of intersectionality, developed in feminist thinking, is highly relevant in a context of increased diversity within diversity. Central to this perspective is that divisions like gender, class, generation, age cohorts and ethnicity are considered to be interconnected (Crenshaw 1989), thus promoting a holistic perspective in which different modes of differentiation are seen as related without privileging any particular category of difference (Glick Schiller, Caglar, and Gulbrandsen 2006). Not only are they related but the
combination of different characteristics is more than the sum of single elements separately. Intersectionality theory, however, has been criticised of failing to address the role of institutional structural conditions (Davis 2008; Núñez 2014). For this omission the integration context theory (Crul and Schneider 2010), which stresses the importance of differences in institutional arrangements across local and national contexts as well as over time, provides an important input. Both segmented and new assimilation theories were largely developed to study assimilation or incorporation in one country or local context. The assumption of segmented assimilation theory is that it is applicable irrespective of the local or the national context. In the last part of this article, I will show that such a claim does not do justice to the importance of the integration context.

Major demographic and socio-economic transformations

I will first briefly describe the main transformations in US and Western European cities that placed the concept of super-diversity on the map. An important trend to focus on first is that cities are no longer dominated by a small number of large immigrant groups but that characteristic of big cities, in both the USA and Europe, nowadays is the enormous diversity of ethnic groups—large and small. As Berg, Gidley, and Sigona (2013) write: migration in the last decade has changed from many migrants to and from few places into fewer migrants to and from many more places. Nowadays in many neighbourhoods in Europe and the USA, school classes with 15 nationalities are more often the rule than the exception. This trend is more recent in European cities. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the number of groups, the legal status of the group members and the timing of arrival have become much more diverse and complex. Third-generation descendants (the grandchildren) from labour migrants who came to Europe in the 1960s and 1970s now grow up with the first and 1.5 generation from Poland, Bulgaria or Romania. Arnaut (2012, 4) describes this simultaneity as characteristic for super-diversity.

Many cities in this process have become majority–minority cities. This first became a reality in North American cities like New York, Los Angeles and Toronto: cities that consist of only minorities. In these cities there is no longer a dominant ethnic or racial majority group. Large Western European cities are moving very rapidly towards that same situation. Amsterdam and Brussels recently became majority–minority cities. Considerable parts of London and Paris also are past the ethnic tipping point. Some describe this as ‘the diversity turn’ or ‘the transition to diversity’.

Another cardinal new trend in European cities is that classical migrant groups that came in the 1960s and 1970s as labour migrants now extend into three generations living in the city. Children and grandchildren of the first generation are mostly born in these very same cities and grew up there. They now form one of the established groups in the city. They are strongly rooted in the city, also because most of their close family lives there. People of native descent often come to the city to study and to find work and often leave again when they marry and start a family. This trend overthrows the picture of who are newcomers and who belong to the established group. This situation of course has been part and parcel of the history of large US cities. In European cities, however, in more recent history this is a new trend.

These trends challenge existing assimilation theories. The idea of assimilation or integration becomes at any rate more complex in a situation where there is no longer a clear majority group into which one is to assimilate or integrate. The pressure to assimilate, coming from the—old—majority group, is less strong if not backed by sheer numbers in everyday life. The group into which one assimilates in the concrete situation of a neighbourhood or a school is, as a result, more and more unlikely to be the old majority group but rather an amalgam of people of different ethnic backgrounds, migration cohorts, migration statuses and socio-economic positions. Partly this encompasses the aforementioned children of the third generation, who by now form one of the established and most rooted groups in the cities. They are native to the city and one or both of their parents grew up in the city before them. To equate them with people of native descent (the old majority group) would at the same time dismiss important differences. To say that the
grandchildren of immigrants have become part of the mainstream or the majority population seems more problematic in Europe than in the USA.

There is also an increasing diversity within diversity. Emerging patterns of social mobility in the second and third generations reveal large within-group differences that request from us a rethinking of the existing grand theories of assimilation. Within the second generation, we find big differences in educational and labour market outcomes. These differences increase within the third generation, resulting in polarisation within the same ethnic group and same generation. This polarisation of outcomes within ethnic groups makes it unrealistic to frame the position of people at the group level in ethnic terms primarily and challenges existing assimilation theories that predict a linear development over time at the group level.

The diversity in outcomes of their descendants is partly the result of the different opportunities the first-generation migrants encountered as they came through different migration channels (as labour migrants or marriage partners, legal or undocumented) at different historical periods. In some ethnic groups, migration continues and a new first generation keeps on arriving through marriage migration, ongoing labour migration or politically driven migration. This adds to the differences within ethnic groups. The circumstances for new migrants often have changed dramatically in comparison to earlier migration waves from the same sending country. The previous first generation came under different legal, social and political circumstances. The new migrants arrive in an already established community. Continued migration from a single country results in fundamentally different opportunities for people from the same ethnic group.

In sum, the heterogeneity of ethnic minority groups is becoming more and more visible. Quoting Glick Schiller and Caglar (2013): we cannot approach people of the same national or ethnic migrant background homogenously in terms of their values, cultural repertoire, skills, opportunities or identity. This reality demands a new theoretical perspective which sheds more light on the dynamic interplay between ethnicity, generation, age cohorts, education, gender and legal status on the one hand and the majority–minority context of integration in big cities on the other.

Based on empirical findings from the cities of Amsterdam, Berlin and Stockholm, I will illuminate some of the described major transformations. What exactly is the situation that young descendants of the migrant groups in the majority–minority city of Amsterdam encounter in daily life? With whom do they integrate or assimilate? In the second part of the article I will analyse patterns of social mobility making use of an intersectional approach and the integration context theory.

Super-diversity: an increased diversification of ethnic groups in cities

Amsterdam is a relatively small city among Europe’s major cities with about 800,000 inhabitants. Roughly speaking, Amsterdam saw two large migration waves after the Second World War: one started in the 1960s and the other after the fall of the Berlin wall in the 1990s and onward. The children of the migrants of the first wave went to school and lived in neighbourhoods where there was still a clear dominant majority group of native descent. This provided a classical assimilation situation. For younger second-generation cohorts, the moment of entering into a majority–minority situation in schools occurred in the 1990s as new migrants and their children arrived, while the children and grandchildren of older migrant groups were also filling the classrooms in substantial numbers.

In Amsterdam, people from the former colonies in the Caribbean (Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles) form the city’s largest and most established post-war immigrant groups (Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, labour migrants from Morocco and Turkey came through labour recruitment programmes. They were recruited as unskilled labourers, who came either directly from rural areas or first passed through the larger provincial cities of Turkey and Morocco in search of labour. Together, with about 194,000 people, these four classical migrant groups (from Surinam, the Antilles, Turkey and Morocco) now form about a quarter of Amsterdam’s population (O+S Kerncijfers 2014, 69).
The second big wave of migrants who started arriving in Amsterdam from the early 1990s brought together a broad collection of groups. First of all, they come from many more corners of the earth, but also their socio-economic characteristics, legal status and migration reasons differ a lot. One of these new migrant groups are Ghanaians, now estimated to be the fourth largest ethnic minority group in Amsterdam with about 14,500 people, of whom an estimated 3000 were undocumented (Kooyman 2013). Nowadays the fastest growing group comes from new EU countries. In 10 years’ time, their official numbers increased by a factor of four (O+S Amsterdam 2013). However, estimations are that three to four times as many are actually living in Amsterdam (O+S Amsterdam 2013, 19). Being EU citizens, they are neither illegal nor undocumented, but many do not officially register in Amsterdam. The migrants from Poland, Bulgaria and Rumania represent a broad mixture of socio-economic background characteristics (O+S Amsterdam 2013, 17). Currently, due to the financial crisis, new migrants from Southern Europe arrive in the city, with Greeks and Spaniards being the most prominent groups (O+S Amsterdam 2013, 10). Apart from this, we see migration from a whole range of different countries, together constituting a substantial part of the newly arrived Amsterdam population. Considerable numbers come from the Middle East, especially Egypt, but also many new Amsterdammers have their roots in China, Pakistan, Columbia or Ecuador.

Together, migrants and people with foreign-born parents now make up a bit more than half of the Amsterdam population. As said, a quarter of the population belongs to the four established migrant groups and the remaining quarter to a large amalgam of migrant groups, which mostly are recent migrants or temporary migrants (Table 1 (a)).

The migration of the last decade gave the last push for Amsterdam to become a majority–minority city. With almost half of the population being of Dutch descent, this group is still the largest ethnic group. However, the four established groups have an equal impact on how the city develops in the near future: Under age 15, now 37% of the Amsterdammers are descendants from the four classical migrant groups (see Table 1 (b)), the exact same percentage as those under 15 of Dutch descent (Scheffer and Entzinger 2012, 70). Another substantial new group of youngsters is formed by children of other non-European countries. Children of newly arrived groups from EU countries are generally still too young to make up a substantial part of the younger age cohorts. One in ten Amsterdam children under 15 belongs to this group (Scheffer and Entzinger 2012).

The two largest new groups in Amsterdam come from Ghana and Poland. In what sort of situation will their children grow up? To look at this in more detail, we look at the degree of diversity at the neighbourhood level. Most migrants from Ghana settled in the South East district of Amsterdam called the Bijlmer, a huge project built in the 1970s that became the home for the Surinam community in the 1980s. The Ghanaians often became the new tenants in the high-rise buildings left by upwardly mobile people of Surinamese origin who moved to more affluent parts of Bijlmer. The Ghanaians mostly live in neighbourhoods of the South East district where people of Dutch descent only form a small minority, with around one in five inhabitants at the most (Broekhuizen, van Marissing, and Wonderen 2012). The largest group in these neighbourhoods is formed by people of Surinamese descent: between a quarter in some and over a third of the residents in other

Table 1. Ethnic background of the city population of Amsterdam (a) all age groups and (b) under 15 years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amsterdam population</th>
<th>Dutch descent</th>
<th>Moroccan descent</th>
<th>Turkish descent</th>
<th>Surinamese descent</th>
<th>Antillean descent</th>
<th>Other non-European descent</th>
<th>European and US descent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under the age of 15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
neighbourhoods. The group of Surinamese descent is ethnically very diverse and includes people who originally were brought to Surinam as slaves from Africa, or ‘contract’ workers from India, China and Indonesia. Next to the larger groups, about half of the Bijlmer population comes from an amalgam of groups among which are people of Moroccan and Turkish descent, new smaller West African groups and people from the Middle East (Broekhuizen, van Marissing, and Wonderen 2012). How can this situation be described in terms of integration? Obviously the children of immigrants in this district do not integrate or assimilate into a Dutch majority group anymore. And though there is a lot of ethnic diversity in the South East district, at the same time there is hardly any socio-economic diversity. We see overall high levels of poverty and a concentration of social housing in high-rise apartment blocks. The neighbourhood also serves as the entry point for many newly arrived migrants and their families. The schools cater to many children who enter the Dutch school system at a later age and who have little or no command of Dutch. This is indeed a super-diverse neighbourhood, according to the first two criteria, but it is a specific type of super-diverse neighbourhood. The challenges are extensive, as we can imagine. Test scores of elementary school children are far below the average city level and drop-out figures and reported youth crime rates are high. Results for children of newly arrived groups show alarming gaps when compared with those of the children of more established migrant groups and of native Dutch descent (Broekhuizen, van Marissing, and Wonderen 2012).

Now we set the course for the opposite compass point: the West and New West part of the city where the migrants from Eastern Europe mostly settled. Here too people of Dutch descent form a minority. In some neighbourhoods, they make up a third of the population, in others a bit over 40% (Wonderen and Broekhuizen 2012). However, under age 15, children of Dutch descent make up a quarter of the total group at the most. Children of Moroccan descent form the largest group and children of Turkish descent are the third ethnic group, after the children of Dutch descent. These three groups add up to a bit more than half of the youth population (Wonderen and Broekhuizen 2012). There are smaller groups, for example, first-generation children coming from Eastern Europe, third-generation Surinamese and Antillean children and children from a wide range of African and Asian groups. Therefore, the children of Polish migrants also primarily grow up with children or grandchildren of other migrants. The Amsterdam West and New West neighbourhoods are more socio-economically diverse and in terms of generations the inhabitants are more evenly distributed between people of the first, second and third generations than in the South East district. In many neighbourhoods in the West and New West district, in the older generation the group of Dutch descent is still dominant. Though the West and New West districts can be labelled super-diverse in the younger age cohorts according to the first two criteria, the challenges here are very different from those of the South East district. The super-diverse neighbourhood context in the West yields more positive educational outcomes for children of old and newly arrived groups (Wonderen and Broekhuizen 2012). Research comparing these different types of super-diverse neighbourhoods and different super-diverse situations would advance our thinking of super-diversity as a theoretical concept.

Super-diversity: increased diversity within ethnic groups

In this second part of my article I look at differences in social mobility patterns within ethnic groups, generations and different contexts. I will focus on intergenerational social mobility patterns because this has been a key building block for existing grand theories of assimilation. I will juxtapose the approach of the grand theories of assimilation with an approach that analyses the intersection of different background characteristics and takes into account the importance of institutional arrangements as is formulated in the integration context theory. The general idea of segmented assimilation is that ethnic groups as a whole follow one of the three typical patterns described in the theory: either two possible upward variants or one downward variant (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). The emphasis in segmented assimilation theory is on ethnic and socio-economic characteristics of the first generation that influence the type and/or speed of assimilation pathways. In my approach I will look at how ethnicity, age, education and
gender and the context of integration intersect. I will make use of the representative TIES survey among second-generation Turks and Moroccans and their parents in Amsterdam.

Labour migrants, like the Turkish and Moroccan migrants, came with overall low socio-economic and cultural capital (see Table 2). The majority of the fathers only went to primary school or did not go to school at all. Most of the parents came from the countryside with hardly any education, because schooling was simply not available for them.

Most of the parents were not able to help their children in the Dutch school system with homework or advise them in their study choices. According to segmented assimilation theory this picture of the parents predicts a downward trajectory in the second generation, with only modest social mobility for the majority of the group and a substantial group that is at risk.

However, the actual situation in the second generation is different: The part of both the Turkish and the Moroccan groups that studies in higher education or already has obtained a higher education diploma is larger than the part that leaves school early (see Table 3). The group of early school leavers, about a quarter, is, however, also considerable. If anything, the second generation is characterised by a strong polarisation in their school outcomes. The differences within the two ethnic groups are more pronounced than between the two ethnic groups, as illustrated in Table 3 which shows the comparison between the respondents of Turkish and Moroccan descent.

Rather than focusing on the differences between the two ethnic groups or between them and the group of Dutch descent I will focus on the within-group differences first. How can the differences in social mobility patterns within the second generation be explained while the parents are so homogeneously less educated? Even small differences in educational levels could offer a potential explanation. However, the education of both the fathers and the mothers does not explain the differences. Only for the education of the Moroccan mothers can we find a weak significant correlation (\( p < .1 \)) with the education level attained by their children.

The only clear indicator we find in both groups is the difference between age cohorts. Especially the increase of respondents in higher education is spectacular among the younger cohort. In the group of Turkish descent there is a 15% increase and in that of Moroccan descent a 13% increase in the younger cohort (between 18 and 25) compared to the older cohort (between 25 and 35). Our data suggest that the younger cohort receives much more educational support of the parents compared to the older cohort. They get more help with homework, parents more often control time spent on homework, more often talk about the importance of school and more often meet with the teacher. The change in attitudes is most dramatic among the Moroccan parents (for all four educational support indicators the changes are significant). The attitudes towards education and the level of support of the Moroccan parents for the older cohort were also the most negative; so it is indeed predictable that the progress is more substantial in this group.

Not only did the parents change in their attitudes and practices over time, but also the structural conditions changed. Schools became better prepared for teaching children of immigrants. Second-

| Table 2. Parental educational level of Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Amsterdam. |
|----------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                                       | No schooling | Primary school at the most | Lower secondary | Upper secondary | Post-secondary and tertiary |
| Turkish fathers                        | 7%          | 47%                      | 28%             | 13%             | 5%                   |
| Turkish mothers                        | 15%         | 53%                      | 18%             | 10%             | 3%                   |
| Moroccan fathers                       | 33%         | 29%                      | 15%             | 16%             | 8%                   |
| Moroccan mothers                       | 47%         | 20%                      | 19%             | 12%             | 2%                   |

| Table 3. Educational level of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Amsterdam. |
|----------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                                       | Early school leavers | Post-secondary vocational | Tertiary education |
| Second-generation Turkish              | 24%                  | 46%                 | 30%                 |
| Second-generation Moroccan             | 20%                  | 48%                 | 32%                 |
language classes were introduced and extra funding provided to schools with large proportions of immigrant children. This money was mostly used to reduce the class size (Crul 2000). But also the preschool facilities were improved. In both younger cohorts, a significantly higher number of children went to preschool. In the younger cohort of Turkish descent, 45% went to preschool, compared to 24% in the older cohort. In the group of Moroccan descent this is 35% compared to 24%. The attendance of preschool is primarily the result of more affordable preschool facilities becoming available through a change in national and local policies. The polarisation between age cohorts in the second generation results from a combination of changes in the structural conditions (school context) and changes in attitudes and practices among the parents over time.

The large differences in educational attainment within the second generation in their turn propel a further dynamic through the partner choice, as the partner choice results in great differences between more and less educated young families when we look at labour market participation, employment position and income situation. Changing gender roles play an important role. Among the college educated respondents, gender roles change dramatically compared to their parents, while the less-educated second generation mostly reproduces the traditional gender roles of their parents (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013). Those with a higher education diploma more often (52% for the Turkish and 62% for the Moroccan second generation) marry someone also with a higher education. Both partners enter the labour market, which means that there are two incomes in these families. This allows them to buy their own apartment or rent in the private sector, thus providing them with the opportunity to leave the working class neighbourhood of their parents. Their children will go to schools in a middle class neighbourhood and at home will have the resources of well-educated families (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013).

The story of the upwardly mobile group resembles what is often understood as the classical form of assimilation over time. We nevertheless also see a second trend that is certainly at odds with classic assimilation: The early school leavers move in the opposite direction. They often (56% in the case of the Turkish and 32% in the case of the Moroccan second generation) marry someone who is also an early school leaver. The men occupy, at best, the same position as their fathers, but the risk of being unemployed is nowadays actually much bigger for them. Their female marriage partner, frequently newly arriving from Turkey or Morocco, is often not working but takes care of the children (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013). This means that there is, at best, only one household income and generally this income is not very substantial. Many second-generation women who are early school leavers reproduce the position of their mother and do not enter the labour market at all. They more often marry someone from their parents’ birth country who is less educated and the chances for that person to get a job look bleak. Often these families have to rely on social benefits (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013). As a result, they are on a downward mobility path. The places where they can afford to live are limited to social housing areas in the most deprived neighbourhoods. Their children will go to the worst performing schools of the city. The chances of third-generation children in this group actually look much worse than those of the second generation.

In segmented assimilation theory, differences in social mobility patterns are explained through differences in group averages between different ethnic groups and/or the majority group. This leads to an overemphasis on ethnic group characteristics. The social mobility patterns among the Turkish and Moroccan Dutch groups show that differences in the conditions under which youngsters go to school have a massive effect on social mobility patterns over time. The young women who attain higher education degrees postpone marriage, choose a partner who is also highly educated and enter the labour market alongside their partner, which further increases the gap with those who are stuck at the bottom of the educational ladder. While assimilation theories put a huge emphasis on ethnic and socio-economic background characteristics of the first generation, our findings show that a lot of the within-group differences result from the dynamics that are rooted in changing attitudes and choices in the second generation itself. An intersectional approach proves helpful here. The intersection of pertaining to a younger cohort, being college educated and being a fulltime working woman explains the positive outcomes for part of the second generation. Being less
educated and a woman of Turkish or Moroccan descent have a totally different social and socio-economic outcome.

It is those people who move upward as well as those who move downward who show a striking resemblance across the two ethnic groups. They use similar pathways and display more similarities than differences in the mechanisms that explain their success—or failure.

This of course does not mean that between ethnic groups there are no differences in the size of the group that is upwardly or downwardly mobile. The question, however, is whether these differences have an inherently ethnic basis, or, as I will show in the next paragraph, that ethnicity only becomes important in relation to the type of institutional demands made by a particular integration context.

Super-diversity and cross-country comparisons

The authors of segmented assimilation theory argue that some ethnic groups are more often found on a downward path, while others are more often found on an upward path. As is argued, this is partly explained by differences in the reception of these groups, and, more importantly, by the ethnic and socio-economic characteristics of the first generation. By grouping people according to their ethnic background characteristics into the three segmented assimilation pathways, the suggestion is that ethnicity plays the most important role here. The example of Amsterdam, however, shows that next to ethnicity other background factors and local and national contextual factors play a huge role too. Furthermore, segmented assimilation theory claims to explain ethnic groups’ social mobility patterns regardless of the national context. I will show that the national context does have a fundamental and defining effect that is drastically altering outcomes. Making use of the integration context theory (Crul and Schneider 2010) I will show how institutional arrangements in education and child care shape outcomes in interaction with resources of the first and second generations.

We will look at three different local contexts: Amsterdam, Stockholm and Berlin. We look at first- and second-generation Turks in these cities comparatively, using TIES survey data. Both Stockholm and Berlin show less polarisation within the second generation than Amsterdam does, but they show two opposite outcomes. In Stockholm, the upward social mobility trend is more prominent, while in Berlin the stagnant or downward mobility trend dominates. This immediately shows that to explain social mobility patterns we should also take into account the importance of the integration context.

But first let me introduce the first-generation Turks in each of the three cities. Post-1960s Turkish migration to Europe consisted of different flows of migration to different European cities. The migration to Sweden was more diverse, including a larger share of political refugees (Assyrians and Kurdish Turks). This partly explains the higher levels of education of the first generation in Sweden. Also, adult education, an important Swedish educational institutional arrangement, had a prominent effect on the educational level of the first generation: no less than a third of Turkish first-generation women went to school in Sweden as did about a quarter of the first-generation men. In contrast, the number of first-generation parents who went to school in Germany or the Netherlands is almost negligible (Table 4 (a)–(c)).

Table 4. Parental educational level of Turkish second generation in (a) Berlin, (b) Amsterdam and (c) Stockholm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No schooling</th>
<th>Primary school at the most</th>
<th>Lower secondary</th>
<th>Upper secondary</th>
<th>Post-secondary and tertiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Turkish fathers</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish mothers</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Turkish fathers</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish mothers</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Turkish fathers</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish mothers</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The outcomes for the second-generation Turks look very different across the three cities. The figures for Stockholm look by far the most positive of the three city contexts. Especially the gap with Berlin is striking. This is somewhat explained by the educational level of the parents, but even when we control for the educational level of the parents impressive differences remain (Crul 2013; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013) (Table 5).

A unique feature of the TIES survey is that we can fully reconstruct the educational careers from preschool onwards. Thus, we can pinpoint that part of this tremendous difference is already present in secondary school after children are tracked into different ability tracks. In Berlin, the overwhelming majority is streamed into vocational education while in Stockholm the overwhelming majority is streamed into an academic track. Another remarkable disparity is that in Berlin tracking results strongly depend on the educational support of parents while this is hardly the case in Stockholm (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012). Different school systems seem to demand different things from parents. Practical support with homework is crucial in the highly stratified system in Germany, while in Stockholm children work on their homework assignments in school. In Stockholm, preschool attendance is free of costs and widely available. Second-generation Turkish children are attending preschool even more often than children of native descent. In Berlin it is exactly the other way around: Due to higher costs and less availability many second-generation Turkish children do not attend preschool at all, or only in the last year before entering compulsory education at age five (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012). This means that parents are largely responsible for teaching their children German as a second language. As a result, many Turkish second-generation children start elementary school with a large deficit in the German language. After only four years in elementary school, at age 10, they are already selected into different tracks. It should come as no surprise that so dramatically few children attend Gymnasium and continue into higher education. At the same time, drop-out is extremely high in Berlin (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012). The apprenticeship system is meant to present children in vocational education with the opportunity to take up an apprenticeship in a company. However, students have to arrange this on their own. Especially those going to Hauptschule (the lowest track) often have difficulties obtaining an apprenticeship position (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012), thus dropping out. Comparing Stockholm and Berlin exposes the significance of the school context in combination with the resources in the family.

Now we follow our respondents in Berlin and Stockholm in the further stages of their lives: How do these differences in educational outcomes influence their partner choice, income and housing? The picture is very similar to what we saw in Amsterdam, but with even more extreme effects in Stockholm. Early school leavers in Stockholm more often marry someone born in Turkey than is the case in Amsterdam, and on the other end of the spectrum, the college educated in Stockholm more often marry a Swedish-born partner than in Amsterdam. In Berlin, the second generation (both less and more educated) more often marries a partner with a Turkish background born in Germany. This is related to the much larger Turkish community in Berlin and the fact that migration from Turkey to Germany started earlier, resulting in a large pool of potential partners. The major effect of educational attainment that we see in Berlin is that marrying a partner with a similar educational level is even more pronounced than in Amsterdam and Stockholm (Tables 6 and 7).

When we look at the combination of the educational levels of both partners, in Stockholm the situation of the young couples is by far the most positive: One in six couples both have a higher education degree and in another one in five couples one partner is college educated. So in more than a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5. Educational position second-generation Turks in Berlin, Amsterdam and Stockholm.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educational position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early school leaving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The picture is very similar to what we saw in Amsterdam, but with even more extreme effects in Stockholm. Early school leavers in Stockholm more often marry someone born in Turkey than is the case in Amsterdam, and on the other end of the spectrum, the college educated in Stockholm more often marry a Swedish-born partner than in Amsterdam. In Berlin, the second generation (both less and more educated) more often marries a partner with a Turkish background born in Germany. This is related to the much larger Turkish community in Berlin and the fact that migration from Turkey to Germany started earlier, resulting in a large pool of potential partners. The major effect of educational attainment that we see in Berlin is that marrying a partner with a similar educational level is even more pronounced than in Amsterdam and Stockholm (Tables 6 and 7).

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third of the second-generation families, one or two partners are college educated. When we compare this with Berlin the gap is huge. Here, only one in fourteen couples has one highly educated partner. When it comes to the couples consisting of one or two early school leavers the numbers rise dramatically: 3 out of 10 couples consist of two early school leavers and in three-quarters of the couples one of the partners is an early school leaver. It leaves no doubt that this starkly colours the future of the third generation in Berlin.

The effect of the higher educational level of the second generation in Stockholm becomes more pronounced when we look at it on the level of couples. It is a logic multiplier effect of educational homogeneity. This also has far-reaching consequences for the position of both partners in the labour market. In Stockholm, in almost three-quarters of the couples both partners work while this is true for only a third of the couples in Berlin (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013). In Berlin, two out of three female partners of second-generation men look after the children and do not participate in the labour market at all. In Stockholm, on the other hand, this is only true for one in ten female partners (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013).

These overwhelming differences can partly be explained by Stockholm’s better child care facilities and partly by the higher educational levels. However, in Stockholm also the female early school leavers and women educated at the middle level almost all participate in the labour market, while in Berlin, the bulk of them do not enter the labour market at all (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013).

We see how differences between Swedish and German institutional arrangements in education for the second generation are crucial because of the resulting differences in partner choice and in the pace of change in gender roles among the lower and the higher educated. In their turn, these differences become more pronounced because of differences in institutional arrangements around child care.

The comparison between the three cities underscores the necessity of linking the intersection of age, gender, education and ethnicity to the differences in local institutional arrangements.

Discussion

The theoretical debate in the last two decades has been dominated by grand theories like segmented assimilation theory and the newly articulated assimilation theory by Alba and Nee. The theories served to explain assimilation and integration processes, especially in the case of a clear majority group and a small number of sizable migrant groups. Both grand theories are based on empirically looking at ethnic groups compared to each other and/or compared to the ‘white’ majority population. With the growing diversity of immigrant groups and also the growing diversity within

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**Table 6. Second generation in Berlin, Amsterdam and Stockholm: partner born in Turkey or the survey country.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner born in:</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
<th>Amsterdam</th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early school leavers</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table 7. Education of the partner, second-generation Turks in Amsterdam, Stockholm and Berlin.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Early school leaver</th>
<th>Middle level</th>
<th>Higher education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>A'dam</td>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early school leavers</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

immigrant groups, in terms of differences both within the same generation as well as between generations, the ethnic group as a unit of analysis has become problematic. I explored whether the super-diversity theory could fill the gap between the grand theories and the changed reality. The new demography of cities and neighbourhoods without a clear-cut majority group creates a new situation for the children of both new and old migrant groups and of the old majority group. The old majority group is no longer the standard to which newcomers and children adapt. At the same time, there is no other dominant ethnic group in the majority–minority city. Many integration or assimilation situations are now characterised by a multiplicity of diversity in terms of the number of ethnic groups, the differences in generations and socio-economic positions. The term super-diversity presented itself as an appropriate concept for this context. However, a concept that describes the situation does not yet provide a theoretical framework needed for analysing the impact of super-diversity on society. The grand assimilation theories have been instrumental in our analysis of social mobility patterns for the second generation. Both segmented and new assimilation theories describe social mobility as a linear process at the group level in which the assimilation progress is measured based on average outcomes at the group level. The growing diversity within ethnic groups makes this approach problematic. We need a more refined analysis that takes within-group differences into account. The ideas, practices and goals within ethnic groups change over time and as a result the diversity within groups is often ample and it grows. This urges us to develop an approach that does not take ethnic groups as the primary unit of analysis. We need a more open approach in which other possible axes of differences like age cohorts, changes in gender roles, marriage patterns or generation are also core elements. Not only should we ponder the diversity within groups, but also the differences in institutional arrangements in school, the labour market and child care (preschool). They vary across different contexts and change over time. This brings in the importance of the integration context.

I showed how various axes of difference interact with contextual factors when explaining different pathways of social mobility. People who are upwardly mobile show a lot of similarities across ethnic groups in terms of pathways and mechanisms. Upward mobility is first of all characterised by a favourable school context and parents who provide positive educational support. But this only accounts for part of the difference. The gap with the downwardly mobile group is further widened by the change in gender roles that we see in the highly educated group which results in other choices concerning marriage partners and different decisions about entering the labour market.

The way that axes of difference like gender and education intersect varies not only across ethnic groups but also across contexts. The authors of segmented assimilation theory argue that it is the reception in the country of migration and the background characteristics of the first generation that explain differences in social mobility (upward or downward) more than contextual factors. A comparison across local and national integration contexts puts this in question. In a favourable school context, the attitudes of parents towards schooling are less important than in a school context that is highly dependent on the support of parents. Gender roles change dramatically in a context providing good opportunities for girls to be successful in school. In a negative school environment with few opportunities for girls to be academically successful gender roles hardly change. The pace of social mobility and the pace of change in gender roles are more determined by opportunities or blockades in the context than by ethnic background characteristics. A negative school context will block upward mobility even for those with very supportive parents. And the other way round: a positive school context will give opportunities also to children whose parents are not supportive or cannot give support. Background characteristics only become important when the school system demands certain attitudes or skills of the parents.

In this article, I brought together the intersectional approach in super-diversity theory that promotes looking at multidimensional aspects of agency with insights from the integration context theory which emphasises the importance of institutional arrangements. The next step is to build a more full-fledged explanatory model. While segmented assimilation theory and new assimilation theory have the ambition to be grand theories applicable irrespective of the national contexts, super-
diversity theory, as I re-formulated it in this paper, emphasises the need to look at within-groups differences in relation to differences in the local and national contexts. It promotes studying the interlocking relationship between the impact of different background characteristics and the differences in opportunities that different local and national contexts offer, with the aim to develop an international comparative theory suited to study the new reality of our cities.

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